State v. Triggs
| Decision Date | 28 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014AP204–CR.,2014AP204–CR. |
| Citation | 358 Wis.2d 711,856 N.W.2d 346 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Isaiah N. TRIGGS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Isaiah N. Triggs appeals the judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless homicide, as party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05 (2011–12).1 He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. On appeal, Triggs argues that the trial court erred in denying his postconviction motion without a hearing because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the plea colloquy was defective; and (3) in the alternative, the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing. We affirm.
¶ 2 In February 2012, Triggs and a co-defendant, Johnny Tyrone Gibson Jr., were charged with first-degree intentional homicide as parties to the crime for the shooting death of Mark Burt. According to the criminal complaint, both Triggs and Gibson told police that they lured Burt into an alley under the pretense of committing a robbery together, and both told police that Triggs shot Burt, but each defendant tried to implicate the other for planning the homicide. Triggs' story was that Gibson “was ‘beefing’ with the victim over a lie and ... wanted the victim dead.” Triggs also said that Gibson threatened to kill him if he did not kill Burt. Gibson, on the other hand, said that Triggs wanted to kill Burt “for allegedly having sex with his cousin.”
¶ 3 The complaint was based in part on three statements that Triggs gave to police after his arrest. The first statement was given the evening of February 18, 2012, a few hours after Triggs was arrested. In this statement, Triggs provided police with background information about his family and education, and then, after being provided with Miranda2 warnings, spoke to police about Burt's death, saying that “he had no idea who killed Mark Burt and he wasn't there.” The second statement was given the morning of February 19, 2012, at about 6:34 a.m. In this statement, Triggs, after being provided with Miranda warnings, agreed to speak with police and said that he never talked with Gibson about Burt's death. When the interviewing detective accused him of lying, Triggs said that he wanted to talk with a lawyer and the interview ended. The third statement was given the evening of February 19, 2012, after Triggs informed police that he wanted to talk.
¶ 4 The third statement contained Triggs' confession. We relate the details here as material to this appeal. At the start of the third interview—an interview that Triggs, not police, had initially requested—Triggs asked for counsel to be present. One of the interviewing detectives told Triggs that it would not be possible for him to speak with a lawyer that night, as police “would not be able to facilitate getting a lawyer ... on [a] Sunday night.” Triggs then asked whether he could speak with a lawyer in the future, and the detective responded that he could do so, but not on that particular night. Triggs responded that “he wished to tell his side of the story and would speak to Detectives without a lawyer present.” When the detectives brought Triggs to the interview room, however, Triggs “again mentioned his lawyer.” The interviewing detective explained that “we would not be conducting this interview if he wished to have a lawyer present.” Triggs then said that he did in fact want to talk to police and that he would do so without an attorney present. One of the interviewing detectives then gave Triggs his Miranda warnings, and, after confirming that Triggs understood them and did in fact wish to proceed without an attorney present, questioned him about the shooting. Triggs then told police that he did in fact shoot and kill Burt, but wanted to explain “his side of the story,” which was that Gibson threatened to shoot him if he did not kill Burt.
¶ 5 Following the police interviews and the charge of first-degree intentional homicide, Triggs waived his preliminary examination. Triggs signed a preliminary hearing questionnaire and waiver form, and a court commissioner engaged in a colloquy with Triggs, confirming that Triggs understood the rights he was waiving and that no one had made any promises to induce him to waive his hearing.
¶ 6 In October 2012, Triggs pled guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to one count of first-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Before the plea hearing, Triggs executed a written guilty plea questionnaire, to which trial counsel had attached the jury instruction for first-degree reckless homicide. As relevant here, during the plea hearing, the trial court took steps to ensure that: Triggs understood the nature of the crime to which he pled guilty; there was a factual basis for the plea; and Triggs understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
¶ 7 At the plea hearing, to ensure that Triggs understood the nature of the charges against him, the trial court discussed the individual elements of first-degree reckless homicide:
You caused the death of the victim of the offense by criminally reckless conduct and that criminally reckless conduct means that you created a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person and that the risk of death or great bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial and that your conduct, you are aware that your conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm and that the circumstances of your conduct showed utter disregard for human life.
The trial court asked Triggs if he understood and Triggs replied, “Yes.” The trial court asked Triggs whether he had gone over the elements of the offense with his lawyer and how they related to the facts of the case, and Triggs responded that he had done so. The trial court then explained the concept of party-to-a-crime liability and asked Triggs if he understood, and Triggs replied that he did. The trial court also informed Triggs that if the case went to trial, the with which he had been charged.
¶ 8 In addition, during Triggs' guilty plea hearing the trial court stated that it would use the criminal complaint as a factual basis for the guilty plea. Neither the State nor Triggs objected.
¶ 9 Also at the plea hearing, the trial court confirmed that Triggs understood the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Triggs had, by this point, already executed the standard guilty plea questionnaire and waiver-of-rights form, which identified the rights Triggs waived by pleading guilty. At the hearing, trial counsel indicated that she had reviewed the questionnaire and attachments with Triggs and that Triggs understood them. The trial court then discussed the forms with Triggs, asking Triggs if he understood that he would “be waiving those constitutional rights that are contained in the guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form [he] signed.” Triggs responded, “Yes.” The trial court further discussed some of those rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to a unanimous verdict, and the right to have the State prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt regarding each and every element of the offense. Triggs responded that he understood. The trial court then asked Triggs if he understood that he would be waiving any defenses to the charges, including the right to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint, the right to challenge the constitutionality of any police actions—including any stop, search, seizure, arrest, or actions surrounding Triggs' statements made to police—and Triggs responded, “Yes.” The trial court also informed Triggs of his right to confront witnesses who would have testified against him and to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf. Triggs stated that he understood. Finally, the trial court asked trial counsel if she was satisfied that Triggs “intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly” waived his constitutional rights, and counsel responded that she was.
¶ 10 After Triggs pled guilty, the trial court sentenced him to forty years of initial confinement and eight years of extended supervision. The trial court noted that Triggs and Gibson hatched a plan that led to a “horrific, brutal, savage result which took the life of another human being.” The court also noted Triggs' role as the shooter and “the vicious or aggravated nature of the offense—sneaking up on someone, shooting the person in the head and ... shooting a number of different shots into ... the victim's body.” The court also explained that the sentence was “also to protect the community because” Triggs had killed one of his friends, saying “what would you do to someone else who wasn't a friend of yours, somebody who had trusted [you?]” The trial court did recognize various mitigating factors, such as Triggs' young age, his education, background, employment history, as well as positive factors such as Triggs' apparent remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
¶ 11 Thereafter, Triggs filed a postconviction motion, which the trial court denied. Triggs now appeals. Additional facts will be developed below.
¶ 12 On appeal, Triggs argues that the trial court erred in denying his postconviction motion because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the plea colloquy was defective; and (3) in the alternative, the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing. We address each argument in turn.
(1) Trial counsel was not ineffective.
¶ 13 On appeal, Triggs argues that the trial court erred in denying his postconviction motion because trial counsel, by persuading Triggs to waive his preliminary hearing and by failing to move to suppress the statements he made to police, was ineffective.
¶ 14 “Whether a defendant's postconviction motion alleges sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to a hearing for the relief requested is a mixed...
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