State v. Thoma, s. C8-97-465

• Decision Date: 16 September 1997
• Docket Number: CX-97-466,CX-97-564 and C6-97-710,Nos. C8-97-465,C1-97-467,s. C8-97-465
• Citation: 569 N.W.2d 205
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Debra Jeanette THOMA, Christine DeShawn Vasser, Marnie Marie Denn, Olga Engelhardt Davis, Respondents. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Rachel Marie LANNON, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 205

569 N.W.2d 205

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Debra Jeanette THOMA, Christine DeShawn Vasser, Marnie Marie

Denn, Olga Engelhardt Davis, Respondents.

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Rachel Marie LANNON, Respondent.

Nos. C8-97-465, CX-97-466, C1-97-467, CX-97-564 and C6-97-710.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Sept. 16, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A stay of adjudication is a "pretrial order" that the state may appeal even in nonfelony prosecutions.

2. A stay of adjudication must be supported by "special circumstances" making it a clear abuse of discretion for the prosecution to charge the offense as it did.

3. Neither mitigating circumstances that may justify lenient sentencing nor collateral consequences that affect many offenders constitute "special circumstances" supporting a stay of adjudication.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, St. Paul, for appellants.

Martin J. Costello, Hughes & Costello, St. Paul, for appellant State in C8-97-465, CX-97-466, C1-97-467, and CX-97-564.

Kari A. Lindstrom, Scott Joint Prosecution Association, Shakopee, for appellant State in C6-97-710.

Arlene M. Asencio Perkkio, St. Paul, for respondent Thoma.

Leslie J. Rosenberg, Special Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondents Vasser, Denn and Lannon.

Stephen N. Sage, Mark Labine, St. Paul, for respondent Davis.

Considered and decided by TOUSSAINT, C.J., and RANDALL, NORTON, SCHUMACHER, HARTEN and WILLIS, JJ., and FOLEY, J. ^*

OPINION

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

These prosecution appeals from misdemeanor and petty misdemeanor stays of adjudication have been combined for purposes of considering the jurisdictional issue of the appealability of nonfelony stays of adjudication. Respondent Rachel Marie Lannon pleaded guilty, and had adjudication stayed, on underage drinking and driving. Minn.Stat. § 169.1218 (1996). The other four defendants pleaded guilty to certified petty misdemeanor theft. Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(5)(1996). We accept jurisdiction, reverse, and remand.

FACTS

Respondent Debra Jeannette Thoma was charged with changing the price tags on fruit and vegetable trays at a supermarket, resulting in her bill being understated by $12.37. At her arraignment, Thoma's attorney noted that she had serious medical problems and that it had been a traumatic experience for her. The court, after taking Thoma's plea of guilty, stayed adjudication, stating that it would give Thoma a chance to keep the offense off her record. When the prosecutor objected to the stay of adjudication, the court stated that it had a policy of staying adjudication on petty misdemeanor thefts of food or similar items with minimal monetary value.

Respondent Christine DeShawn Vasser was charged with shoplifting $100.37 worth of Similac and other infant care items from a supermarket. At Vasser's arraignment, defense counsel noted that Vasser had a child and that infant formula was expensive. The trial court accepted her guilty plea and stayed adjudication, giving Vasser "credit for the fact that you have a young child and are not working, and the items related to the child directly."

Respondent Marnie Marie Denn was charged with shoplifting two items with a total value of $13.06 from a supermarket. The trial court accepted Denn's guilty plea and stayed adjudication without giving any reasons, but apparently based on the policy noted in the case of respondent Thoma, who was arraigned on the same day in the same court and also given a stay of adjudication.

Respondent Olga Engelhardt Davis was charged with shoplifting $7.73 worth of coffee and other merchandise. At Davis's arraignment, the court noted that Davis, who was 68 years old, had a clean record, that the theft involved a minimal amount, and that it seemed to be an isolated incident. The court also noted that there was no pretrial diversion for this type of offense and stated that even a petty misdemeanor could show up on Davis's record. The court accepted Davis's guilty plea and stayed adjudication.

Respondent Rachel Lannon was charged with underage drinking and driving, a misdemeanor offense for which a conviction must be reported to the commissioner of public safety for suspension of the offender's driver's license. Minn.Stat. § 169.1218(b) (1996). At arraignment, Lannon decided to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement that there would be no executed jail time. The trial court questioned Lannon, eliciting her need to be licensed in order to drive to school. The trial court stayed adjudication for 90 days, requiring that Lannon pay $50 for the costs of prosecution and comply with other conditions. The court explained that it felt it was not in the public interest that Lannon lose her driver's license, which she needed to drive to school, and therefore adjudication should be stayed.

ISSUES

1. Does the state have a right of appeal from nonfelony stays of adjudication?

2. Were there "special circumstances" supporting stays of adjudication in these cases?

ANALYSIS

1. The supreme court has held that the trial court has "inherent judicial power" to stay adjudication if "special circumstances" exist warranting this "unusual judicial measure[ ]." State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996). Krotzer involved a felony charge of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The issue of stays of adjudication also has arisen in nonfelony cases. In an appeal from a stay of adjudication in a misdemeanor assault prosecution, the supreme court later clarified that a stay of adjudication should be used only "sparingly "

and only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.

State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn.1996) (emphasis in original).

The jurisdictional question has arisen in these and other cases as to whether the state has a right to appeal a nonfelony stay of adjudication. The state may appeal a sentence only in a felony case. Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(2). The prosecution, however, may appeal

in any case, from any pretrial order of the trial court except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense or an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 631.21 * * *

Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1). The state argues that stays of adjudication are pretrial orders. Respondents contend they are sentences, appealable only in felony cases.

A stay of adjudication is intended to avoid the necessity of trial. The state, however, may appeal, as "pretrial orders," various orders that would avoid trial by dismissing the prosecution. See State v. Kiminski, 474 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn.App.1991) (dismissal of complaint based solely on question of law is appealable), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1991). This court has considered an appeal from an order allowing the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense, over the state's objection, a circumstance analogous to a Krotzer stay of adjudication. State v. Favre, 428 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.App.1988). Favre does not discuss the jurisdictional basis for the appeal, nor does it note any jurisdictional problem. See Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975) (appellate court's duty to determine jurisdiction sua sponte); cf. Chapman v. Dorsey 230 Minn. 279, 288, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1950) (appeals decided on the merits that do not address issue of appellate jurisdiction are not precedential authority on jurisdiction).

The supreme court in Krotzer held that the trial court may impose conditions of probation, including probationary jail time, as part of a stay of adjudication. 548 N.W.2d at 256. The inclusion of criminal sanctions, however, does not make a stay of adjudication a "sentence." First, a sentence constitutes a final judgment, or adjudication, of conviction. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1) (judgment of conviction is considered final upon sentencing). Under Krotzer, however, the court stays any adjudication if it finds special circumstances.

Second, it is the legislature's prerogative to define the punishment for the offense. See e.g. State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578 580 (Minn.1978) (legislature has power to define punishment for offense, and court is merely the executor of that power). The supreme court in Krotzer conceded there was no statutory authority for stays of adjudication, [if the stays are considered as sentencing dispositions]. 548 N.W.2d at 254. The court in Krotzer relied primarily on the trial court's power to dismiss criminal charges to support the inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication. Id. at 255. The stay of adjudication functions in effect as a continuance for dismissal, which can fairly be characterized as a "pretrial order."

We conclude that the state may appeal, as "pretrial orders," stays of adjudication in nonfelony cases. We note that the supreme court has granted further review of several nonfelony stays of adjudication. See State v. Cash, 558 N.W.2d 735 (Minn.1997) (supreme court considered propriety of stays of adjudication in misdemeanor driving while intoxicated cases); Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 540 (supreme court considered propriety of status of adjudication in misdemeanor assault case).

2. The state argues that there are no "special circumstances" in these cases to support stays of adjudication. Respondents argue that this court should apply a deferential standard of review and affirm the trial court orders.

The supreme court in Krotzer and succeeding cases has not suggested what standard of review should be applied to stays of adjudication. Respondent Lannon argues that the clear abuse of discretion standard for review of sentencing departures should be applied. But we have held that a stay of adjudication is not a "sentence." Moreover, sentencing departures are not "unusual judicial measures," as are stays of adjudication. See generally State v. Best, 449...