State v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 13 December 1930
• Docket Number: 13039.
• Citation: 156 S.E. 169,159 S.C. 76
• Parties: STATE v. THOMAS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

156 S.E. 169

159 S.C. 76

STATE v. THOMAS.

No. 13039.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 13, 1930

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Anderson County; John S. Wilson, Judge.

James R. Thomas was convicted of murder, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Blythe & Bonham, of Greenville, and H. C. Miller, of Anderson, for appellant.

L. W Harris and T. Frank Watkins, both of Anderson, for the State.

STABLER J.

The defendant, James R. Thomas, a resident of Honea Path, was charged with poisoning and drowning one Maxie Thomas. The deceased, at the time of his death, was about fifteen years of age. When only three months old, he was taken into the home of the defendant, his reputed father, with whom he lived thereafter until his death. It appears that Thomas was fond of fishing, and often took Maxie with him on his trips. On the morning of July 30, 1929, they went together to the Saluda river, about four or five miles from Honea Path, in a Ford automobile driven by Maxie, to visit the fishing lines which they had set the afternoon before. Some time later in the morning, between 9 [159 S.C. 79] and 10 o'clock, the defendant gave out the alarm that Maxie had fallen into the river and had been drowned. Subsequently, the stomach of the dead boy was removed and sent to Clemson College for analysis. The chemist who made the analysis testified at the inquest that he had found strychnine and brucine in the stomach, and that these were poisonous drugs and would kill if taken in sufficient quantities. The defendant was afterward indicted and tried for murder; the theory of the state being that Thomas administered the strychnine to the boy, and that, when it began to take effect, he threw him into the river, and that he died as a result of the concurring effects of the poison and strangulation by water. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty, on the ground that the corpus delicti had not been proved. This motion was overruled, and he was found guilty of murder, with recommendation to the mercy of the court. The case now comes here on appeal.

We shall not discuss the numerous exceptions seriatim. The questions they raise may be thus stated: (1) Error in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty; (2) error in the admission of evidence; (3) error in the exclusion of evidence; (4) error in denying to the defendant the right to inspect the chemist's report. These we shall consider in order.

I. Did the court err in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict? "The corpus delicti, in a case of murder, consists of two elements,--the death of a human being, and the criminal act of another in causing that death" (State v. Martin, 47 S.C. 67, 25 S.E 113, 115); and, in order to authorize a conviction, the state must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, which may be done by circumstantial evidence (State v Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 571, 114 Am. St. Rep. 95, 6 Ann. Cas. 993). But, if there is no proof of the corpus delicti, the defendant is entitled as a matter of law, to a directed verdict. State v. Brown. 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21, L. R. A. 1916D, 1295.

Under the view taken by the court, that there must be a new trial, we do not deem it proper to discuss the testimony. It is sufficient to say that we have carefully read the record, consisting of more than seven hundred typewritten pages, and find some evidence in proof of the facts that form the basis of the corpus delicti which warranted the trial judge in refusing the motion for a directed verdict. The sufficiency of the evidence was a question for the jury under proper instructions from the court. State v. Brown, supra. This assignment of error must therefore be overruled.

II. Was there error in the admission of testimony? The court permitted the state to introduce in evidence, for the purpose of proving motive on the part of the defendant, certain applications for insurance--with the defendant as beneficiary--upon the life of the deceased, some of which had been accepted by the insurance companies and policies issued thereon, while others had been declined.

The defendant objected to the admission of these applications on the ground that they were not the best evidence and were irrelevant, contending that, in so far as the insurance was concerned, motive could be established only by competent evidence of a valid contract of insurance in force on the life of the boy at the time of his death and payable to the defendant in case of his death--that certainly those applications which had been declined by the insurance companies, and upon which no insurance had been issued, were clearly irrelevant, and their introduction in evidence tended to prejudice the defendant's case.

"The rule that evidence tending to show motive or absence of motive on the part of accused is relevant and admissible, and that a wide latitude in the admission of this kind of evidence is permissible, are particularly applicable *** in cases of circumstantial evidence, motive being a circumstance bearing on the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime." 16 C.J. 547.

The fact that the defendant was carrying heavy insurance on the life of the deceased was clearly relevant on the question of motive. As to the competency of the evidence offered to prove that fact: The defendant himself, on direct examination, testified that at the time of the boy's death he was carrying insurance upon the life of the deceased, with himself as beneficiary, amounting to more than $20,000 in case death should result from accident or violence. If the introduction of the applications on which this insurance was issued was error, it was cured by this testimony. As to the applications which were refused and on which no policies were issued, we think they were admissible as bearing on defendant's motive sought to be shown, in that they tended to show that he tried to obtain an even greater amount of insurance on the life of the deceased than that which he actually procured.

When D. L. Stalcup, a witness for the state, was on the stand, he testified that he was overseer of the spinning department of the Chiquola Manufacturing Company, and that for some months prior to the death of Maxie both the deceased and the defendant worked in the mill, but irregularly. Counsel for the defendant suggested to the court that they did not see the relevancy of this testimony, as the defendant was not on trial for vagrancy. Even if counsel's suggestion should be regarded as an objection to the testimony, it does not appear that the court made any ruling, and no question is presented to this court for consideration. Moreover, we cannot see how the defendant was prejudiced in any way by the testimony.

On cross-examination of the defendant, the solicitor asked him what the premiums on the insurance he carried on Maxie's life amounted to yearly, and he replied, "Three hundred and some-thing dollars a year." He was then asked whether he had not given one Will Hayes a bad check that he had been unable to pay, the object of the question being, as stated by the solicitor, to show that the defendant had no money at that time with which to pay the premiums on the heavy insurance he was carrying on Maxie's life. This was objected to by the defendant. The court made no ruling on the objection, but stated to the solicitor that he could get the information...