State v. Tharp
Decision Date | 15 July 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 2-1279A384,2-1279A384 |
Citation | 406 N.E.2d 1242 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert THARP, Morris Walters, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Stephen Goldsmith, Pros. Atty., Larry Sells, Deputy Pros. Atty., Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.
David L. Foutty, Richard J. Hartman, Hartman & Foutty, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee Morris Walters.
The State appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the motion for discharge of appellees Robert Tharp and We affirm.
Morris Walters on the ground that prosecution of all counts of the information against Tharp and Walters was barred because the defendants had not been brought to trial within the time limit prescribed by Ind. Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4. 1
On November 19, 1977, an information was filed against Tharp and Walters charging them with theft. This charge was dismissed by the State on February 3, 1978. On March 8, 1978, an indictment was returned against Tharp and Walters charging them with theft. 2 The indictment was dismissed upon the defendants' motion, subject to the State's right to amend, on April 14, 1978. Apparently, the charges were filed again on July 13, 1978, and dismissed by the State on April 25, 1979. All of these prosecutions charged Tharp and Walters with the November 18, 1977, theft of certain described frozen food products from Mid-West Food Center, Inc.
On April 25, 1979, the State filed an information in three counts. Count I charged Tharp and Walters with conspiracy to commit theft; Count II charged Tharp with theft on November 18, 1977, of the frozen food products from Mid-West Food Center, Inc.; and Count III charged Walters with theft by aiding Tharp in the theft of the frozen food products. Tharp and Walters each filed motions to dismiss which were sustained as to Count I. On July 12, 1979, the State filed an amended Count I which charged that Tharp and Walters "from on or about July 1, 1977 to and including on or about the 18th day of November, A.D. 1977" with conspiring to commit theft of certain described frozen food products from Mid-West Food Center, Inc. This amended Count I charged as overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy the November 18, 1977, theft by Tharp of the same frozen food products, and the aiding of Tharp by Walters in the commission of the same theft. All of the charges have been predicated upon the theft on the same date of the same items from the same place. On August 7, 1979, Walters filed a motion for discharge under C.R.4(C), and Tharp filed a like motion on August 23, 1979. On August 24, 1979, the State filed a motion to amend Count I further by striking the words "with intent to deprive Mid-West Food Center, Inc. of the value and use of said property" from each of the alleged overt acts in Count I. The trial court denied this motion to amend and sustained the motions for discharge.
1. Did the court err in granting the motions for discharge as to the conspiracy charge against the defendants?
2. Did the court err in denying the State's August 24, 1979, motion to amend Count I of the amended information (the conspiracy count)?
The precise question presented by this appeal is whether or not the State of Indiana may prosecute two defendants for conspiracy to commit a crime after prosecution for the substantive offense which was the subject of the conspiracy admittedly is barred by the failure to meet the time requirements of C.R.4(C). 3 The State earnestly contends that because conspiracy to commit theft is not an included offense in a charge of theft and vice versa, prosecution of the conspiracy charge after the running of C.R.4(C) against the theft charge is not precluded. On the other hand, Walters contends 4 that the failure to bring the defendants to trial on the theft charge within the time limit prescribed by C.R.4(C), which failure is conceded by the State, not only required the discharge of the defendants on the theft charge, but also deprived the State of any prosecution growing out of the same set of facts, specifically the conspiracy charge. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we agree with Walters.
We agree that defendants may be charged with a criminal offense and conspiracy to commit that offense and may be convicted and sentenced for both the offense and the conspiracy. Elmore v. State, (1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 893; Collier v. State, (1977) Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 871. We do not agree, however, that these cases give the State a right to prosecute for conspiracy to commit an offense after prosecution for that offense is time-barred under C.R.4.
The State contends the issue before us is controlled by Durke v. State, (1932) 204 Ind. 370, 183 N.E. 97. In Durke, supra, the defendant was charged in separate affidavits with burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary, both charges growing out of the same incident. The burglary charge was dismissed after the State's evidence at the burglary trial failed to identify Durke as one of the parties committing the burglary. Durke argued that, since the two charges grew out of the same transaction, the State had to elect with which charge it would proceed and the State was barred from proceeding with the conspiracy charge by double jeopardy principles. Our Supreme Court rejected such contention holding that the burglary prosecution, regardless of its outcome, would not bar the conspiracy prosecution. However, Durke, supra, does not involve a situation where prosecution of the substantive offense was barred for failure to bring the case to trial within the prescribed time limit of the applicable speedy trial rule. Durke, supra, therefore, is not in point here.
In Pillars v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 390 N.E.2d 679, the defendant was charged on May 17, 1976, with assault with intent to kill. On August 19, 1977, the State filed additional charges of threatening to use a deadly weapon and aiming a weapon. All of these charges involved an assault allegedly made by defendant upon Donald D. Knox by means of aiming and firing a firearm at Knox. The case was not brought to trial until August 22, 1977, more than one year after the filing of the original charge. Pillars had filed a motion for discharge on August 3, 1977, and filed a motion to dismiss the additional charges on August 22, 1977. Judge Staton 5 writing for the Court held that C.R.4 had clearly run against the initial charge of assault with intent to kill, and also against the additional charges in Counts II and III (the threatening to use a deadly weapon and aiming a weapon charges) stating at 390 N.E.2d 684:
In Pillars, supra, this court relied upon Small v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 349, 287 N.E.2d 334, holding that a discharge for failure to prosecute within the prescribed time limit also barred prosecution of any lesser included offense, and upon Johnson v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 164, 313 N.E.2d 535, holding that a motion for discharge of a robbery charge should have been granted and that a motion for a discharge of a subsequent charge of inflicting injury in the commission of a robbery should have been treated as a motion to dismiss and sustained.
In a strikingly similar case, the Supreme Court of Washington held that after prior embezzlement charges against a public officer had been dismissed pursuant to that state's speedy trial rule, subsequent prosecution for falsification of accounts involving the same facts was likewise barred. State v. McNeil, (1978) 20 Wash.App. 527, 582 P.2d 524. That court relied strongly upon the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1968). The court said at 582 P.2d 528:
It is clear that the conspiracy charge here could have been joined with the theft charge under our statute pertaining to joinder of offenses. IC 35-3.1-1-9(a)(2). Further, it is inconceivable that a prosecutor having sufficient knowledge and information to charge two persons with theft, would not at the same time, and as a result of the same information, have knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy by them to commit the theft.
In a very recent case the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a conviction for robbery prior to the...
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