State v. Trifiletti
| Docket Number | A21-1101 |
| Decision Date | 12 September 2022 |
| Citation | 980 N.W.2d 357 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Anthony James TRIFILETTI, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.*
The issue presented reflects a clash between the district court's reasonable concern for the health and well-being of all those in the courtroom and the constitutional right of a defendant to confront his accusers. The constitutional right of the defendant wins the clash.
Appellant Anthony Trifiletti was driving from downtown Minneapolis to Cottage Grove on the evening of May 1, 2020. Trifiletti's three friends were following Trifiletti in a separate vehicle on Interstate 94 in St. Paul when a car cut between them. In response, Trifiletti pressed his truck's brakes, causing the car to collide with the back of Trifiletti's truck. After leaving the interstate and stopping their vehicles on Burns Avenue, Trifiletti and the driver of the other vehicle began to argue. Trifiletti and his friends heard the man yell, "I'm GD," which Trifiletti understood to be a gang term. After Trifiletti's friends had returned to their vehicle, the situation worsened and Trifiletti shot the man with the handgun Trifiletti lawfully possessed. The man died of his wounds later that night.
The state charged Trifiletti with second-degree intentional murder, and later amended the complaint to add second-degree felony murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subds. 1(1), 2(1) (2018). During the trial in March 2021, Trifiletti claimed self-defense, explaining to the jury that he saw the other motorist "turn around and start coming straight towards me" and reach into his waistband as if he were grabbing a gun. To contradict Trifiletti's self-defense claim, the state called to testify the only other eyewitness to the shooting—M.W., who was driving her vehicle with her boyfriend, S.S., and observed Trifiletti shoot the man. M.W. testified, "I seen [Trifiletti] run to his vehicle and then I seen him grab a gun, shut his door, and then fired." She told the jury that the other driver was "walking away" when Trifiletti shot him. The jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, so the district court declared a mistrial.
During the second trial, in April 2021, M.W. and S.S. each reported that they may have been exposed to COVID-19. During the first day of trial evidence on April 12, the district court learned that M.W. had experienced unidentified symptoms but "apparently is getting better" and spoke with a doctor, who advised against taking a COVID-19 test. The district court directed the prosecutor to provide updated information about the COVID-19 status of M.W. and S.S. so that the district court could decide whether they should be present in the courtroom.1
On day two of trial evidence, April 13, the district court judge announced to the attorneys that he spoke to Dr. Lynne Ogawa, M.D., a Ramsey County public-health official, and she advised that "it would be reasonable ... for [M.W. and S.S.] to testify, as long as they remain masked and we enforce the other public health protocols that we had put into place during trial," such as mandatory masking and distancing. The prosecutor reported that M.W. and her infant child previously experienced a cough
but that this symptom had dissipated. Based on this information, the district court indicated that it would allow M.W. and S.S. to testify.
Later on day two of trial evidence, the prosecutor reported that S.S.’s doctor, upon learning of S.S.’s recent contact with an individual who may have had COVID-19 but was asymptomatic, recommended that he quarantine for ten days. The prosecutor also informed the district court that M.W. reported that she had experienced COVID-19-like symptoms after being in close contact with her sister on April 6, who tested positive for the virus on April 12, but that those symptoms had fully dissipated.
On day three of trial evidence, April 14, and based upon the information learned the previous afternoon, the state argued that both witnesses were unavailable and therefore sought to either read the transcripts of the witnesses’ first-trial testimony or present their testimony remotely using video technology. Trifiletti objected to the state's request, insisting that he has a right to live, in-person confrontation and pointing out that the district court had received only self-reported, secondhand information about these witnesses’ potential unavailability.
The district court concluded that M.W. and S.S. were unavailable to testify. It declined to conduct a remote voir dire of the witnesses to inquire further about the circumstances of their potential exposure, relying instead on the updates the witnesses gave the prosecutor. The district court informed the parties that, based upon its review of information from the department of health's website that morning, both M.W. and S.S. "should be in quarantine and should not be coming down to the courthouse." It determined that the witnesses’ "reported exposure to a COVID-positive person ... presents a clear public health risk within the view of national and local guidance."
The district court gave Trifiletti two alternatives as it relates to presentation of [M.W.’s] testimony in her absence: examine the witnesses remotely via video technology or have her testimony from the first trial read to the jury. Trifiletti objected to both alternatives as "a Hobson's choice"2 because "neither [was] acceptable," and stated that he felt "very strongly" that he would not "pick the lesser of two evils." The district court noted that Trifiletti objected to both options, and that he would make "legal arguments that ... will preserve" the objection. Trifiletti filed a memorandum presenting his legal arguments with the district court.
On day four of trial evidence, April 15, the district court found that neither option would "violate the confrontation clause." Defense counsel inquired about a potential third option, stating that "I assume if I move for a continuance, that will be denied, based on the Court's ruling." The district court responded, "My inclination would not be to continue the trial." Defense counsel further inquired, "And that would apply equally if I ask for a mistrial," to which the district court responded, "I don't see the grounds for a mistrial." The district court concluded that "both of the methods [of presenting M.W.’s testimony] that I am allowing would be a constitutional surrogate for the live testimony of [M.W.]."
After lunch break, defense counsel stated, "We've made a decision, understanding that we have one of two options to pick, and we've opted ... [for] the prior testimony [to] be read into the record."
The jury found Trifiletti guilty of second-degree murder while committing a felony and the lesser-included charge of second-degree manslaughter pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.205(1) (2018)3 but acquitted him of intentional second-degree murder. The district court sentenced Trifiletti to 150 months in prison. Trifiletti appeals.
Is Trifiletti entitled to a new trial on the ground that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him by ruling that M.W. was unavailable to testify in person?
Trifiletti challenges his conviction, arguing that prohibiting M.W. from testifying in person violated the Confrontation Clause and that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Because the Sixth Amendment guarantees Trifiletti the right to confront M.W., with only limited exceptions recognized by the founding-era common law, and the state failed to prove that any of those limited exceptions exist, we agree that his Confrontation Clause right was violated and the error was not harmless. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI ; see also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. This right is grounded in the common-law tradition "of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing." Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 43, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Because the Confrontation Clause was patterned after the common-law right, "the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required" before admitting an out-of-court testimonial statement: "unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The state bears the burden of proving that a witness is unavailable to testify before presenting her prior testimony, and we review de novo whether the state met that burden. See State v. Cox , 779 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Minn. 2010) ().
Before proceeding with our Sixth Amendment analysis, we must first consider our court's recent decision in State v. Tate and why, contrary to the state's argument, it does not answer the issue before us. 969 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. granted (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022). The state argues that our court in Tate concluded that a witness who is possibly exposed to COVID-19 is unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes. We disagree that Tate informs our decision. Tate was decided pursuant to a different legal framework described in Maryland v. Craig , 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), in which a witness provided live testimony via remote technology. The case presented to...
To continue reading
Request your trial