State v. Thomas

Decision Date21 December 2011
Docket NumberSept. Term,No. 1242,2011.,1242
Citation33 A.3d 494,202 Md.App. 545
PartiesSTATE of Maryland v. Konnyack A. THOMAS.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Carrie J. Williams (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Ben Miller (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: MEREDITH, GRAEFF and WATTS, JJ.

GRAEFF, J.

This appeal involves the State's challenge to the ruling of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County suppressing a statement that Konnyack Thomas, appellee, made to the police. The appeal was brought by the State pursuant to Md.Code (2006 Repl.Vol.) § 12–302(c)(3)(i) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.P.”), which requires us to render our decision within 120 days of the filing of the record in this Court. The record was filed on September 6, 2011; therefore, our decision must be rendered by January 4, 2012.

Two issues have been presented for our review,1 which we have rephrased as follows:

1. Did the circuit court err in granting appellee's motion to suppress the statement he made to the police on the ground that appellee was in custody when he made the statement and was not given Miranda2 warnings?

2. Should appellee's statements be suppressed because they were made in reliance on a promise to help his daughter, rendering the statements involuntary pursuant to Maryland law?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court on the custody issue. We will not review the claim regarding the voluntariness of the statements based on the record before us.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2010, appellee was charged by indictment with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense. On June 28, 2011, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County held a hearing on appellee's motion to suppress his statements to the police, which defense counsel explained was “based on the failure to give Miranda and based on there being inducements by the police.” Defense counsel introduced into evidence, as Defense Exhibit 1, a transcript of appellee's August 31, 2010, statement to the police. Detective Kristie Thorpe, a member of the Montgomery County Police Department, Family Crimes Division, and appellee testified at the hearing.

Appellee, a sergeant in the United States Army, testified that a detective contacted him on August 31, 2010, and asked: [C]an I come down to the station, it has to do with one of my children.” Appellee agreed and drove himself to the police station. He initially believed that he was going to the station to discuss a problem with his teenage stepson, who recently had run away from home. While driving to the station, however, appellee spoke with his wife on his cell phone. She told him that she and his then 14–year–old daughter, C., had told the police that appellee had sexually abused C.3

Appellee arrived at the police station approximately one hour after he received the detective's call. Detective Thorpe and Detective Errol Birch, who both were unarmed and dressed in plain clothes, met appellee in the station lobby. The officers asked appellee to speak with them and led him to a child interview room. They went through a locked door that requires an access card to open, and once through that door, “the interview rooms are right there.” There was no discussion, other than small talk or “introductions,” before entering the interview room.

Detective Thorpe described the interview room as “a small room,” with “teddy bears along the wall [in] a bookcase ... [a] couch in the center and ... two chairs that are on both sides of the door.” Appellee sat on the couch, and the officers sat on the two chairs, between appellee and the door. Detective Thorpe initially testified that she told appellee that the door was unlocked, and he could leave if he wanted to leave. After reviewing a transcript of the interview, Detective Thorpe testified that she did not tell appellee that he could leave, but she told him that he was not under arrest and the door was not locked.

Appellee appeared to understand everything that she was saying. The interview lasted approximately an hour and a half, and appellee never said that he did not want to speak to the officers or that he wanted to exit the room. Detective Thorpe testified that she did not make any threats or promises “about giving him things or ... something [would] go easier for him if he talked to” her.

When Detective Thorpe began talking with appellee that night, she did not intend to place him under arrest. Her intentions changed [t]oward the end of the interview when [she] asked [appellee] how was he feeling and how was he coping with things and he made statements indicating he wasn't doing well and he wasn't coping well,” at which point she “became concerned about his safety.”

Appellee testified that, during the interview, he believed “that I wasn't leaving that place, that I was there, you know, to be arrested for these accusations.” Appellee's counsel then referred to a portion of the transcript, which counsel characterized as “the detective said that you should talk to them so they could take care of [C.], that she needed some help.” Counsel then quoted from the transcript where Detective Thorpe said: “Right now we want to get [C.] any type of services she can get that will assist her in getting through this.” Appellee responded in the affirmative when counsel asked: “Do you recall that the detective said that she would speak to the Army regarding your cooperation with them and in getting continued support for the family?” Appellee testified that he relied on “the promises to, that the officers would speak to the Army,” stating: [T]hem sitting there saying that my daughter needed assistance, my daughter needs help, I just told them what, what they, I guess they wanted to hear ... in order to help my daughter.”

On cross-examination, appellee admitted that the detectives never raised their voices during the interview. The following colloquy then occurred:

[Prosecutor]: On the phone with Detective Thomas, she never promised you that if you came in and talked to them things would go easy for you, right?

[Appellee]: No.

[Prosecutor]: And she never told you if you came in and talked to them, you would never be arrested?

[Appellee]: No.

[Prosecutor]: And she never told you if you came in and talked to them, then your daughter would get services?

[Appellee]: No.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. And Detective Thorpe and Detective Birch, they never had any kinds of conversations with you out in the lobby area about any of that, right?

[Appellee]: No.

The court then asked appellee: “What did you think was going to happen after you went into the interview room?” Appellee responded: “I was assuming that I was going to be arrested for these accusations.” When asked when he began to believe that, appellee responded: “After my conversation with my wife.” The court asked if appellee felt that he “could just get up and walk out.” Appellee responded: “No, I did not, Your Honor.”

Defense counsel argued that appellee was in custody during the interview, which required that the police advise him regarding his Miranda rights. He asserted that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances, i.e., where he had been accused of molesting his daughter, and he was placed in a closed room with two detectives, after being led through a locked door which required a key card.

The court, referencing the transcript of the interview, asked the State why Miranda warnings were not given “after Page 10,” when appellee admitted to engaging in vaginal intercourse with his daughter. The court stated that, “up to Page 10 it's good detective work,” but it questioned whether, once appellee admitted he “had sex with a minor,” he was free to leave.

The State noted that the police advised appellee that, although he might be arrested “at some point,” he was “not going to go to jail tonight.” 4 It pointed out that appellee was left alone to write a letter to his daughter, and he was permitted to use the restroom by himself while the police were out of the room. The prosecutor asserted that a review of the videotape would be helpful, as opposed to merely reading the transcript, because the words “do not accurately convey the feeling in the room,” which the prosecutor characterized as “like a confessional,” with appellee “decid[ing] to unburden himself.”

The court then asked the State to address the parts of the transcript where the detective said they “just want to help [C.].” The State argued that the officer's statements were “in response to a direct question by the defendant.” The State quoted from the transcript, noting appellee's concern about “the next step,” and “that [C.] is safe and that she's taken care of ... financially.” The prosecutor quoted Detective Thorpe's statement: “Your first question was about your family. Right now we want to get [C.] any type of services that she can have,” and she argued that the statement about services for C. was “in direct response to the defendant's inquiry about what happens next.”

Defense counsel then presented his argument that the statement was involuntary. He argued that appellee's statements were inadmissible because they were the product of a promise to assist appellee's daughter.

The prosecutor then played the video recording of the interview. 5 The two detectives began speaking with appellee at approximately 7:14 p.m. The interview began with Detective Thorpe saying: “Sit on the couch. Thank you for coming in. It looks like we caught you coming in from work.” 6 The detectives then asked about appellee's name, address, telephone numbers, and date of employment. The following then took place:

Detective Thorpe: Okay. Do you have any idea why you're here today?

[Appellee]: I know why I'm here.

Detective Thorpe: Okay....

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • Thomas v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • October 26, 2012
    ...Article of the Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.),2 and the Court of Special Appeals reversed in a reported opinion, State v. Thomas, 202 Md.App. 545, 33 A.3d 494 (2011), because they determined that Thomas was not in custody at the time he gave the statements at issue.3 We granted Thomas......
  • Mills v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • December 13, 2022
    ...379 Wis.2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, 698 (2018) ; State v. Edwards , 299 Conn. 419, 11 A.3d 116, 125 (2011) ; State v. Thomas , 202 Md.App. 545, 33 A.3d 494, 512-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011), aff'd , 429 Md. 246, 55 A.3d 680 (2012) ; Muntean , 12 A.3d at 529 ; State v. Oney , 187 Vt. 56, 989 A.2......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 27, 2017
    ...circumstances preceding the interview weigh against a finding of custody.Id . at 262, 55 A.3d at 690 (quoting State v. Thomas , 202 Md.App. 545, 570, 33 A.3d 494, 509 (2011) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court ultimately affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' determination that......
  • Paige v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • November 30, 2015
    ...the benefit of Miranda warnings, the defendant must establish two things: (1) custody; and (2) interrogation." State v. Thomas, 202 Md.App. 545, 565, 33 A.3d 494 (2011) (citation omitted), aff'd, 429 Md. 246, 55 A.3d 680 (2012). Accord Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 518, 974 A.2d 991 (200......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT