State v. Torres

Decision Date11 February 2021
Docket NumberNo. CR-20-269,CR-20-269
Citation2021 Ark. 22,617 S.W.3d 232
Parties STATE of Arkansas, Petitioner v. Mauricio A. TORRES, Respondent
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Rebecca Kane, Ass't Att'y Gen.; and Vada Berger, Sr. Ass't Att'y Gen., for petitioner.

Jeff Rosenzweig, George (Birc) Morledge, and William O. James Jr., Little Rock, for respondent.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice

Petitioner, the State of Arkansas, petitions this court for a writ of certiorari in response to the Benton County Circuit Court's order granting a mistrial as to both the guilt and penalty phases of Mauricio A. Torres's capital murder trial when the event precipitating the mistrial occurred after the jury found Torres guilty. The State argues that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed an error that is apparent on the face of the record when it concluded that it was statutorily precluded from granting a mistrial only as to the penalty phase of the trial. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-1(a)(1) (2020). We deny the petition.

On November 15, 2016, a Benton County jury convicted Torres of capital murder and first-degree battery in the death of his six-year-old son Maurice "Isaiah" Torres. Torres was sentenced to death for the murder and twenty years’ imprisonment and a fine for the battery. Torres appealed, and this court reversed. Torres v. State , 2019 Ark. 101, 571 S.W.3d 456. The State retried Torres. On March 5, 2020, a Benton County jury again found Torres guilty of the capital murder and first-degree battery of Isaiah. During the penalty phase of the trial, the State called as a witness Torres's adult stepson, who was shackled at his ankles due to his incarceration at the Arkansas Division of Correction. When the prosecutor asked the witness whether Torres had sexually abused him, the witness leapt out of the witness box and lunged toward Torres in an apparent effort to assault him or his attorneys. Multiple court personnel were required to subdue the witness. During the struggle, a table was overturned, and papers were scattered. In the aftermath, the circuit court instructed jurors to retire to the jury room.

After the jury left the courtroom, Torres's counsel moved for "a mistrial of this sentencing phase" and "of the sentencing proceeding." Initially, Torres's counsel stated that he was not moving for a mistrial "at guilt." The State opposed the motion, and the circuit court called for a lunch recess. After the recess, and outside the presence of the jury, the circuit court announced that it would declare a mistrial and that the mistrial would cover both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. The defense then stated that it favored a mistrial that "covers the whole landscape, guilt and penalty." Despite the fact that the events leading to the mistrial happened after the jury found Torres guilty, the circuit court concluded that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-602(3)(A) (Repl. 2013) requires that when a defendant is found guilty of capital murder, the same jury must sit again in order to determine the sentence. Ultimately, the circuit court entered a written order declaring a mistrial as to both the guilt and the penalty phases of the trial. The State moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's decision and argued that no statute or case law prohibited a sentencing-only mistrial and that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-616(a) and Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 contemplated sentencing by a jury other than the one that decided guilt despite the provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-602(3)(A). After Torres responded, the circuit court, in a March 19, 2020 order, denied the State's motion.

On April 20, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking an order directing the circuit court to preserve the guilty verdict and conduct a new sentencing hearing only. Torres responded to the petition, requested oral argument, and sought supplementation of the record. On June 18, we granted the request for oral argument, authorized supplementation of the record, and ordered that the petition be taken as a case with briefing.

A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Herndon , 365 Ark. 180, 226 S.W.3d 776 (2006). There are two requirements that must be satisfied for this court to grant a writ of certiorari. Zimmerman v. Cir. Ct. of Miller Cty. , 2018 Ark. 264, 555 S.W.3d 406. First, there can be no other adequate remedy but for the writ of certiorari. Pedraza v. Cir. Ct. of Drew Cty. , 2013 Ark. 116, 426 S.W.3d 441. Second, a writ of certiorari lies only when (1) it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion, or (2) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record. Id. Certiorari is not to be used to look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, to control discretion, to review a finding upon facts, or to review the exercise of a court's discretionary authority. Zimmerman , 2018 Ark. 264, 555 S.W.3d 406. A petitioner for certiorari must bear a "very heavy burden[.]" Skokos v. Gray , 318 Ark. 571, 575, 886 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1994). This court has held that the writ of certiorari may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. Conner v. Simes , 355 Ark. 422, 429, 139 S.W.3d 476, 480 (2003).

This petition requires us to construe our penal statutes. We construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. Thompson v. State , 2014 Ark. 413, 464 S.W.3d 111. Significantly, penal statutes are to be strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the defendant. Smith v. State , 2020 Ark. 410, 2020 WL 7253448. Strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. Metzner v. State , 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650. Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. Singleton v. State , 2009 Ark. 594, 357 S.W.3d 891 ; Bush v. State , 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999). Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and in harmony, if possible. Jester v. State , 367 Ark. 249, 239 S.W.3d 484 (2006). We construe court rules using the same means and canons of construction used to interpret statutes. Taffner v. State , 2018 Ark. 99, 541 S.W.3d 430.

Two sentencing statutes, as well as Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3, are relevant to our analysis. We look first to the general rule governing jury sentencing in capital cases, which is set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-602(3)(A). That section provides that

[i]f the defendant is found guilty of capital murder, the same jury shall sit again in order to:
(i) Hear additional evidence as provided by subdivisions (4) and (5) of this section; and
(ii) Determine the sentence in the manner provided by § 5-4-603.

We next consider Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-616. There, the General Assembly crafted an exception to the general sentencing rule for capital cases. That statute in relevant part provides that

(a) Notwithstanding § 5-4-602(3) that requires that the same jury sit in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the following shall apply:
(1)(A) Upon any appeal by the defendant when the sentence is of death, if the appellate court finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, the appellate court may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court in the jurisdiction in which the defendant was originally sentenced.
(B) No error in the sentencing proceeding shall result in the reversal of the conviction for a capital felony.
(C) When a capital case is remanded after vacation of a death sentence, the prosecutor may move the trial court to:
(i) Impose a sentence of life without parole, and the trial court may impose the sentence of life without parole without a hearing; or
(ii) Impanel a new sentencing jury[.]
(2) If the prosecutor elects subdivision (a)(1)(C)(ii) of this section the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing proceeding;
....
(b) This section shall not be construed to amend a provision of § 5-4-602 requiring the same jury to sit in both the guilt and sentencing phases of the original trial.

Finally, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3(c)(1) & (2) contemplates alternate jurors participating in a trial's penalty phase. Rule 32.3 provides that

(c) In the case of a capital murder trial or any other bifurcated trial in which the court cannot fix punishment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-103(b), and in which there are alternate jurors remaining after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty, the next alternate jurors, not to exceed two, shall be placed in the jury box along with the regular jurors. Any alternate jurors in addition to these two shall be dismissed. The trial will proceed with the penalty phase. When the jury retires to deliberate the penalty, the remaining alternate juror or jurors will again remain at the courthouse during deliberation.
(1) If at any time after a verdict of guilty, but before a verdict fixing punishment, a juror who participated in the guilt phase of a capital murder trial or other trial described above dies, becomes ill, or is otherwise found to be unable or disqualified to perform his or her duties, such juror shall be discharged. The court may in its discretion, as an alternative to mistrial or any other option available by statute or these rules,
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2 cases
  • Strawhacker v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2022
    ...to his detriment.We have recognized the possibility that "residual doubt" may factor into a jury's sentencing decision. State v. Torres , 2021 Ark. 22, 617 S.W.3d 232, (citing Lockhart v. McCree , 476 U.S. 162, 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) ). It therefore follows that repudiat......
  • State v. Van Voast
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 3, 2022
    ...to interpret statutes, and our review is de novo, as it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute or rule. State v. Torres , 2021 Ark. 22, 617 S.W.3d 232 ; Newman v. State , 2011 Ark. 112, 380 S.W.3d 395. The first rule in interpreting a statute is to construe it just as it reads......

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