State v. Tianle

• Decision Date: 24 April 2018
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-1318-13T4
• Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TIANLE LI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TIANLE LI, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-1318-13T4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Argued January 23, 2018

April 24, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Before Judges Fisher, Fasciale and Moynihan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 11-05-0690.

Alan Dexter Bowman argued the cause for appellant.

Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Tianle Li appeals from her conviction after jury trial for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2), and third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4), in connection with the thallium poisoning of her husband, Xiaoye Wang. She argues in her merits brief:

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT HER RIGHT TO RAISE INTERVENING CAUSE AS A CHALLENGE TO THE STATE'S PROOFS OF PURPOSEFUL MURDER THEREBY PLACING THE BURDEN ON THE STATE TO DISPROVE THE DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE 2006 TOYOTA RAV-4.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A MISTRIAL.

POINT IV

ADMISSION OF THE ALLEGED ATTACK ON APPELLANT'S MOTHER NOT CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT SUBVERTED THE FAIRNESS OF THE TRIAL.

POINT V

THE INSUFFICIENT TRANSLATION OF MIRANDA¹ WARNINGS AND THE ATTENDANT CONDITIONS REQUIRED THAT THE ENTIRE STATEMENT BE SUPPRESSED.

POINT VI

THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING STEFANELLI TO TESTIFY.

In her supplemental pro se brief she adds:

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO ADMIT HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS.

POINT II

THE PROSECUTOR DELIBERATELY VIOLATED N.J.R.E. 104(c) AND THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUESTS FOR A MISTRIAL.

POINT III

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN BARRING DEFENSE WITNESS CHAPLAIN WHITE [FROM] TESTIFY[ING] TO THE SUBMISSION OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A PRAYER FOR WANG.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S WAIVER OF A LIMITING JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE STATE'S WITNESS MING WANG.

POINT V

APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL.

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST TO REVEAL THE CIVIL SUIT AND IDENTIFY THE STATE DOCTOR WITNESSES AS DEFENDANTS IN ESTATE OF XIAOYE WANG V. DOCTOR'S A-Z AND PRINCETON HEALTHCARE SYSTEM.

POINT VII

THE PROSECUTOR'S FLAGRANT MISCONDUCT DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.

POINT VIII

THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY VOUCHED FOR A WITNESS.

POINT IX

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A TIMELINE CREATED BY INVESTIGATOR TEMPLE INTO TRIAL.

POINT X

THE JURY WAS MISLED BY THE UNTRANSLATED CHINESE PRINTOUT AND THE WRONG SPECULATION OF THE PROSECUTOR AND STATE'S WITNESSES.

POINT XI

[]THE COURT ERRED IN THE ENTIRETY OF THE DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REQUEST TO PLAY AUDIOTAPE OF DR. DAS'[S] STATEMENT ON JANUARY 27, 2011 TO INVESTIGATOR[S] TEMPLE AND GROSSER.

POINT XII

THE CUMULATIVE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER COMMENTS DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.

We affirm.

I

Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the video-recorded statement she provided to police on January 26, 2011, the day her husband passed away. She argues the police provided "inadequate and indecipherable" Miranda warnings — which were given in English by Monroe PoliceInvestigator Jeffery Temple, then translated to defendant's native Mandarin Chinese by Monroe Police Officer Rob Wei — and that police continued to interview her after she indicated she wanted to terminate the interview.

Our standard of review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress requires our deference to the court's factual findings so long as they are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). The deferential standard applies to factual findings based on a video-recorded statement. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379-81 (2017). "By contrast, the task of appellate courts generally is limited to reviewing issues of law. Because legal issues do not implicate the fact-finding expertise of the trial courts, appellate courts construe the Constitution, statutes, and common law 'de novo — with fresh eyes . . . .'" Id. at 380 (quoting State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 308 (2016)). We need not defer to a trial judge's interpretive conclusions "unless persuaded by their reasoning." Morrison, 227 N.J. at 308.

"The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503." S.S., 229 N.J. at 381 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)). The Mirandaprotections provide "a meaningful opportunity to exercise" that right by requiring the police to advise a suspect prior to a custodial interrogation that: she has the right to remain silent; anything she says can be used against her; she has the right to an attorney; and an attorney will be provided if she cannot afford one. Id. at 382; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. "In resolving the adequacy of the language of a Miranda warning a court should give precedence to substance over form." State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 13 (1974). Police need not read the Miranda warning from a script but must "convey the substance of the warning along with the required information." Id. at 14.

The judge, after conducting a two-day suppression hearing during which he heard testimony from three police witnesses and watched the video-recording, concluded defendant understood the warnings as given because she

appropriately answered questions in English that were posed to her in English. There was little delay between the questions asked and her answers, indicating that she had a good grasp on the English language. Defendant asked clarifying questions when she did not understand or needed additional information before answering a question.

The judge also found "defendant was [a forty-one]-year[-]old, well educated . . . chemist" who "had been in the United States forapproximately thirteen years and had been educated at Washington University and [the] University of Pennsylvania."

The judge acknowledged the Mandarin translation was not "verbatim,"² but found the translation satisfactorily "conveyed to . . . [d]efendant her right to remain silent, that what she said could be used against her in court, that she could have an attorney present and that if she could not afford an attorney one would be supplied."

The record amply supports the judge's findings including those relating to his review of the video-recording that showed defendant's reactions to the spoken-English warnings and questions, and those regarding the translation which substantially conveyed defendant's rights. See Melvin, 65 N.J. at 13-14 (recognizing that variation in Miranda warnings is permissible so long as the words used convey the substance of the rights).

We also agree with the judge's rejection of defendant's argument that the police failed to honor her invocation of rights when she stated, "Oh I wish I can — we can do whatever you want with me next day, not today."³

If during an interrogation a person makes "a request, 'however ambiguous,' to terminate questioning or to have counsel present[,] [it] must be diligently honored." State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 263 (1986) (quoting State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288 (1984)). "Any words or conduct that reasonably appear to be inconsistent with defendant's willingness to discuss [her] case . . . are tantamount to an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 136 (1988). If the police are unsure whether the suspect invoked the right, they must "(1) terminate the interrogation or (2) ask only those questions necessary to clarify whether the defendant intended to invoke [her] right to silence." S.S., 229 N.J. at 383; see also State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 275-76, 284 (1990) (holding officers had a duty to end the interview or "to ask only questions narrowly directed to determining whether defendant was willing to continue" when he said, "I can't talk about it right now," and remained silent at various points during the interrogation).

The judge compared the circumstances here to those in Johnson, Hartley and Bey and found defendant's comment was analogous to the defendant's statement in Bey, 112 N.J. at 133, 134-43, where the Court held a defendant's mid-interrogation request "to lie down so that he could think about what happened" did not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent. We agree with thejudge's conclusion that defendant was not seeking to end her statement to the police. The judge acknowledged defendant "was emotional around page [forty-six] of the [transcript of her] statement" but that "her emotional state . . . did not indicate to the investigating officers that [she] was asserting her right to remain silent," citing State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 568-69 (2012) (holding a defendant's emotional display, including "weeping or moaning" is not a basis to conclude "he or she intend[ed] to invoke the right to silence"). In fact, she stopped crying as she continued to answer questions without protest. As the judge observed, "the record shows that [d]efendant continued to speak to police and remained cooperative until page [ninety-nine,] line [six] when the police accused her of poisoning her husband," and she responded, "Oh, my God. I don't want to talk anymore."

We determine the balance of defendan...