State v. Thompson, 97-1913.
| Decision Date | 03 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1913.,97-1913. |
| Citation | 597 N.W.2d 779 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Carlos THOMPSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and James G. Tomka, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, and Michael Clark and Mona Clarkson, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
BEFORE: McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.
Defendant Carlos Thompson challenges his conviction of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(3) (1997). He contends his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by his trial counsel's failure to withdraw due to an alleged conflict of interest. He also argues the district court erred in failing to grant his request to remove his trial counsel. We affirm the convictions.
Immediately prior to the start of trial, Thompson requested that his court-appointed counsel, Ronald Ellerhoff, be removed as his counsel and a different attorney be appointed to represent him. After conducting an inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and Ellerhoff's preparation for trial, the court denied Thompson's request and the trial proceeded.
Following the presentation of evidence at trial, in which Thompson testified, the attorneys and Thompson met outside the presence of the jury to discuss jury instructions. The prosecutor requested that the jury be instructed on aiding and abetting based on Thompson's testimony. The court agreed that Thompson's testimony "could lead ... the finder of fact to conclude that he may have been aiding or assisting another in making a delivery." Thompson realized that he had implicated himself through his testimony at trial and became quite upset. The following exchange took place:
The record shows that Thompson then struck Ellerhoff in the face, causing an injury which required medical attention. The proceedings were recessed for nearly two hours while Ellerhoff received treatment. Upon Ellerhoff's return, the parties again met outside the presence of the jury and the following record was made:
At no time following the altercation did Thompson request that he be granted a different attorney. The parties proceeded with closing arguments. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts.
On appeal, Thompson contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because, following the assault, Ellerhoff had a potential cause of action against him which presented a conflict of interest. Thompson also maintains the district court should have granted his request at the beginning of trial to remove Ellerhoff as his attorney.
Both of Thompson's arguments on appeal involve the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. We have previously summarized this right as follows:
State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Iowa 1997)
.
Thompson maintains the district court erred in failing to grant his request at the beginning of trial to remove Ellerhoff as his attorney and provide him with a different attorney. Our review of a district court's decision regarding the disqualification of an attorney and his or her removal is for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 627. We find an abuse of discretion only when the party claiming such shows that the court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. To the extent this issue implicates constitutional protections, we review the issue de novo. Id.
We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Thompson's request for disqualification of Ellerhoff prior to the start of trial. Thompson's request came only moments before trial began, the court made a thorough inquiry into the adequacy of Ellerhoff's preparation, and questioned Ellerhoff as to whether any conflicts existed at that time. No abuse of discretion is apparent. We affirm the district court's denial of Thompson's request for disqualification of Ellerhoff and the appointment of new counsel.
Thompson also argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of Ellerhoff's failure to withdraw as counsel following the assault. We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.
The general standard used for reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066-69, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695-99 (1984). That standard requires a defendant to show that his counsel's performance fell below minimum professional standards and that his counsel's poor performance was so prejudicial that it probably changed the outcome of his trial. Id. "The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-97.
The Supreme Court recognized in Strickland, however, that a different standard applies for those cases in which an alleged conflict of interest provides the predicate for the ineffective assistance claim. Id. The Court noted that in some cases, particularly those involving the actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or state interference with counsel's assistance, prejudice "is so likely that case-by-case inquiry ... is not worth the cost." Id. The Court also cited an earlier ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case in which it had applied a "similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice." Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)).
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718-19, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-48 (1980), the Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, which involves a breach of the duty of loyalty, one of counsel's most basic duties. See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230 (1981)
(). The Court in Strickland noted as follows with regard to the standard established in Cuyler:
Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, ... it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims [of actual or constructive denial of counsel or state interference]. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696-97 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 347-48).
The facts in Cuyler involved two privately retained lawyers who represented three criminal defendants charged with first-degree murder. The defendants were tried separately. The first defendant to be tried was convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence after his defense rested without presenting any evidence. The two codefendants were subsequently acquitted. The first defendant sought collateral relief, alleging he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorneys represented conflicting interests. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337-40, 100 S.Ct. at 1712-13, 64 L.Ed.2d at 339-41.
The Supreme Court set forth two issues to resolve in Cuyler: (1) "whether a state trial judge must inquire into the propriety of multiple representation even though no party lodges an objection"; and (2) "whether the mere possibility of a conflict of interest warrants the conclusion that the defendant was deprived of his right to counsel." Id. at 345, 100 S.Ct. at 1716, 64 L.Ed.2d at 344-45. With regard to the first issue, the Court concluded that "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court...
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