State v. Tiernan, 55315

• Decision Date: 25 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. 55315,55315
• Citation: 206 N.W.2d 898
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joseph Francis TIERNAN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 898

206 N.W.2d 898

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joseph Francis TIERNAN, Appellant.

No. 55315.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 25, 1973.

Martin E. Spellman, Perry, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., C. Joseph Coleman, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard Poffenberger, Perry, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, REES, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

We affirm defendant's conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.

On June 24, 1971 Iowa Highway Patrolman Larry Mathers observed the defendant driving his truck. The truck was being driven in an erratic manner, slid sideways and weaved considerably. The officer's overhead lights and siren failed to stop the truck and it was not until Mathers drove his patrol car in front of defendnat and gradually slowed down that defendant stopped.

After defendnat was advised of his constitutional rights and submitted to routine balance tests he was arrested. The officer then invoked the provisions of the implied consent law, chapter 321B, The Code. The offer of a blood test was first refused by defendant. He then consented to submit to a breath test, the results of which were admitted at trial. On appeal from his conviction defendant assigns 15 errors which can be treated by grouping them into three categories.

I. The trial court sustained defendant's motion in limine proscribing any mention of the fact a blood test was offered defendant or that he refused it. At trial Officer Mathers, in answering a question put by the county attorney, volunteered the information the blood test had been refused. The question did not suggest any reference to the offer or refusal of a blood test. Defendant's counsel interrupted the answer to object to the testimony. The objection was sustained and the jury was admonished to disregard any testimony relating to a blood test. After the witness was excused defendant moved for a mistrial because he mentioned the blood test. Defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial.

The error was in sustaining the motion in limine and hence was in favor of the defendant. Evidence of the offer and refusal of the blood test was admissible under the plain terms of section 321B.11, The Code. We have said: '* * * Such refusal is made admissibly by statute. Section 321B.11, Code of Iowa. We held the statute constitutional in State v. Holt, 261 Iowa 1069, 156 N.W.2d 884. If the statute is constitutional and such evidence is made admissible by statute, there was no error in failing to strike it.' State v. Heisdorffer, 164 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 1969).

Evidence of the refusal was not only admissible, it was required as a foundation for any evidence of the breath test. Rodriguez v. Fulton, 190 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1971); State v. Hraha, 193 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1972); State v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 1972). Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial by reason of the testimony regarding the offer and refusal of a blood test.

II. In numerous assignments of error defendant strongly challenges the admission into evidence of results of the breath test. He argues the evidence was so insufficient and unreliable as to be inadmissible.

The breath test was administered under a procedure similar to the one later prescribed by the safety commissioner in chapter 1, Title V of the Iowa Departmental Rules. We have previously held '* * * the results of the breathalyzer test * * * should be admitted only upon a showing (1) of the devices and methods approved by the Commissioner of Public Safety for the taking of such tests as provided in section 321B.4 and (2) proof that the test was given by use of the approved devices and methods.' State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 223 (Iowa 1972).

Here there was substantial compliance with this requirement.

Neither the admissibility nor the sufficiency of the State's evidence is affected by the opinions later expressed by defendant's expert witness on the same subject which the jury might have chosen not to believe. The State relied on two witnesses, Officer Mathers and Mrs. Lynn Calkins, a chemist employed at the state hygienic laboratory. From their testimony it appears they had both been furnished devices and directions from the commissioner for implementing a procedure whereby the officer would gather and the chemist would later analyze the breath specimen. Defendant's challenge is all embracing and addressed to every device and step in the procedure.

The device used by the officer is shown to be extremely simple in conception and operation, reflecting his limited role in only gathering the specimen. Its operation is almost exclusively mechanical. A soft metal tube, called an indium tube, is placed in a box and electrically heated. This heating process, the only non-mechanical part of the specimen gathering procedure, is necessary to prevent moisture gathering within the tube. Such moisture might result from the variance between the temperature of the tube and the breath. As hereafter explained the presence of moisture might invalidate the test. The person furnishes the sample by blowing through the tube which has a balloon attached to the other side. While breath is passing through the tube the box is closed on it in such a manner as to crimp the tube. The closing traps breath specimens in three separate chambers, each of which can be analyzed. The officer testified the 'machine was working acceptably (and) that there had been nothing damaged * * *.' Mrs. Calkins testified the kit received from the officer was in good...