State v. Thompson, 35134.
| Decision Date | 01 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 35134.,35134. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Robert Eugene THOMPSON. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephanie L. Evans, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Matthew A. Weiner, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Stacey M. Miranda, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
LAVINE, SHELDON and PELLEGRINO, Js.
The defendant, Robert Eugene Thompson, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him after a jury trial on charges of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92 (a)(2)(A); sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(1); assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–61 (a)(1); and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–62 (a)(1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the complainant gave inadmissible, unfairly prejudicial testimony against him, implicating him in the commission of similar crimes against other persons, and thereby violating his constitutional right to a fair trial; (2) the prosecutor violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by repeatedly referring to the complainant as the “victim,” over defense counsel's persistent objections and in contravention of the trial court's repeated admonitions not to do so; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on the charge of kidnapping in the first degree, under the rule of State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), and State v. Sanseverino, 291 Conn. 574, 969 A.2d 710 (2009). We disagree with each of the defendant's claims, and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 11 p.m. on November 14, 2008, as the complainant, V.D.,1 was walking home from a visit to her son's house, she encountered the defendant walking toward her on Sherman Avenue in New Haven. V.D. and the defendant, who were not previously acquainted, introduced themselves to one another and struck up a casual conversation. The defendant told V.D. that he lived with his sister, a pastor,2 who was currently recruiting people to join her church. For that reason, he asked V.D. if she was interested in meeting his sister. Because V.D. enjoyed attending church, she agreed to go with the defendant to meet his sister. V.D. and the defendant walked together to his sister's house, which was located on Willis Street in New Haven.
Upon arriving at the house, to which he had no key, the defendant left V.D. on the front porch while he walked to the side of the house to knock on a window. After rejoining V.D. on the porch, the defendant knocked on the front door, which was promptly answered by a young boy who unlocked it to let them inside. 3 Upon entering the house, V.D. and the defendant walked through a small hallway into the living room, where the defendant told V.D. that his sister would join them. V.D. sat on the living room sofa while awaiting the arrival of the defendant's sister.
Shortly thereafter, however, the defendant returned to the living room alone, explaining that his sister would not be joining them because she was asleep. V.D. replied that if she could not meet the defendant's sister, she would be leaving. She then rose from the sofa and began to walk toward the front door. As she did so, however, the defendant positioned himself between her and the door, blocking her exit and stating that she “wasn't going nowhere.” As they stood by the door, V.D. asked the defendant, “[W]hy?” The defendant responded by ordering her to “shut up” and take off her clothes. Again, V.D. asked the defendant, “[W]hy?” This time, the defendant responded by punching her in the nose, causing her to bleed. The defendant then pushed V.D. several times toward the living room. Although V.D. attempted to resist him, the defendant ultimately succeeded in pushing her back into the living room. There, while they were standing near the sofa, the defendant once again ordered her to undress. When V.D. initially balked, the defendant grasped a nearby object and warned her that if she refused to undress or she made any noise, he would kill her. Fearing for her life, V.D. acquiesced and undressed, while the defendant simultaneously removed his clothing. As V.D. stood naked at the edge of the sofa, the defendant struck her in the mouth, causing her to “[stand] there swallowing the blood.” The defendant then tossed V.D. a shirt to wipe the blood from her face and ordered her to lie on the sofa. Afraid of the defendant, V.D. complied.
After V.D. lay down, the defendant ordered her to open her legs. When she did so, he lay down on top of her. As V.D. lay on her back, swallowing blood, the defendant forced her to engage in vaginal intercourse with him. When he was finished, he stood up and ordered V.D. to lie with him on the floor. Once again, she complied. As the defendant and V.D. lay naked on the floor, the defendant restrained her by placing his arms around her waist. When she attempted to move away from him, the defendant restrained her further by pulling more tightly at her waist. As a result of the defendant's strong grasp, V.D. could only move one of her arms. While lying on the floor, V.D. noticed the defendant's pants lying nearby. In an attempt to discover his identity, she removed the wallet from his pants and took his social security card from the wallet. Eventually, when V.D. believed that the defendant was asleep, she moved his arm slightly. When he did not respond, V.D. stood up, dressed and went to the bathroom to wash her bloody face.
After leaving the bathroom, V.D. entered the bedroom of Deborah Thompson–Savage, the woman she believed to be the defendant's sister, and woke her, explaining: Thompson–Savage immediately got up and accompanied V.D. into the living room, where she found the defendant lying naked on the floor. With V.D. standing behind her, clutching the back of her shirt, Thompson–Savage woke the defendant and asked him: “[W]hat did you do?” The defendant then rose and, upon seeing V.D., lunged toward her. Thompson–Savage blocked his lunge, however, and pushed V.D. toward the door, telling her to “go get help.”
Fleeing the Willis Street house, V.D. ran to Dixwell Avenue, where she found a New Haven police officer. V.D. reported the sexual assault to the officer and gave him the defendant's social security card. To investigate V.D.'s claim, the officer drove her back to Willis Street, where she pointed out the defendant's sister's house. She was then transported to the Hospital of Saint Raphael, where she was treated for her injuries and a sexual assault kit was performed on her. Subsequent laboratory analysis revealed that V.D. was a DNA contributor to blood found both in the bathroom sink of the Willis Street house, and on a sofa cushion, a polo shirt and a T-shirt found at that location. Laboratory testing of seminal fluid found on a sofa cushion in the house revealed that its DNA profile was consistent with the defendant's known DNA profile.
The defendant was later arrested in connection with this incident on four criminal charges: kidnapping in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, assault in the third degree and threatening in the second degree. The defendant was ultimately tried by a jury and found guilty on all four charges. The court rendered judgment accordingly, sentencing the defendant on those charges to a total effective term of forty-five years incarceration, execution suspended after thirty-five years, followed by ten years probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that V.D. gave inadmissible, prejudicial testimony against him, implicating him in similar crimes against other persons, in violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant argues that V.D.'s unsolicited testimony that he had told her she “[was] not the first person ... he [had] done this to” constituted inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence, and, accordingly, that “due process requires that the defendant be given a new trial.” Furthermore, to the extent that this claim is unpreserved, the defendant requests that we review it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). In response, the state argues that the defendant waived this claim before the trial court “because he failed to seek any curative measures when the issue of V.D.'s statement was discussed in the trial court and, instead, acquiesced in the trial court's handling of the matter.” Concluding, as we do, that the defendant effectively waived this claim, we decline to review it on the merits.4
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. During the course of her treatment at the Hospital of Saint Raphael, V.D. was interviewed by Officer Wendy Barrett of the New Haven Police Department. In her recorded statement to Barrett, V.D. reported that the defendant had told her “that he has done this before and done this to all his women.” On December 3, 2010, prior to the state's case-in-chief, the defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude the statement as evidence of uncharged misconduct. 5 The defendant argued, inter alia, that the prejudicial impact of the statement outweighed its probative value. The state countered by arguing that the statement. was “admissible as an admission by the defendant....”
Initially postponing its ruling on the motion when it was first discussed on the eve of trial, the court stated: ...
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