State v. Terre Haute Brewing Company

• Decision Date: 20 April 1917
• Docket Number: 23,026
• Citation: 115 N.E. 772,186 Ind. 248
• Parties: State of Indiana v. Terre Haute Brewing Company
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

115 N.E. 772

186 Ind. 248

State of Indiana v. Terre Haute Brewing Company

No. 23,026

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 20, 1917

From Sullivan Circuit Court; William H. Bridwell, Judge.

Prosecution by the State of Indiana against the Terre Haute Brewing Company. From a judgment sustaining defendant's motion to quash the indictment, the State appeals.

Affirmed.

Evan B Stotsenburg, Attorney-General, and Wilbur T. Gruber, for the State.

Davis Bogart & Royse, for appellee.

OPINION

Myers, J.

On October 30, 1915, by indictment, appellee was charged with having violated what is known as the "Corrupt Practices Act," as defined by § 7111d Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 489.

Appellee's motion to quash the indictment was sustained, and from a judgment discharging appellee the state appeals. The indictment, in substance, charges that The Terre Haute Brewing Company, a private corporation, did make a contribution of $ 200 to William Murphy Draper to promote the success of a principle to be voted on at a special election commonly called a local option election, held in Curry township, Sullivan county, Indiana, on May 28, 1915, in accordance with the law of the State of Indiana governing such elections.

This indictment was drawn under § 4 of the "Corrupt Practices Act," approved March 3, 1911, as amended in 1913, (§ 3, Acts 1913 p. 489, § 7111d, supra). Appellee insists, as it did in the trial court, that under this section of the act a corporation is not subject to indictment, nor is the alleged offense within the definition of the particular statute. As to whether appellee could be guilty of any offense under this section, we are not concerned. The only question for decision is presented by the indictment and the motion to quash, and the answer depends upon whether or not the legislature in this section has expressly designated the crime for which appellee is indicted, as applicable to corporations, and fixed an appropriate penalty as a punishment.

Since the session of the legislature in 1852, our criminal law is entirely of statutory origin, and a crime may be defined as an act committed or omitted in violation of a penal statute. Section 237 Burns 1914, § 237 R. S. 1881, is still in force, and provides that: "Crimes and misdemeanors shall be defined, and punishment therefor fixed by statutes of this state and not otherwise". In Ledgerwood v. State (1893), 134 Ind. 81, 88, 33 N.E. 631, 633, it is said: "It was not for the purpose of securing a more minute definition of crimes and misdemeanors than the common law afforded, that this provision was added, but it was to get rid of common law offenses entirely by not adopting that part of the common law."

As applied to corporations, the rule in this State is that they may be indicted only when the legislature has specifically so provided. State v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (1864), 23 Ind. 362; Paragon Paper Co. v. State (1897), 19 Ind.App. 314, 49 N.E. 600; State, ex rel. v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co. (1908), 42 Ind.App. 282, 82 N.E. 801, 85 N.E. 724; State v. Sullivan Co. Agr'l Society (1895), 14 Ind.App. 369, 42 N.E. 963. And as a general rule, criminal statutes must be strictly construed to avoid the creation of penalties by construction. Groff v. State (1908), 171 Ind. 547, 85 N.E. 769, 17 Ann. Cas. 133. That part of the statute at all applicable to the questions under consideration reads as follows: "No contributions, payments or favors of any kind shall be made, extended by or solicited from any private corporation to promote the success or defeat of any candidate for public office or of any political party or principle or for any other political purpose whatever."

If there were any...