State v. Tiernan
| Decision Date | 16 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-306-CA.,2006-306-CA. |
| Citation | 941 A.2d 129 |
| Parties | STATE v. Peter TIERNAN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Virginia M. McGinn, Esq., for Plaintiff.
John A. MacFadyen, III, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
On January 30, 2006, a jury found the defendant, Peter Tiernan, guilty of felony assault in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-5-2. Thereafter, on April 10, 2006, he was sentenced to a term of four years of probation, coupled with the additional requirements that he have no contact with the victim, participate in anger management counseling, and make restitution.
The defendant has appealed to this Court, contending that the trial justice violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by excessively limiting his ability to cross-examine the accusing witness.
This case came before the Court for oral argument on November 5, 2007, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the case should be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth below, we sustain the appeal, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.
On March 27, 2005, which happened to be Easter Sunday, Mr. Tiernan was driving his PT Cruiser easterly on Matunuck Schoolhouse Road (a two-lane road divided by a double yellow line) in South Kingstown, Rhode Island, on his way to church with his wife. As he drove, he could see two people riding bicycles in front of him on the road. The two bicyclists were Kevin Finnegan and his then girlfriend, Linn Floderus. They were riding on the same side of the road and in the same direction as Mr. Tiernan, and they were riding side by side. Mr. Tiernan waited until a car that was driving in a westerly direction passed, and he then sounded his horn and proceeded to go around the two bicyclists. As Mr. Tiernan was passing the bicyclists, a verbal confrontation ensued between him and Mr. Finnegan. After passing the bicyclists, Mr. Tiernan stopped his vehicle and backed up. As Mr. Tiernan did so, Mr. Finnegan positioned himself at the left side of the vehicle, while Ms. Floderus positioned herself at the right of the vehicle. Mr. Finnegan and Mr. Tiernan then continued their verbal imbroglio.
According to the trial testimony of Mr. Finnegan, when the exchange of words had ended and as Mr. Tiernan was driving away from the scene, the PT Cruiser struck him and his bike, causing him to fall to the ground. After the impact, Mr. and Mrs. Tiernan continued on their way to church. After parking the car in the church parking lot and while preparing to walk into church, they noticed a scratch on the driver's side door of the PT Cruiser. At that point, Mr. and Mrs. Tiernan decided to go to the police station. Before they arrived at the station, however, a police officer pulled them over, discussed the Matunuck Schoolhouse Road incident with them, and took photographs of the vehicle, including one of the driver's side door.
On July 6, 2005, Mr. Tiernan was charged by criminal information with felony assault pursuant to § 11-5-2.11 A jury trial commenced on January 25, 2006 and continued for four days.
At trial, during the cross-examination of the complaining witness, Mr. Finnegan, defense counsel attempted to ask questions about the nature and extent of, the injuries that Mr. Finnegan had allegedly incurred at the time of the March 27, 2005 incident, but the prosecutor objected on grounds of relevance.
Defense counsel argued that the injuries were relevant to the issue of whether or not defendant's car had been used as a dangerous weapon at the time of the Easter Sunday incident. Counsel further—and significantly—argued that his inquiry into the alleged injuries was necessary for him to seek to show that the witness was biased. He stated that the inquiry was "extraordinarily significant" because it related "to a bias that this witness has while testifying * * *." He further stated: "* * * I intend to elicit * * * that this individual has made a series of claims of injury resulting from this incident with Mr. Tiernan, [and] that he currently has retained an attorney." Defense counsel was not subtle in explaining the purpose of his proposed line of cross-examination; he explicitly informed the trial justice that he was seeking to show that Mr. Finnegan had a "bias against [Mr. Tiernan] from the perspective of he has an incentive to testify in a particular way * * * because he is seeking monetary damages from [Mr. Tiernan] for a series of injuries which he has reported over time." Defense counsel also argued that Mr. Finnegan's statements about his injuries had changed over time and that that information was relevant to Mr. Finnegan's credibility.
The trial justice observed that, where a charge of felony assault is concerned, whether or not the victim was injured is not relevant. The trial justice specifically noted that the information filed by the state did not refer to any injury,' but simply stated that Mr. Tiernan "did assault Kevin Finnegan with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a 2005 Chrysler PT Cruiser, in violation of [§ 11-5-2 of the [G]eneral [L]aws."
The trial justice then ruled that he would permit defense counsel to ask Mr. Finnegan whether or not he had filed or intended to file a civil suit as a result of the events that occurred on March 27, 2005. The court further ruled, however, that cross-examination would "be limited to that question, not for damages for injuries, pain and suffering, discomfort or any of those things, just to that point." (Emphasis added.)
At that juncture, the court took a recess. When the trial resumed, defense counsel again argued that he should be able to cross-examine the witness about "whether or not he anticipates bringing a legal action for monetary damages * * *." Defense counsel informed the trial justice that the witness had an attorney who had been observing the ongoing criminal trial and that it was counsel's understanding that Mr. Finnegan had made a demand to the insurance company and had advised the insurance company that he was a prospective party to a civil action. Notwithstanding this further argument and offer of proof,2 the trial justice stood by his earlier ruling.
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Finnegan resumed, and the following very terse exchange took place:
On January 30, 2006, the jury found Mr. Tiernan guilty of assaulting Mr. Finnegan with a dangerous weapon. On April 10, 2006, the court sentenced him to four years of probation. The court also ordered Mr. Tiernan to have no contact with Mr. Finnegan, to engage in anger management counseling, and to make restitution. A judgment of conviction was entered on April 12, 2006, and Mr. Tiernan filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on April 17, 2006.
On appeal, Mr. Tiernan contends that he should have been permitted to cross-examine the complaining witness, Mr. Finnegan, in some detail regarding: (1) Mr. Finnegans escalating claims of injuries resulting from the March 27, 2005 incident; (2) Mr. Finnegans statements to various health-care providers regarding the point of impact, which statements were allegedly inconsistent with his trial testimony; and (3) Mr. Finnegans intended civil suit. He argues that more extensive exploration of these issues could have had a material impact on the jury's evaluation of the witnesses credibility and possible bias. The defendant maintains that the trial justice overly restricted his cross-examination regarding Mr. Finnegans planned civil suit, and he argues that more extensive cross-examination was essential to his plan to test Mr. Finnegans credibility and to explore his possible bias.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Similarly, the Declaration of Rights, article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against them." Indeed, the right of accused persons to confront the witnesses against them has ancient and venerable roots,3 and this Court has ardently protected this right. See, e.g., State v. Pettiway, 657 A.2d 161, 163-64 (R.I.1995); State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149, 1153-54 (R.I. 1984); State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1356-59 (R.I.1984); State. v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 551-53 (R.I.1982).4
The right of confrontation "means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Indeed "[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Id. at 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Cross-examination connotes searching and often intense scrutiny. During cross-examination, the fact-finder, whether judge or jury, is enabled to observe and evaluate the entirety of what transpires as the witness is examined, including the witness's body language and expressions of emotion. Cross-examination, when well conducted, is not a desiccated syllogistic exercise, but is rather a multifaceted attempt at unveiling what might lie behind the direct testimony of the witness.
This Court has emphatically stated that "[t]he...
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