State v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 24 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 29783.,29783. |
| Citation | 102 P.3d 1115,140 Idaho 796 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Robert A. Wallace, Boise, for appellant, argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) to set aside a guilty plea and dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion because the defendant had not at all times complied with terms and conditions of his probation. We affirm the order of the district court.
On October 19, 1995, the defendant-appellant Michael Thompson (Thompson) pled guilty to the felony crime of burglary. On November 22, 1995, the district court granted him a withheld judgment and placed him on probation for three years.
On January 24, 1997, the State filed a motion to revoke Thompson's probation, alleging that he had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to pay restitution as ordered, by failing to report to his supervising officer on the dates and times required, and by failing to submit a truthful, written report each and every month. The district court issued a bench warrant and set bail in the sum of $10,000.
Thompson was arrested on the warrant and appeared in court on February 12, 1997. His probation officer was present and informed the court that after requesting the motion to revoke probation in December 1996, he had regained contact with Thompson and that Thompson was now complying with everything requested by the probation officer. The probation officer asked that Thompson be released on his own recognizance and that the matter be continued. He added that if Thompson continued complying with the terms and conditions of probation, he would request that the probation violation be dismissed. The district court released Thompson on his own recognizance and continued the matter until March 19, 1997. On that date, Thompson appeared back in court, and upon the State's motion the district court dismissed the probation violation proceedings.
On August 25, 1999, Thompson filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(1)1 to dismiss this case. The motion was heard on October 25, 1999. The State objected on the ground that the probation violation proceedings commenced in January 1997 indicated that Thompson had not at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. Thompson then vacated the hearing.
On April 29, 2003, Thompson filed an amended motion to set aside his guilty plea and dismiss this action. That motion was heard on June 10, 2003. Thompson called his probation officer as a witness. The probation officer testified that when Thompson was initially placed on probation he did not comply with all terms and conditions of his probation, but after the probation violation was filed Thompson became and remained compliant. Thompson also testified, and he admitted that early in his probation he was delinquent in his restitution payments and for a period of time did not report to his probation officer as directed. The district court denied the motion because Thompson had failed to show that he had at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. Thompson then timely appealed.
After completing his period of probation, Thompson asked the district court to set aside his guilty plea and dismiss his case. Idaho Code § 19-2604 permitted the court to do so: (1) "upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation" and (2) if the court was convinced that doing so was "compatible with the public interest." The district court agreed that doing so was compatible with the public interest. The issue in this case is whether the district court correctly ruled that Thompson had failed to prove he had at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation.
Thompson contends that we should not require strict compliance with the statute. Instead we should construe the phrase "at all times" to mean most of the time, or the phrase "the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation" to exclude trivial terms and conditions, or the word "complied" to mean complied to the satisfaction of the judge.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003). It must begin with the literal words of the statute, those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole. Id. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. Id. Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Id. If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial. Id.
The statute requires that the defendant must "at all times" have complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. In State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003), we stated that those words meant just what they said.
The phrase "at all times" means just that. A defendant who has at any time failed to do what he or she was required to do while on probation in a particular case has not at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his or her probation in that case.
The statute requires that defendant has "complied" with his conditions of probation. It does not state that he must have obeyed to the satisfaction of the sentencing court or substantially complied. Finally, it states that he must have at all times complied with "the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation." Compliance with most of the terms, or the major terms, is not sufficient.
Thompson contends that requiring strict compliance "prevents every supervising judge (and his successor) from encouraging promising defendants to become completely successful and further their rehabilitation." The threat of a probation revocation and a consequential period of incarceration is a strong incentive that a judge may use to encourage successful completion of probation.
The statute is unambiguous on its face. This Court lacks the authority to revise it by reading into it qualifiers that lessen its requirements. Thompson argues that defendants, like himself, who...
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