State v. Tomah
| Decision Date | 14 July 1989 |
| Citation | 560 A.2d 575 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Frederick TOMAH. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Neale T. Adams, Dist. Atty., Caribou, for plaintiff.
Sarah J. McPartland, Mitchell & Stearns, Bangor, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.
Defendant Frederick Tomah appeals his conviction on one count of burglary, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401 (1983 & Supp.1988) and one count of theft, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (1983) entered in the Superior Court (Aroostook County; Pierson, J.). Defendant represented himself during the jury trial and now on appeal argues through counsel that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. We agree and we vacate the judgment.
Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Maine guarantee an accused the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Me.Const. art. 1 § 6. An accused also has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel so long as he is made aware of the dangers of self-representation, and the record reflects that he knows what he is doing and makes his choice with his eyes open. State v. Walls, 501 A.2d 803, 805 (Me.1985). In Maine the implementing statute and rule require that the court fully advise the defendant of his rights at arraignment and appoint counsel unless the defendant elects to proceed without counsel or the court finds that he has sufficient means to employ counsel. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 810 (1980); M.R.Crim.P. 44. When, as in the present case, the trial court permits a defendant to represent himself without an express finding of waiver, we review the trial court's decision "in the light most favorable to the court's ruling to determine whether the record will support a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver." State v. Walls, 501 A.2d at 805. The record in the present case contains only the following exchange between the justice and defendant with regard to representation:
Because waiver is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case, it is not possible to specify the elements of an adequate basis for a finding of waiver. We have no trouble, however, in concluding that the present record is woefully inadequate to support the finding. The elements focused upon in our past decisions are totally absent here. See State v. Walls, 501 A.2d at 805; State v. Gaudette, 431 A.2d 31, 32 (Me.1981) (); State v. Crafts, 425 A.2d 194, 196 (Me.1981) (); State v. Currier, 409 A.2d 241, 243 (Me.1979). (No error where, "after an extended colloquy between the presiding...
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State v. Watson
...of the dangers of self-representation, and gave him several opportunities to express a change of heart"). [¶ 21] In contrast, in State v. Tomah the defendant announced that he would represent himself following a brief colloquy in which the judge merely asked whether the defendant intended t......
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...or either, at the election of the accused." This provision unambiguously confers a right to self-representation. See State v. Tomah , 560 A.2d 575, 575 (Me. 1989) ; State v. Walls , 501 A.2d 803, 805 (Me. 1985). But it does not explicitly address how that right operates when there has been ......
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...out any such prophylactic rule.Id. at 1353. We then expressly disavowed statements in an opinion issued the previous year, State v. Tomah, 560 A.2d 575 (Me.1989), that could have been read to favor such a prophylactic rule. Id. [¶ 35] Watson stands for the same proposition. In Watson, we ob......
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...on the record. Neither Supreme Court case law nor our own lays out any such prophylactic rule. If our recent opinion in State v. Tomah, 560 A.2d 575 (Me.1989), can be read to that effect, we take this opportunity to disavow that Count 6 of the indictment charged Morrison with unlawful sexua......
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...understanding of the role of counsel and the consequences of proceeding pro se , coupled with a voluntary waiver of counsel. Tomah , 560 A.2d at 575-576. “[B]ecause it is a fundamental constitutional right, the right to representation by counsel requires that every reasonable presumption mu......