State v. Tinsley

• Decision Date: 12 May 2020
• Docket Number: AC 41975
• Citation: 232 A.3d 86,197 Conn.App. 302
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Darrell TINSLEY

197 Conn.App. 302

232 A.3d 86

STATE of Connecticut

v.Darrell TINSLEY

AC 41975

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 3, 2019

Officially released May 12, 2020

Naomi T. Fetterman, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPentima, C. J., and Bright and Devlin, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C. J.

The defendant, Darrell Tinsley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying his motion to correct because his conviction for manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1)¹ and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-21,² as amended by No. 95-142 of the 1995 Public Acts, violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We agree with the defendant and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In affirming the defendant's conviction on direct appeal, we concluded that the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. "[T]he victim's mother, and the defendant met at an office building in downtown Hartford, where they worked as security personnel. Although the defendant and [the victim's mother] had an unstable relationship, they cohabited in a one bedroom apartment along with the [fifteen month old] victim .... During the course of the adults' relationship, individuals who knew the victim noticed a marked change in his behavior when he was in the presence of the defendant. At such times, the victim was timid, withdrawn and afraid of the defendant. The defendant's attitude toward the victim ranged from indifference to dislike. When [the victim's mother] was no longer able to avail herself of professional child care, the defendant sometimes took care of the victim while [the victim's mother] worked.

"Prior to his death, the victim was in good health. On December 8, 1996, between 8 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., the defendant drove [the victim's mother] to her place of employment. According to [the victim's mother], there was nothing wrong with the victim when she went to work. During the morning, [the victim's mother] and the defendant spoke by telephone several times concerning the victim. At approximately 11:15 a.m., the defendant telephoned [the victim's mother], stating that there was something wrong with the victim and that he did not know what was the matter. The defendant then drove the victim to [the victim's mother's] place of employment, and from there all three proceeded to the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (medical center) in Hartford. They were involved in a motor vehicle accident en route.

"When he arrived at the medical center, the victim was in critical condition because he was not breathing and had little heart activity. The victim died when resuscitation efforts failed. An autopsy revealed bruises on the victim's right cheek, left leg and chest, which an associate medical examiner from the [O]ffice of the [C]hief [M]edical [E]xaminer determined occurred shortly before the victim's death. The injuries were inconsistent with an automobile accident, a twelve inch fall into a bathtub, cardiopulmonary resuscitation

or bumping into a fire door, which were explanations offered by the defendant. The victim also suffered significant internal injuries, namely, multiple fresh cranial hemorrhages, a broken rib and a lacerated liver that caused three quarters of his blood to enter his abdominal cavity. According to the associate medical examiner, the victim's liver was lacerated

by blunt trauma that occurred within [one] hour of death and was the cause of death.

"After the victim died, the defendant was taken to the police station, where he gave a statement and repeatedly denied injuring the victim. The police inspected the apartment where the defendant and victim were alone prior to the victim's death. They found vomit and feces on the victim's clothes, a bedspread and the floor. The victim's blood was found on the bathroom door. When he was informed of the autopsy results, the defendant insisted that the doctors were wrong, a position he maintained throughout trial." State v. Tinsley , 59 Conn. App. 4, 6–7, 755 A.2d 368, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 938, 761 A.2d 765 (2000).

The state charged the defendant with capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. 1995) § 53a-54b (9), as amended by No. 95-16 of the 1995 Public Acts,³ and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21. The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1)⁴ and risk of injury to a child. On February 6, 1998, the court sentenced the defendant to twenty years of incarceration on the manslaughter count and ten years of incarceration on the risk of injury count with the sentences to run consecutively.

On August 14, 2017, the self-represented defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.⁵ The defendant alleged that his sentence violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. On March 8, 2018, the defendant, now represented by counsel, filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence and an accompanying memorandum of law, reasserting his double jeopardy claim. The state filed its memorandum in opposition on March 26, 2018, and the court, Schuman, J. , held a hearing on April 12, 2018. Pursuant to the court's order, the parties submitted supplemental memoranda.

On May 15, 2018, the court issued its memorandum of decision denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. At the outset of its analysis, the court observed that the double jeopardy clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. It then stated: "In determining whether a defendant has been placed in double jeopardy under the multiple punishments prong, the court applies a two step process. First, the charges must arise out of the same act or transaction. Second, it must be determined whether the charged crimes are the same offense. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

With respect to the first step of the analysis, the court noted that the homicide and risk of injury charges involved the same time, place and victim. The homicide count charged that the victim's death had resulted from blunt force trauma to the abdomen, whereas the risk of injury count alleged that the defendant had inflicted multiple traumas

to the face, head, chest and abdomen, which caused the laceration of the liver, internal bleeding in the abdomen, a fracture of the tenth rib, and multiple contusions of the face, head, chest and abdomen. The court also observed that the laceration of the liver

occurred within one hour of death while the bruises on the victim's cheek, leg and chest occurred shortly before death. "While it is possible that all of these injuries occurred at the same time, it is not certain. Based on the Appellate Court's recital of the facts, it is also possible that the bruising to the cheek, leg, and chest took place at a different time in the morning from the lethal trauma to the liver. It is simply speculative to conclude, based on the existing record, that ... the victim here incurred injuries in one continuous, uninterrupted assault occurring in a matter of a few minutes." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

As an alternative and additional analysis, the court also considered whether the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury constituted the same offense. The court specifically identified the issue as "whether risk of injury as charged was a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as charged. Stated differently, the issue is whether it was possible to commit manslaughter in the first degree in the manner charged without necessarily committing risk of injury as charged." The court concluded that such a possibility existed. It explained that the jury could have found that the defendant violated the risk of injury statute as a result of striking the victim in the face, leg or chest. For these reasons, the court denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.

On June 4, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the parties should be afforded the opportunity to address (1) our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Porter , 328 Conn. 648, 182 A.3d 625 (2018),⁶ which had been released after the hearing on the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and (2) the evidence underlying the recital of facts by this court in the defendant's direct appeal. See State v. Tinsley , supra, 59 Conn. App. at 6–7, 755 A.2d 368. On June 19, 2018, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue.

The court held a hearing on July 5, 2018. After hearing from the parties, the court denied the relief requested by the defendant. It maintained its conclusion that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that both offenses occurred during the same transaction. Specifically, the court stated: "It still seems to me entirely possible that the fatal blows to the ribs, liver, and abdomen could have occurred from a separate blow that was interrupted perhaps by a minute or so before or after trauma was inflicted to the child's face and head, which is also alleged in the information. And in that situation it would not clearly be one continuous uninterrupted assault. I acknowledge the defense argument that there's no way to actually parse through all this at this time twenty years later, but ultimately it's the defendant's burden and if we can't do that then the defendant has not met his burden." This...