State v. Thomas, 19986
| Decision Date | 01 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 19986,19986 |
| Citation | 213 S.E.2d 452,264 S.C. 159 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. McKinley Mack THOMAS, Appellant. |
Costa Pleicones and P. Lewis Pitts, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Deputy Atty. Gen., C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr., and Staff Attys. Joseph R. Barker and Kenneth P. Woodington, Columbia, for respondent.
McKinley Mack Thomas, the appellant herein, along with Theodore Byrd and Dennis Wilson, was indicted by the grand jury of Kershaw County and charged with the crimes of murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, two counts of armed robbery, grand larceny, breaking and entering a motor vehicle with intent to steal and unlawful possession of a pistol. A change of venue was granted from Kershaw County to Richland County. Theodore Byrd entered a plea of guilty to all charges and was duly sentenced. Thereafter, the appellant and Dennis Wilson pled not guilty and were tried at the 1974 June Term of the Court of General Sessions for Richland County. The appellant was acquitted on all charges except the two counts of armed robbery and the unlawful possession of a pistol. Following his conviction the appellant was duly sentenced. This appeal followed.
It is admitted that on February 21, 1974, at about 11:00 A.M., the appellant and his co-defendants were hitch-hiking on Interstate Highway 20 in Kershaw County when they were stopped by two deputy sheriffs. All three defendants were carrying pistols and while being questioned by the officers these pistols were drawn, with Byrd killing one of the deputies and wounding the other.
At the trial it was the contention of the appellant that, although he was present during the homicide, he was not involved in that crime or any other except the unlawful possession of a pistol.
The transcript of record in this case does not contain the testimony offered by the State but only that given by the appellant and Dennis Wilson. The appellant has not, by any exception, questioned the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant his conviction. The only exception of the appellant alleges error on the part of the trial judge in allowing the State to elicit, over his objection, testimony which linked him to previous unconnected offenses including the murder of a police officer, the error being that such testimony was not relevant and was introduced solely for prejudicial effect.
It is argued that during the cross-examination by the solicitor Thomas was subjected to questioning regarding his involvement in two prior unconnected crimes with which he had been charged. The record does not substantiate this argument. The appellant testified that he, along with his co-defendants the night prior to the killing of the deputy sheriff, was riding around Columbia in an automobile owned by Byrd and that about 2:00 A.M. they went to a trailer for the purpose of spending the rest of the night, parking Byrd's car in front of the trailer. At about 2:30 A.M. Byrd woke the appellant and Wilson and told them the police were out front and at that time all three ran out the back door of the trailer, jumped two fences and got on Interstate Highway 20, walking towards Camden. The appellant was cross-examined and was permitted, over objection, to answer the question as to why they did not drive away in Byrd's car, to which he answered, 'Because of a crime Byrd had committed'. The appellant on cross-examination also testified, without any objection being made thereto, that he knew the police were looking for him and his co-defendants. It thus appears that the appellant was not cross-examined by the solicitor regarding his involvement in two prior unconnected crimes.
The defendant Dennis Wilson, testifying in his own behalf and being examined by his counsel, who was other than the counsel for the appellant, testified without objection that as they were walking along Interstate Highway 20 two policemen traveling in a police car passed them and turned around and came back to where the three of them were. He testified that the officers asked where they were going, to which he replied they were going to Camden. He admitted in response to the officer's question that they had no identification upon their persons. He testified that the officers said they were going to have to take the three into custody because of a robbery that had occurred the day before. He further testified that shortly after Byrd shot the officers that he said 'They don't want you and McKinley, I'm the one they are after.'
This witness testified that he fled the scene of the crime and went to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he surrendered to the officers, ascribing that his reason for flight was because he was with Byrd at the time a crime was committed.
When Wilson was cross-examined by the solicitor, he testified that he along with the appellant and Byrd, just prior to going to the trailer, had been on Lady Street and in Forest Acres in Columbia. We quote the following from the cross-examination of Wilson:
'A. McKinley Thomas and Byrd.
'
At this point counsel for Wilson objected to the foregoing testimony. There was no objection made in behalf of the appellant. The solicitor was then permitted to continue his cross-examination as follows:
At this point counsel for Wilson objected on the ground that this is not an issue before the court. Counsel for the appellant then stated, 'We are going to join in that on behalf of McKinley Thomas.' This motion was overruled. The cross-examination continued as follows:
It is the contention of the appellant that it was error for the court to allow the solicitor to cross-examine the defendant Wilson as to the appellant's participation in the breaking into of the building on Lady Street. The appellant made no objection to this testimony given at the trial; hence, this question cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Laster, 261 S.C. 521, 201 S.E.2d 241, and State v. Griffin, 262 S.C. 447, 205 S.E.2d 186.
The appellant also alleges error on the part of the trial judge in permitting the solicitor to ask the defendant Wilson whether or not 'Byrd did something terrible' when stopped by a policeman in Forest Acres. The affirmative answer to this question did not connect the appellant with another crime of show that Byrd had in fact committed another crime.
The general rule is that evidence that the accused has committed another crime...
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State v. Blackburn
...evidence is inadmissible, a well established exception is when the evidence of other crimes tends to prove motive. State v. Thomas, 264 S.C. 159, 213 S.E.2d 452 (1975); State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961); State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 234 S.E.2d 219 (1977); State v. Milling......
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State v. Grainger, 21327
...was offered for the purpose of establishing motive for flight which resulted in the death of the officer. The case of State v. Thomas, 264 S.C. 159, 213 S.E.2d 452, involved a somewhat similar situation and sets forth the governing legal principles, as The general rule is that evidence that......
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