State v. Toti, 10154
| Decision Date | 03 April 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 10154,10154 |
| Citation | 94 R.I. 212,179 A.2d 488 |
| Parties | STATE v. George N. TOTI. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Corinne P. Grande, Special Counsel, for the State.
Ralph Rotondo, Providence, for defendant.
This is an indictment charging the defendant with carrying a weapon concealed on or about his person without a license so to do. The case was tried before a superior court justice sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict of guilty. It is before us on the defendant's bill of exceptions to certain evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of an alleged confession, the denial of his motion for a directed verdict and certain other exceptions which we do not deem it necessary to consider.
The record discloses that at or about midnight on August 7, 1959, defendant rang the doorbell of Stella Barrette at Bodell avenue in the city of Providence. It appears that defendant was known to her but she had not seen him for some seven years previously.
She testified that on hearing the doorbell she went to the door but did not open it; that she looked through the curtain on the door window and recognizing defendant told him to leave and returned upstairs and that because defendant continued to ring the bell she opened the door 'Just slightly ajar.' She stated that she talked with defendant, could not remember the conversation, and added, '* * * after a while he hands this gun to me.'
Mrs. Barrette further testified that when she observed defendant through the curtained window she noticed nothing unusual. When asked specifically, however, if she could see his arms, she replied,
Counsel for the state inquired as to how defendant was dressed and the witness replied that he was wearing a suit, and in answer to a specific question stated that defendant was not in his shirt sleeves. She further testified as follows: ' She again stated that she noticed nothing unusual.
There was then admitted into evidence, without objection, a gun which the witness identified as the one handed to her by defendant.
In redirect examination Mrs. Barrette was again questioned about the first occasion when she observed defendant through the curtained window in the door. Asked if she saw a gun at that time she replied that she did not. It is significant, however, that in connection with this observation Mrs. Barrette had testified that she did not notice defendant's arms.
It further appears from the record that in response to a call from the central station, Sergeant William J. Lawton went to Mrs. Barrette's home, where after talking with her he instructed a fellow officer to apprehend defendant. Sergeant Lawton testified over defendant's objection that the latter had confessed to carrying the gun in his waistband while en route to Mrs. Barrette's home. The defendant thereupon moved that the answer be stricken on the ground that thus far the state had failed to adduce any evidence establishing the corpus delicti. The trial justice denied the motion, to which denial defendant duly excepted.
At the conclusion of the officer's testimony the state rested its case. The defense offered no evidence and moved for a directed verdict, which motion was denied.
The defendant's first two exceptions are to the admission of Sergeant Lawton's testimony and to the denial of defendant's motion to strike such testimony after it had been given. Since both exceptions relate to the admissibility of defendant's alleged admission or confession, we shall consider them as constituting a single exception.
The defendant contends that in the absence of some corroborative evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti, a confession or self-incriminating statement is inadmissible for the reason that an unsupported confession is insufficient to prove the corpus delicti. We are in full accord with this principle. In State v. Boswell, 73 R.I. 358, at page 362, 56 A.2d 196, at page 198, ...
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State v. Maloney
...court, the motions for directed verdicts would be considered by us on the basis of evidence properly admitted, citing State v. Toti, 94 R.I. 212, 179 A.2d 488 (1962). Continuing, we further indicated that with the motions for directed verdicts so postured, the question of whether defendant ......
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State v. Maloney
...however, is the question of whether certain controlling evidence considered by the trial justice was properly before him. In State v. Toti, 94 R.I. 212, 179 A.2d 488, we pointed out that a denial of a motion for a directed verdict will be reversed if it rests for validity upon dispositive e......
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State v. Kurowski
...on the part of the defendant. See State v. Bennett, 92 R.I. 316, 322, 168 A.2d 282. We find no error in his decision. State v. Toti, 94 R.I. 212, 179 A.2d 488, and State v. Montella, 88 R.L. 469, 149 A.2d 919, are not in point and therefore require no discussion. We have carefully considere......
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Santos v. Smith
...of his power when in fixing the penalty he considered the attendant circumstances. The petitioner, however, refers us to State v. Toti, 94 R.I. 212, 179 A.2d 488, and State v. Montella, 88 R.I. 469, 149 A.2d 919, but his reliance on those cases is misplaced. There we held that a conviction ......