Groff v. The State
| Decision Date | 14 October 1908 |
| Docket Number | 21,145 |
| Citation | 85 N.E. 769,171 Ind. 547 |
| Parties | Groff v. The State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied January 8, 1909.
From Criminal Court of Marion County (36,246); William Irvin Judge pro tem.
Prosecution by The State of Indiana against Nathan B. Groff. From a judgment of conviction, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
L. D Buenting and M. Y. Campbell, for appellant.
James Bingham, Attorney-General, Henry M. Dowling, A. G. Cavins and E. M. White, for the State.
OPINION
Appellant was found guilty of selling oleomargarine for dairy butter, in violation of the pure food law of 1907 .
The overruling of his motion for a new trial, because the finding by the court was contrary to law and the evidence, is the only error assigned.
The question for decision is: Can a principal be held criminally liable for the sale, by a clerk or agent, of adulterated food, if the sale was made in the absence of the principal, and in violation of his instructions?
The general rule is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed to avoid the creation of penalties by construction, but such reasonable view must be taken of a statute as will effectuate the manifest intent and purpose of the lawmakers. State, ex rel., v. Roby (1895), 142 Ind. 168, 185, 41 N.E. 145; State v. Kelly (1896), 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163; Gillett, Crim. Law (2d ed.), § 20.
It is too obvious for discussion that said pure food statute was enacted as a means of protecting the people against the fraud and imposition of manufacturers and venders of inferior and unwholesome food and medicinal products. The statute is of great public interest, and such interpretation should be given it--if possible, within sound canons of construction--as will secure to the people the benefits intended by the General Assembly.
In the first place, the offense created by the statute belongs to that class in which knowledge, or guilty intent, is immaterial, and need not be shown in order to justify a conviction. It falls under the general rule that statutes which declare the doing of a certain thing shall constitute an offense against the public, without reference to whether done without notice, or with guilty knowledge. In such cases it is the act itself, not the intent, that determines the guilt; the actual harm to the public is the same in one case as in the other.
The distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to human life and health; hence, a dangerous act, and cannot be made innocent and harmless by the want of knowledge or the good faith of the seller. State v. Engle (1901), 156 Ind. 339, 58 N.E. 698; Commonwealth v. Gray (1889), 150 Mass. 327, 329, 23 N.E. 47; State v. Schlenker (1900), 112 Iowa 642, 649, 84 N.W. 698, 51 L.R.A. 347, 84 Am. St. 360; People v. Kibler (1887), 106 N.Y. 321, 12 N.E. 795; People v. Worden Grocer Co. (1898), 118 Mich. 604, 611, 77 N.W. 315; Commonwealth v. Weiss (1891), 139 Pa. 247, 252, 21 A. 10, 11 L.R.A. 530, 23 Am. St. 182; Eagle v. Nowlin (1899), 94 F. 646, 648; State v. Rogers (1901), 95 Me. 94, 102, 49 A. 564, 85 Am. St. 395; Fox v. State (1901), 94 Md. 143, 146, 50 A. 700, 89 Am. St. 419; State v. Ryan (1899), 70 N.H. 196, 46 A. 49, 85 Am. St. 629.
The offense under consideration is thus defined by the statute: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, within this State, to manufacture for sale within this State, offer for sale therein, or sell within this State, any drug or article of food which is adulterated, or misbranded." § 7638, supra. § 7639, supra.
Guilty intent is not an element in the crime, as we have seen; hence, the rule that governs in that large class of offenses, which rests upon criminal intent, has no application here. Cases like this are founded largely upon the principle that he who voluntarily deals in perilous articles must be cautious how he deals.
The sale of oleomargarine in an adulterated form, or as a substitute for butter, is a crime against the public health. Whoever, therefore, engages in its sale, or in the sale of any article interdicted by the law, does so at his peril, and impliedly undertakes to conduct it with whatever degree of care is necessary to secure compliance with the law. He may conduct the business himself, or by clerks or agents, but if he chooses the latter the duty is imposed upon him to see to it that those selected by him to sell the article to the public obey the law in the matter of selling; otherwise, he, as the principal and the responsible proprietor of the business, is liable for the penalty imposed by the statute. We do not believe it was the legislative intent that such proprietor should escape by showing that an unlawful sale made by his clerk was unauthorized. We must take a practical, common-sense view of the whole statute, to give effect to the legislative purpose. To hold that the proprietor should be held liable only when the sale was made in his presence, or with his knowledge or consent, would be to prepare a way of easy escape. When we take into consideration the community of interest of the proprietor and clerk, in a case like this, and that private instructions to a clerk may be given in such a way that there may be more meaning in the manner than in the words spoken, and adding thereto the fact that the modern method of ordering supplies by telephone renders the identification of the seller generally impossible, we are led to the conclusion that to sustain appellant's contention would operate as a virtual overthrow of the statute.
Upon the same subject, it was said by a learned judge in the State of Ohio: Williams v. State (1902), 4 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 193; the same case affirmed, Williams v. State (1904), 69 Ohio St. 570, 70 N.E. 1135.
In construing an act of congress upon the same subject,...
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