State v. Tewell
| Decision Date | 11 April 1983 |
| Citation | 460 N.E.2d 285,9 Ohio App.3d 330,9 OBR 597 |
| Parties | , 9 O.B.R. 597 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. TEWELL, Appellee. * |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A warrant to search a dwelling "and surrounding curtilage" includes the right to search an automobile parked on the driveway next to the residence.
2. The term "surrounding curtilage," when used in a search warrant, includes a driveway which is located adjacent to and used in connection with a dwelling house.
Lee C. Falke, Pros. Atty., and Robert B. Coughlin, Dayton, for appellant.
John H. Rion, Dayton, for appellee.
On April 21, 1982, a search warrant was served upon the defendant, Kenneth G. Tewell, at his residence at 466 Willowhurst Drive, Centerville, Ohio. Specifically, the warrant commanded a search of:
"466 Willowhurst, a white wood frame with brick, single family dwelling with attached one-car garage and an unattached two-car garage and surrounding curtilage."
A search of Tewell's residence produced large quantities of cocaine, and a search of the trunk of Tewell's 1975 Cadillac, which was parked on the driveway about three feet from the residence, produced a substantial amount of hashish.
Subsequently, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the trunk of the Cadillac on the grounds that the search of his automobile was beyond the scope of the search warrant and violated his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Ohio.
On October 6, 1982, the motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the Cadillac automobile was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, and from the judgment so entered, the state has perfected an appeal to this court.
The only issue presented in the appeal is whether a warrant to search a family dwelling "and surrounding curtilage" includes the right to search an automobile parked on the driveway next to the residence.
The word "curtilage" probably carries a more exacting connotation in England, but in this country, the designation, in legal contemplation, has come to mean any number of things. See 10A Words and Phrases 477, Curtilage; 68 American Jurisprudence 2d 676, Searches and Seizures, Section 20. However, in accordance with any and all definitions, and by any reasonable standards anywhere, the "surrounding curtilage" would necessarily include a driveway which is located adjacent to and used in connection with a dwelling house. See Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 346. Hence, Tewell's automobile was located within the curtilage at the time of the search, and this being the case, it was entitled to no more protection than any other chattel on the premises which might have served as an enclosure for the illicit drugs. See State v. Nedeczky (Nov. 18, 1982), Greene App. No. 82-CA-36, unreported.
The Fourth Amendment accommodates people rather than places, and under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the automobile, parked as it was beside the house, was no more private than the implement shed, the dog house, the rabbit hutch, the tool trunk, or any other of a number of chattels which might have served as a hiding place for the objects of the search of the surrounding curtilage.
A number of other jurisdictions have wrestled with problems closely akin to the one presented in the present case, and most have held that motor vehicles are within the scope of a warrant which refers to the "curtilage" or "premises." For example, see State v. Lewis (Minn.1978), 270 N.W.2d 891; United States v. Napoli (C.A.5, 1976), 530 F.2d 1198; certiorari denied (1976), 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 316, 50 L.Ed.2d 287; Brooks v. United States (C.A.5, 1969), 416 F.2d 1044, certiorari denied sub nom. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Jones
...755 (Ky., 1957); State v. Lewis, 270 N.W.2d 891 (Minn., 1978); State v. Reid, 286 N.C. 323, 210 S.E.2d 422 (1974); State v. Tewell, 9 Ohio App.3d 330, 460 N.E.2d 285 (1983) (warrant said "and surrounding curtilage" and car in driveway within curtilage); Leslie v. State, 294 P.2d 854 (Okl.Cr......
-
State v. Ruth Hunt Pitts
...... each of the outbuildings. Under these circumstances, the. officers could reasonably conclude that the camper and. outbuildings were part of the "curtilage" of 2213. 7th Street and therefore within the scope of the search. warrant. See State v. Tewell (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d. 330 (defining "curtilage" as area adjacent and used. in connection with a dwelling house). . . The. appellant alternatively argues that if the search warrant was. meant to encompass the camper and all outbuildings, in. addition to the dwelling house, then ......
-
State v. George Mihalke Iii
...and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. * * *' " State v. Tewell, supra, at 330. the Court of Appeals of Montgomery County has held that a warrant to search a residence and surrounding curtilage extends to any moto......
-
State v. Mitchell, 2007 Ohio 3896 (Ohio App. 8/2/2007)
..."and surrounding curtilage" includes the right to search an automobile parked on the driveway next to the residence. State v. Tewell (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 330, paragraph one of the syllabus. This court has followed the law as set forth by Tewell in State v. Hinson (Sept. 8, 1994), Cuyahoga ......