State v. Thompson, No. 94,254 (Kan. 10/17/2007)
| Decision Date | 17 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 94,254.,94,254. |
| Parties | STATE OF KANSAS, <I>Appellee,</I> v. DENNIS W. THOMPSON, <I>Appellant.</I> |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's suppression motion, appellate courts review the factual underpinnings using a substantial competent evidence standard. But the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from such facts is a question of law subject to de novo review.
2. The State has the burden of proving that a search and seizure was lawful.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights assure each person's right to be secure in his or her person and property against unreasonable searches and seizures.
4. The question of whether there is a seizure arises in the context of one of four types of encounters with law enforcement officers: consensual encounters, which are not considered seizures; investigatory detentions pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and K.S.A. 22-2402; public safety stops; and arrests.
5. When it is alleged an investigatory traffic stop has turned into a consensual encounter, potential issues arise regarding the legality of: (1) the initial stop, i.e., whether the law enforcement officer's action was justified at its inception; (2) the detention, i.e., whether the length and scope of the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place; and (3) the continuation of the encounter beyond the point in time when the purpose of the traffic stop was fulfilled, i.e., whether the continuation was consensual or the officer gained a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity.
6. A traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. A law enforcement officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on fact, that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
7. A traffic stop may not exceed the scope or duration necessary to carry out the purpose of the stop. When conducting a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.
8. If no information raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity is found during the time period necessary to perform the computer check and other tasks incident to a traffic stop, the driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay or questioning unless (1) the encounter between a law enforcement officer and the driver ceases to be a detention, it becomes consensual, and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning or (2) during the traffic stop the officer gains a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal activity.
9. Law enforcement interaction with a person is consensual, not a seizure, if under the totality of the circumstances the officer's conduct conveys to a reasonable person that he or she is free to refuse the requests or otherwise end the encounter.
10. Appellate review of a trial court's determination of whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse the law enforcement officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter consists of two parts: (1) the factual underpinnings are reviewed under a substantial competent evidence standard and (2) the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts, i.e., whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse the requests or to terminate the encounter, is reviewed under a de novo standard.
11. A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it meets one of several recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, including consent; search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses.
12. For a consent to search to be valid, two conditions must be met: (1) there must be clear and positive testimony that consent was unequivocal, specific, and freely given and (2) the consent must have been given without duress or coercion, express or implied.
13. The State has the burden of establishing the scope of the consent and the voluntariness of the consent to search. These questions present issues of fact which appellate courts review to determine if substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's findings.
14. An unconstitutional seizure may infect or taint the consent to search as well as any fruits of the encounter if the nature of the seizure renders the consent to search involuntary. Conversely, a voluntary consent to search can purge the primary taint of an illegal seizure.
15. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provide identical protection.
16. While the defendant's knowledge of a right to refuse to consent is a factor to be taken into account, the State is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
17. Law enforcement questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. Unless the surrounding conditions are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to disregard the questions, there has been no intrusion upon the detained person's liberty or privacy that would implicate the Fourth Amendment.
18. During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer's retention of a driver's documents is significant because it indicates that a reasonable person, as a general rule, would not feel free to terminate the encounter. On the other hand, the return of a driver's license is not a bright line indicating that the encounter is no longer a seizure. Even with the return of the driver's license, an encounter can remain a detention when, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to decline law enforcement requests or end the encounter.
19. The physical movement of a law enforcement officer is a factor that can be taken into account when considering whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse an officer's request or otherwise terminate his or her encounter with an officer, but the State is not required to prove a physical disengagement between the end of a detention and the beginning of a consensual encounter.
20. In applying the totality of the circumstances test in a Fourth Amendment context, no one factor is legally determinative, dispositive, or paramount. The outcome does not turn on the presence or absence of a single controlling or infallible touchstone and requires careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.
21. The subjective intent of a law enforcement officer is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of the officer's conduct only to the extent that such intent has been conveyed to the person confronted.
22. Considered as part of the totality of the circumstances relevant to a determination of whether an encounter with a law enforcement officer is consensual, the presence or absence of emergency lights may or may not be significant; emergency lights may mean different things under different circumstances. A court must examine whether a reasonable person would understand the activation or display of lights to be a show of authority signaling that the person was not free to terminate the encounter.
23. Under the test for determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse a law enforcement officer's request or otherwise terminate an encounter with the officer, an objective standard is applied. Actual state of mind is not a relevant circumstance.
24. Because the determination of whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate an encounter or refuse to answer questions is fact-driven, no list of factors can be exhaustive or exclusive.
25. Even if an encounter is consensual, it must be determined whether a search that is conducted during the encounter is reasonable in scope and manner. A search based upon consent must be voluntary. In considering whether the consent was given without duress or coercion, no one factor is dispositive and relevant factors indicating coercion are much the same as those applied to determine if an encounter is consensual.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 36 Kan. App. 2d 252, 138 P.3d 398 (2006). Appeal from McPherson district court; CARL B. ANDERSON, JR., judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed on the single issue subject to our grant of review, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of remaining issues. Judgment of the district court is affirmed on the single issue before us. Original opinion filed September 7, 2007. Modified opinion filed October 17, 2007.
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Ty Kaufman, county attorney, argued the cause, and Phill Kline, former attorney general, and Paul J. Morrison, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.
Colin D. Wood, special assistant attorney general, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Highway Patrol.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Dennis W. Thompson seeks to suppress evidence seized during warrantless searches of his vehicle and garage. Thompson consented to both searches after a law enforcement officer stopped Thompson for a traffic infraction, gave Thompson a verbal warning, told Thompson to have a nice day, and then asked whether Thompson would answer a few more questions....
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