State v. Townsend, 47469
| Citation | 327 S.W.2d 886 |
| Decision Date | 12 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 47469,No. 2,47469,2 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Sam Thomas TOWNSEND, Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Leo M. Newman, St. Louis, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., George E. Schaaf, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
Appellant was found guilty of tampering with an automobile as defined in par. 1 of Section 560.175 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The information contained the necessary averments, under what is known as the habitual criminal act, that appellant had previously been convicted of four separate felonies. In addition to finding appellant guilty of the offense charged, the jury found that he had previously been convicted of a felony and it assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of five years. Appellant has filed no brief so we consider the assignments of error properly made in his motion for new trial.
The first four assignments of error are, in their entirety, as follows: 'The verdict is against the law,' 'The verdict is against the evidence,' 'The verdict is against the law and the evidence,' and 'The verdict is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence.' They preserve nothing for appellate review. Supreme Court Rule 27.20, 42 V.A.M.S.; State v. Duncan, Mo.Sup., 316 S.W.2d 613; State v. Hood, Mo.Sup., 313 S.W.2d 661.
By the next three assignments appellant sets forth three reasons why he contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict. We shall treat such motion as one for judgment of acquittal. See Supreme Court Rule 26.10, 42 V.A.M.S. This necessitates a statement of the evidence, but in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand such a motion, which is the same as the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we consider as true the evidence favorable to the State and the favorable inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom, and evidence to the contrary is rejected. State v. Thomas, Mo.Sup., 309 S.W.2d 607, 609.
On October 2, 1958, Roland Watson parked a 1951 Chevrolet at his place of employment in the City of St. Louis. Although he had locked the automobile, he later discovered that it was gone and he reported the matter to the police. Shortly before three o'clock of the following morning two police officers saw appellant driving the above referred to automobile in the wrong direction on a one-way street in the City of St. Louis and signaled him to stop. They were able to stop him only after a chase at high speeds and after he had run into a concrete abutment and a brick wall. Roland Watson had given no permission directly or impliedly to appellant to take or use the automobile and he had not loaned it to anyone.
The automobile had been purchased by Frank Watson, a resident of Dixon, Missouri, from Leo Robinson on September 23, 1958. At that time the automobile was turned over to Roland Watson, an eighteen- year-old nephew of Frank Watson, and Roland was told that he could keep the automobile indefinitely as his own. Roland thereafter had the sole and exclusive use of it. The certificate of title was issued in the name of Frank Watson and was introduced in evidence, but it is not a part of the transcript and has not been deposited with the clerk of this court. Appellant does not contend there was no valid assignment of title in the manner prescribed by Section 301.210 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., by Leo Robinson to Frank Watson on September 23, 1958, and from the testimony of Roland Watson it may reasonably be inferred that there was.
The first reason asserted by appellant that a motion of acquittal should have been sustained is that 'State's witness, Roland Watson, was incompetent to testify that the defendant was operating the vehicle without the consent of the owner.' Roland Watson did not so testify. In fact, when such a question was asked him the trial court sustained appellant's objection thereto and no answer was given. To prove this necessary fact the State relied on other testimony of Roland to the effect that his uncle was not in St. Louis on or about October 2, 1958; that his uncle had placed the automobile in his, that is, Roland's, custody and control and he had the sole use thereof; and that he had given no permission to appellant to use or operate the automobile. This, and the other testimony concerning the circumstances, authorized the inference that appellant was operating the...
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State v. Gilliam, 48437
...against the law and the evidence,' preserve nothing for appellate review. State v. Roberts, Mo., 332 S.W.2d 896, 898[2-4]; State v. Townsend, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 886; State v. Russell, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 727, After a hearing in the absence of the jury at the close of the evidence, the court found ......
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State v. Morris
...the car was being operated without the consent, express or implied, of the owner. Defendant cites and relies on the case of State v. Townsend, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 886, as being somewhat analogous to the situation here presented. In Townsend the owner of an automobile, Frank Watson, left town, b......
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State v. Pinkerman
...law and the evidence.' This assignment is too general to preserve anything for appellate review under Supreme Court Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R. State v. Townsend, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 886, 887; State v. Alberson, Mo.Sup., 325 S.W.2d 773, 775; State v. Duncan, Mo.Sup., 316 S.W.2d 613, 615; State v. ......
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State v. Butler
...so lacking in detail and particularity that they present nothing for appellate review. Supreme Court Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R.; State v. Townsend, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 886; State v. Ivory, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 870; State v. Benjamin, Mo.Sup., 309 S.W.2d 602 The fourth and fifth assignments of erro......