State v. Trexler

• Decision Date: 06 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 626A85,626A85
• Citation: 316 N.C. 528,342 S.E.2d 878
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Richard Lewis TREXLER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 878

342 S.E.2d 878

316 N.C. 528

STATE of North Carolina v. Richard Lewis TREXLER.

No. 626A85.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 6, 1986.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by W. Dale Talbert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for State.

Roberts, Cogburn, McClure & Williams by Max O. Cogburn, Isaac N. Northup, Jr., and Glenn S. Gentry, Asheville, for defendant-appellee.

Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy by Charles A. Lloyd, Greensboro, for Greensboro Criminal Defense Lawyer's Ass'n, amicus curiae.

BRANCH, Chief Justice.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the majority of the panel in the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the State had failed to prove the corpus delicti of the charged offense. The majority felt that it was bound by this Court's decision in State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983).

There is some question in the present case as to whether defendant's extrajudicial statements should be categorized as a confession or an admission. An admission is a statement of pertinent facts which, in light of other evidence, is incriminating. 2 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 182, n. 3 (1982). Our State law defines a confession as "an acknowledgement in expressed words by an accused in a criminal case of his guilt to the crime charged or of some essential part of it." State v. Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 25, 175 S.E.2d 561, 576 (1970). See also State v. Shaw, 284 N.C. 366, 373, 200 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1973). A confession, therefore, is a type of an admission. 2 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence, § 182 (1982); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 821 (1970). We conclude that the corpus delicti rule applies with equal force to confessions and admissions. Cf. State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E.2d 178 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3210, 49 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1976); State v. Barber, 278 N.C. 268, 179 S.E.2d 404 (1971). The United States Supreme Court, in applying its corpus delicti rule in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90, 75 S.Ct. 158, 162, 99 L.Ed. 101, 107 (1954), in part, stated: "[a]n accused's admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions and that corroboration should be required." Thus, regardless of whether defendant's statements constitute an actual confession or only amount to an admission, our long established rule of corpus delicti requires that there be corroborative evidence, independent of the statements, before defendant may be found guilty of the crime.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that a naked, uncorroborated, extrajudicial confession is not sufficient to support a criminal conviction. Our application of the corpus delicti rule before our decision in State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985), required that there be corroborative evidence, independent of defendant's confession, which tended to prove the commission of the charged crime. State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983); State v. Green, 295 N.C. 244, 244 S.E.2d 369 (1978); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 3215, 49 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1976); State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960).

This Court recently examined the corpus delicti rule in State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487. After an exhaustive review of the case law in this and other jurisdictions, Justice Billings, speaking for the Court, in part, stated:

We adopt a rule in non-capital cases that when the State relies upon the defendant's confession to obtain a conviction, it is no longer necessary that there be independent proof tending to establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged if the accused's confession is supported by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, including facts that tend to show the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime.

We wish to emphasize, however, that when independent proof of loss or injury is lacking, there must be strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant's confession. Corroboration of insignificant facts or those unrelated to the commission of the crime will not suffice. We emphasize this point because although we have relaxed our corroboration rule somewhat, we remain advertent to the reason for its existence, that is, to protect against convictions for crimes that have not in fact occurred.

Id. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.

We discern from our examination of Parker that the pre-Parker rule has not been abandoned but that Parker expanded the type of corroboration which may be sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of the confession. The pre-Parker rule is still fully applicable in cases in which there is some evidence aliunde the confession which, when considered with the confession, will tend to support a finding that the crime charged occurred. The rule does not require that the evidence aliunde the confession prove any element of the crime. The corpus delicti rule only requires evidence aliunde the confession which, when considered with the confession, supports the confession and permits a reasonable inference that the crime occurred. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1142 (1967). The independent evidence must touch or be concerned with the corpus delicti. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487. The expanded rule enunciated in Parker applies in cases in which such independent proof is lacking but where there is substantial independent evidence tending to furnish strong corroboration of essential facts contained in defendant's confession so as to establish trustworthiness of the confession.

Although the burden is on the State to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime, it is obvious that a confession will ordinarily furnish this proof.

Defendant admitted that the wrecked automobile was his, that he was driving it when it overturned, and that he had "a couple of beers" before driving the car. He further admitted that he went home and returned to the...