State v. Tisdale
Decision Date | 07 February 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 3108.,3108. |
Citation | 338 S.C. 607,527 S.E.2d 389 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Antonio TISDALE, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Assistant Appellate Defender Melody J. Brown, of SC Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor David P. Schwacke, of North Charleston, for respondent.
A jury convicted Antonio Tisdale of entering a bank with intent to steal, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced him to a total of thirty-two years imprisonment. Tisdale appeals, arguing the court erred in refusing to suppress tainted identifications and in denying his motion for mistrial based on a violation of the court's sequestration order. We affirm.
On October 24, 1996, at approximately 10:57 a.m., a gunman robbed a branch of First Citizens Bank in North Charleston. No one saw the robber before he entered or after he left the bank. The police soon arrived and canvassed the area. Larry Fanning, who lived behind the bank at the time, told the police he saw a late-model brown Cadillac in need of a new muffler "shooting" up the alleyway around 11:00 a.m. Fanning described the car as having a bright yellow paper license tag reading "Your Car Store." Through the distinctive tag, the police were able to trace ownership of the car to Tisdale. Based on Fanning's subsequent identification of the car, the police arrested Tisdale later that afternoon.
The following morning, as Officer Robert Myers assembled a photo line-up, a teller from First Citizens, Justine Mood, telephoned and stated she had seen a report of Tisdale's arrest on television the previous night and she believed Tisdale was the robber.1 Myers drove to the bank and took Mood's statement. While there, Georgia Vannice, another teller, told him she had identified Tisdale from a photo in a newspaper article about his arrest.2 She also gave Myers a written statement. Michelle Crawford, a "floating" temporary for First Citizens, also identified Tisdale from the newspaper the morning after the robbery and subsequently gave a statement to police. After these identifications, Myers never completed the line-up preparation because the police decided it would be futile. A few days later, however, Myers returned to the bank and showed Vannice a photograph of Tisdale which she said depicted the robber.
On February 3, 1997, a Charleston County grand jury indicted Tisdale for entering a bank with intent to steal, armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and grand larceny. The case was tried before a jury on November 17-19, 1997. Prior to opening statements, Tisdale moved to sequester the witnesses. The trial court granted the motion, but exempted two of the State's case agents from his ruling. Thereafter, Tisdale moved to suppress the identifications of him made by the three tellers. The trial court held an in camera hearing on the reliability of each teller's identification, and denied the motion as to each witness.
The jury found Tisdale guilty of all the charges. The trial court, however, set aside the larceny conviction as a lesser included offense of armed robbery. The court sentenced Tisdale to thirty years for armed robbery, thirty years for entering a bank with intent to steal, concurrent, and two years for possessing a gun during the crime, consecutive to the robbery sentence. Tisdale appeals, arguing the trial court erred in permitting the tellers' in-court identifications, and in refusing to grant a mistrial based on David Rykowski's violation of the court's order sequestering all non-agent witnesses.
Tisdale first argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress the identifications by Mood, Vannice and Crawford. We disagree.
The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. 425, 462 S.E.2d 263 (1995); State v. Brown, 333 S.C. 185, 508 S.E.2d 38 (Ct.App.1998). Accordingly, a trial court's decision to allow the in-court identification of an accused will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion or prejudicial legal error. Id.
An in-court identification of an accused is inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure created "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968)); State v. Stewart, 275 S.C. 447, 272 S.E.2d 628 (1980). However, in this case, the pre-trial identification of Tisdale by the three tellers was admissible because the televised bond hearing and newspaper article were non-governmental sources of the suggestiveness.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. 967).
93 S.Ct. 375. Therefore, the impetus behind the harsh remedy of exclusion is police deterrence. Although the reliability of an identification may be affected by media identification, no police deterrence would be achieved by excluding evidence where there has been no governmental involvement. Thus, we hold that the Neil analysis is inapplicable where there is a nongovernmental identification source.
A number of other jurisdictions have held media identifications of an accused do not constitute identification procedures for analysis under Neil and its progeny. See United States v. Peele, 574 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1978)
; United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717 (3d Cir.1972); State v. Smith, 681 So.2d 980, 986 (La.App.1996) ()(citing State v. Daughtery, 563 So.2d 1171 (La.App.1990)); State v. Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d 111 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (); State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988).
It is uncontested that the media identifications in this case were suggestive. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383,
88 S.Ct. 967 ( ); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) ( ); State v. Patrick, 318 S.C. 352, 457 S.E.2d 632 (Ct.App.1995) ( ). However, because the police were not involved in the media identifications in this case, the trial judge did not err in allowing the tellers' identification testimony.
Courts that have rejected the Neil analysis have also recognized the possibility of a case "where the mind of a witness is so clouded by suggestions from nongovernment sources that a conviction based principally on the testimony of that witness violates due process." Peele, 574 F.2d at 491; Lawrence, 700 S.W.2d at 112 (); see also State v. Coburne, 10 Wash.App. 298, 518 P.2d 747, 753 (1973)
() .
We are not convinced that the identification testimony admitted in this case violated due process. All the tellers were fully cross-examined regarding their descriptions and the suggestiveness of the media identification. "The extent to which a suggestion from nongovernment sources has influenced the memory or perception of the witness, or the ability of the witness to articulate or relate the identifying characteristics of the accused, is a proper issue for the trier of fact to determine." Peele, 574 F.2d at 491; see also Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 359 (7th Cir.1989)
(); Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717 ( ); Brown, 528 N.E.2d at 532 (...
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