State v. Triplett
| Decision Date | 14 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2013CA00209 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. SON ANDERSON TRIPLETT, JR. Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
For Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHN FERRERO
Stark County Prosecutor
BY RENEE WATSON
For Defendant-Appellant
GEORGE URBAN
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Son Anderson Triplett ["Triplett"] appeals his convictions and sentences on one count of assault and one count of tampering with drugs after a jury trial in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} Charla Green lives on Smith Ave. SW in Canton, across the street from Tonya Rohrer. On March 23, 2013, she arrived home around 9:00 p.m. to find a white Cadillac parked in front of her house. She parked behind the vehicle and walked past it to her house. She recognized the man in the driver's seat as Triplett — she had seen him and Rohrer together in the past.
{¶3} Triplett sat parked for a long time, and then repetitively drove up and down the street. Green thought the situation was suspicious, and it scared her children. She called 9-1-1 and reported Triplett's activities.
{¶4} Meanwhile, Rohrer was home asleep. Around 2:30-3:00 a.m., Triplett entered her home, angry. Rohrer "knew not to argue with him" and "didn't want him to go all crazy in [her] house with [her] kids around," so she went outside with him and sat in his car. Triplett then took off with Rohrer in the car and drove around Canton while beating her, biting her and threatening to kill her. Eventually Rohrer jumped from the moving car to escape.
{¶5} While all that was going on, Gilise Mammone, an insomniac, was up watching television. Around 3:00 a.m., she heard someone pounding frantically at her door. She looked outside, but did not see anyone. She went to a different window and saw a white car drive past. Mammone then went to the front door and opened theinterior door, but still saw nothing. She then opened the screen door and yelled, "What's going on out here?"
{¶6} Rohrer emerged from between the houses, and begged Mammone to let her in, pleading, "he's trying to kill me." Mammone said no, closed, and locked the screen door. Rohrer stepped up onto the porch, tripping the security light. Mammone then saw terror in Rohrer's eyes, and an injury on her forehead. Rohrer continued repeating, "He's going to kill me." Mammone relented and let Rohrer come inside her home.
{¶7} Mammone sat Rohrer down and called 9-1-1. After giving the dispatcher her location and the nature of the call, she put Rohrer on the phone. Rohrer was upset, crying and breathing heavily. She told the dispatcher "he was beating on me...I'm not lying about it- he tried to kill me."
{¶8} Three Canton Police Officers arrived shortly thereafter. Although Rohrer was "in a semi-state of hysteria," Officer Jim Meyers also felt Rohrer was not being completely honest. Rohrer first claimed that while out walking her dog, she was abducted by an unknown black male who was driving a white Cadillac. She said the man beat her, bit her, choked her and explained to her in detail how he was going to kill her. Meyers noted Rohrer had a lump on her forehead, but Rohrer refused medical attention and stated she wanted to go home. Meyers put her in his cruiser and started driving toward her home.
{¶9} On the way, a call went out notifying officers that the suspect white Cadillac and driver had been located and stopped. Meyers changed course, and took Rohrer to that location. She identified Triplett as the man who assaulted her.
{¶10} At that point, Rohrer became more cooperative. She told Meyers that she knew Triplett, and that initially their meeting that evening began civilly. He came to her house and they sat in his car talking. Then the conversation became heated, and she wanted to leave the car. However, Triplett grabbed her, drove off at speed and started "whaling" on her — choking her, biting her and hitting her in the ribs. He explained how he was going to kill her. Rohrer finally managed to bail out of the car near Mammone's home.
{¶11} Meyers photographed Rohrer's injuries — a lump on her head bruises on her neck and a bite mark on her chin, Rohrer additionally complained that her ribs hurt, but still refused medical treatment.
{¶12} Triplett was arrested and booked by Officers Sharpe and Grant. During booking a clear plastic sandwich baggie containing six blue pills was found in Triplett's pants pocket. Triplett initially claimed the pills were Viagra, but then later stated they were Xanax and that he sometimes sells the pills for cash. The pills were sent to the Canton Stark County Crime Lab where Jay Spencer completed testing on the pills. He confirmed that they were indeed Xanax, a Schedule IV drug.
{¶13} As a result of his actions, Triplett was later charged with one count each of kidnapping, assault and tampering with drugs.
{¶14} The state presented six witnesses. Triplett rested without presenting evidence. After hearing all the evidence and deliberating for three hours, the jury acquitted Triplett of kidnapping, but convicted him of assault and tampering with drugs. Triplett was subsequently sentenced to 180 days for assault and 24 months for tampering with drugs. The court ordered Triplett to serve the sentences concurrently.
{¶15} Triplett raises four assignments of error,
{¶16} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCUSE THE ONLY PROSPECTIVE AFRICAN AMERICAN JUROR.
{¶17} "II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS A RESULT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
{¶18} "III. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND OF ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSITUTION,[sic.] BECAUSE HIS TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSITANCE. [sic.]
{¶19}
{¶20} A defendant is denied equal protection of the law guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution when the state places the defendant on trial before a jury from which members of the defendant's race have been purposely excluded. Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664(1880); State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 589 N.E.2d 1310(1992); State v. Bryant, 104 Ohio App.3d 512, 516, 662 N.E.2d 846(6th Dist. 1995). The "equal protection clause forbids a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that jurors of thesame race as the defendant will be unable to impartially consider the state's case against the defendant." State v. Bryant, 104 Ohio App.3d 512, 516, 662 N.E.2d 846(6th Dist. 1995); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69(1986).
{¶21} In his first assignment of error, Triplett maintains that the trial court failed to conduct a proper constitutional analysis as outlined in Batson v. Kentucky in determining that the state was not racially motivated in excluding an African-American from the jury through the use of peremptory challenges. See, Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 78 Ohio St.3d 95, 98, 676 N.E. 2d 872(1997); State v. Toland, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA-0162, 2007-Ohio-644.
{¶22} Whenever a party opposes a peremptory challenge by claiming racial discrimination "[a] judge should make clear, on the record, that he or she understands and has applied the precise Batson test * * *." Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 78 Ohio St.3d at 99, 676 N.E. 2d 872.
{¶23} In Hicks, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the Batson test as follows:
The United States Supreme Court set forth in Batson the test to be used in determining whether a peremptory strike is racially motivated. First, a party opposing a peremptory challenge must demonstrate a prima-facie case of racial discrimination in the use of the strike. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87. To establish a prima-facie case, a litigant must show he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the peremptory challenge will remove a member of the litigant's race from the venire. The peremptory-challenge opponent is entitled to rely on thefact that the strike is an inherently 'discriminating' device, permitting 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate'. State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 582, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1313, certiorari denied (1992), 506 U.S. 898, 113 S.Ct. 279, 121 L.Ed.2d 206. The litigant must then show an inference of racial discrimination by the striking party. The trial court should consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether a prima-facie case exists, including all statements by counsel exercising the peremptory challenge, counsel's questions during voir dire, and whether a pattern of strikes against minority venire members is present. See, Batson at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Assuming a prima-facie case exists, the striking party must then articulate a race-neutral explanation 'related to the particular case to be tried.' Id. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. A simple affirmation of general good faith will not suffice. However, the explanation 'need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.' Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. The critical issue is whether a discriminatory intent is inherent in counsel's explanation for use of the strike; intent is present if the explanation is merely pretext for exclusion based on race. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868,...
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