State v. Thomas
| Citation | 138 N.W. 864,158 Iowa 687 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. EVAN THOMAS, Appellant |
| Decision Date | 11 December 1912 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Page District Court.--HON. O. D. WHEELER, Judge.
THE defendant was convicted upon a charge of seduction, and appeals.
Affirmed.
T. S Stevens and Parslow & Peters, for appellant.
Geo Cosson, Attorney-General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
The defendant was indicted upon the charge of seducing one Lizzie Baetge, and in support of his appeal for a reversal of the judgment entered against him makes the following points:
I. In the examination of the complaining witness, she had said, in substance that she would have yielded to plaintiff's solicitation for intercourse even if he had not promised to marry her, but in further testifying, and in response to a direct question by the county attorney, she was permitted over defendant's objection, to say that she did not yield until there was a promise of marriage. Error is assigned on the ground that such testimony was elicited by leading interrogatories by the prosecutor. The inquiry, as shown by the record, was undoubtedly leading, but we do not think there was reversible error in allowing it. Very few cases will be found where judgment has been reversed upon the single ground that the trial court improperly permitted counsel to put leading questions to a witness. It is safe to say that this is never done except in a very clear case of abuse of discretion by the trial court. It often happens because of the embarrassment or reticence or dullness of a witness, and especially in this class of cases, that direct and leading questions are necessary in order to elicit the information which such witness is able or believed to be able to give. The trial court is in a position to observe and know the circumstances as we cannot, and the presumption of judicial fairness and proper discretion will prevail unless there is a manifest showing to the contrary. The record before us is not of that character, and the objection must be overruled. The rule here applied is too familiar to require a citation of authorities.
II. One Spring, who had testified in the case on a former hearing, could not be produced on the last trial below, and, on the call of the defendant, the shorthand reporter took the stand and read to the jury from his notes of a former trial a part of Spring's testimony. On the demand of the state, and over defendant's objection, the reporter was allowed to read the remainder of this witness' examination to the jury, and to this exception is taken. We think the ruling was correct. The law applicable in such case is akin to that which permits a party against whom part of a conversation is given in evidence to have the remainder thereof admitted. No authority holding otherwise is called to our attention. We have examined the evidence of this witness as it is found in the record, and no material part of it seems to be so foreign to the matter called out by the defendant himself as to give him any just ground of complaint because of its introduction.
III. It is argued that there is no sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the complaining witness to justify submitting the question to the jury. While the corroboration is not overwhelming, we think it is sufficient. Corroboration in nearly all cases of this character is of necessity circumstantial only. In this case the witness is supported in her claim that, at or about the time of the alleged offense, defendant waited upon her, was frequently in her company, attended her, and was upon the streets and other places together with her at night. When the complaining witness was found to be pregnant, and her friends called upon the defendant with reference to her claim that he was the author of her shame, he said he was not trying to get away and would make it right, or that he "aimed to make it right." Corroboration of the character we have above described was held by this court sufficient to take the case to the jury in State v. Smith, 84 Iowa 522, 51 N.W. 24; State v. McClintic, 73 Iowa 663, 35 N.W. 696; State v. Wells, 48 Iowa 671. It may also here be said that for reasons already stated, defendant's claim that upon the whole case the testimony is insufficient to sustain the verdict cannot be upheld.
IV. The next point and the one on which counsel most vigorously contend for a reversal has reference to a somewhat singular episode attending the submission of the case. It appeared in evidence that the complaining witness gave birth to a child on August 29, 1910. According to her story, her pregnancy resulted from intercourse with defendant which occurred first on November 14, 1909, and was repeated at various times after that date. On the part of the defendant, it was claimed that on the evening of November 26, 1909, a date substantially nine months before the birth of her child, the complaining witness attended a "box social" at a local schoolhouse in company with another young man, one Brokaw and that they went away from the schoolhouse together and alone. Their presence at the box social was testified to by several witnesses, as was the fact that about the same time Brokaw had accompanied the girl to one or more other entertainments. To fix...
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