State v. The Glucose Sugar Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1902
• Citation: 91 N.W. 794,117 Iowa 524
• Parties: THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. THE GLUCOSE SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 N.W. 794

117 Iowa 524

THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. THE GLUCOSE SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 11, 1902

Appeal from Tama District Court.--HON. G. W. BURNHAM, Judge.

INDICTMENT charging defendant with the commission of a nuisance. Verdict of guilty. Judgment on verdict, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Wm. D Barge and Struble & Stiger for appellant.

Chas W. Mullan, Attorney General, and Chas. A. Van Vleck Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

The defendant is the owner of glucose works at Marshalltown, in Marshall county, Iowa. Certain refuse matter and washings from these works, including more or less of various chemicals used in the production of the goods there manufactured, are discharged into a sewer, the flow from which empties directly or indirectly into the Iowa river. From the point of this discharge the river flows in a south-easterly direction through Tama county. The indictment alleges that the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and that the substance or materials discharged by defendant into the river, as already stated, have caused the waters of said stream within Tama county to become corrupt, impure, and unwholesome, to the prejudice of the citizens of said county, and especially to certain named citizens engaged in operating paper mills on said river at the city of Tama. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

I. The first proposition in appellant's argument is that the verdict is without sufficient support in the evidence. The point is not well made. It is true there was testimony tending to show that at or about the time it is claimed the river in Tama county was most unclean and offensive somewhat similar conditions prevailed at several points in the same stream above the defendant's works. It was, of course, a legitimate argument to the jury that such facts if established, tend to weaken the state's claim that the foulness of the water below the mouth of the defendant's sewer was caused by the discharge therefrom, but it was for the jury to say how much weight and influence such showing should be allowed in reaching their verdict. It might easily happen that the water above the works was foul, and yet be true that the foulness below the works of which the state complains was caused by the discharge from appellant's sewer. That the discharge from the sewer was as "rank" as Richard's "offense" is abundantly shown. It is also shown that the river below the sewer became foul, emitted sickening odors, left a sticky gelatinous deposit on the stones and substances immersed in it, and clogged and interfered with the working of the paper mills at Tama. Fish inhabiting the waters died in large numbers, and the stench of their decomposition was mingled with the odors arising from the unclean waters. Various witnesses testified that such conditions were unknown before the establishment of the defendant's works. A chemical analysis of water taken from above the mouth of the sewer, from the sewer itself, and from the stream below its mouth, makes it perfectly plain that the tendency of the discharge must have been to befoul the river to a material degree, and whether the impurity which was apparent at the city of Tama was attributable to this source was, as we have already said, for the jury alone to pass upon under all the evidence, and it is putting it very mildly to say that in this respect the verdict has support in the record.

II. It is next said there was no showing that the offense, if any was triable in Tama county. The argument upon which this claim is based is that the place where the contents of the defendant's sewer are discharging into the river is in Marshall county; and, while there is evidence tending to show that such discharge was very impure, and tended to corrupt the river at this point, counsel say that "no witness testified to anything from which one could, by any warrant of law, conclude that this substance flowed into Tama county." We think, however, that there is sufficient warrant for the assumption that the ordinary law of gravitation is in full force in both counties, and that water at the mouth of the sewer, whether foul or pure, finds its way down stream without regard to county lines. It is true that in its movement down the current the impurities may be deposited, or become diluted and disappear, before leaving Marshall county; but it certainly cannot be required that the state shall produce witnesses who are able to say they have traced, step by step, the impure substances, from the point of their discharge all the way from the mouth of the sewer to the county where the indictment is found. If A, standing upon one side of the county line, is seen to fire a gun at B, standing upon the other side of the boundary, and the latter falls dead of a bullet wound, the conclusion that the fatal bullet proceeded from A's gun is a mere inference, for no one saw its flight. So, if A corrupts the water of a river at a certain point in its course, and such act is followed by the appearance of a similar corruption of the stream immediately below him, the inference that the latter is the result of the former is but little less conclusive than in our first illustration. Counsel are correct, doubtless, in saying that, if the evidence of the state is to be believed, the defendant created a nuisance in Marshall county, and the court of that county had full jurisdiction to entertain an indictment for such offense. It does not follow, however, that the existence of jurisdiction of such offense in Marshall county precludes jurisdiction in Tama county for the nuisance there created. If it be true that defendant corrupted the river in the former county, and by the natural movement of the current the foul matter was carried into the latter county, rendering the water there impure, to the discomfort and injury of its citizens, no ingenuity of argument can do away with the patent fact that a nuisance has been created in Tama county; and, although the act which brings about this result was committed in Marshall county alone, it comes clearly within the statute (Code, section 5157) which provides that: "When a public offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another or when the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, jurisdiction is in either county except as otherwise provided by law." That such is the...