State v. Trotter

• Decision Date: 30 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 122,293,122,293
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Christopher M. TROTTER, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

313 Kan. 365

485 P.3d 649

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Christopher M. TROTTER, Appellant.

No. 122,293

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed April 30, 2021.

Luke H. Alsobrook, of The Alsobrook Law Firm, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, was on the briefs for appellant.

Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee.

Per Curiam:

Christopher Trotter attacks a part of his sentence for first-degree premeditated murder. He seeks resentencing under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6628(c), formerly K.S.A. 21-4639, because the sentencing judge engaged in judicial fact-finding to determine that aggravating factors justified a minimum sentence of 50 years instead of the 25-year minimum that would otherwise apply.

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6628(c) does not create an avenue or independent means by which a convicted person can challenge his or her underlying sentence. We thus affirm the district court's denial of Trotter's request for relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Trotter of first-degree premeditated murder, capital murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery based on acts committed in 2001. The district court, without jury findings, imposed a hard 50 life sentence after concluding any mitigating circumstances did not outweigh aggravating circumstances. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Trotter , 280 Kan. 800, 800-03, 820, 127 P.3d 972 (2006).

Trotter later filed a pro se motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 seeking post-conviction, collateral relief. The district court summarily denied the motion, and Trotter appealed to this court. We reversed Trotter's first-degree murder conviction, concluding it was multiplicitous with his capital murder conviction. We found his appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise the multiplicity issue. But we rejected his other arguments that his attorney had been ineffective and that he was entitled to a new trial because his codefendants recanted their prior testimony. See Trotter v. State , 288 Kan. 112, 115, 131, 139, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009).

A few years later, Trotter filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, alleging a defective complaint deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The district court rejected his argument, and this court affirmed. We concluded Trotter could not use a motion to correct illegal sentence to attack his conviction. We also considered construing his motion as a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 but concluded that statute's one-year time limitation barred relief. State v. Trotter , 296 Kan. 898, 899-900, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013).

Trotter filed yet another 60-1507 motion arguing his hard 50 sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). The district court denied relief, concluding Alleyne did not retroactively apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Trotter v. State , No. 112,446, 2017 WL 462164, at *4 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion).

Finally, in 2017, Trotter filed a pro se Motion for Sentence Modification Under K.S.A. 21-6628(c), arguing his hard 50 sentence was unconstitutional and required modification. The district court denied his motion and this appeal followed.

While this appeal was pending, this court decided State v. Coleman , 312 Kan. 114, 472 P.3d 85 (2020). There, we held that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6628(c) does not create a new avenue or independent means by which a convicted person can challenge his or her underlying sentence. 312 Kan. at 121-24, 472 P.3d 85. The State filed a Rule 6.09 letter addressing Coleman . (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 40). This court requested additional briefing, and both parties responded.

This court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (allowing appeal of life sentence to Supreme Court, except for sentence imposed under K.S.A. 21-4643 or K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6627 ).

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

This case involves issues of statutory interpretation and constitutional claims. Both are questions of law subject to de novo or unlimited review. Coleman , 312 Kan. at 117, 472 P.3d 85.

History of Caselaw on Judicial Fact-finding

Trotter raises the same complaint as had Curtis L. Coleman Jr.: A judge, not a jury, found aggravating factors that served as the basis for increasing the minimum term of their life sentences from 25 years to either 40 years in Coleman's case or 50 years in Trotter's. Like Coleman, Trotter contends his sentence should be vacated because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a jury determine these aggravating factors. See Coleman , 312 Kan. at 117-18, 472 P.3d 85 ; Trotter , 284 Kan. at 122-23, 200 P.3d 1236.

When a judge sentenced Trotter, Kansas law allowed judicial fact-finding. But, about seven years after Trotter's direct appeal ended, this court held it was unconstitutional for a judge to increase the minimum sentence a defendant must serve based on findings made by the judge, not a jury. See State v. Soto , 299 Kan. 102, 122-24, 322 P.3d 334 (2014) (citing Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 [2013] ).

This court in Coleman detailed this history. 312 Kan. at 118-19, 472 P.3d 85. We need not discuss all the detail here; a short history provides context for our holding that, like Coleman, Trotter has no right to relief.

Coleman began with a discussion of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court held that any fact other than the existence of a prior conviction "that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. That holding applied explicitly only to the determination of statutory maximum sentences and, that same year, this court declined to extend the Apprendi rule to findings made by a district court judge before imposing a mandatory minimum —the complaint Trotter makes. See State v. Conley , 270 Kan. 18, 11 P.3d 1147 (2000) (relying on McMillan v. Pennsylvania , 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 [1986] ).

Two years later, the United States Supreme Court walked the line between Apprendi and McMillan by characterizing a judge's finding that a defendant possessed, brandished, or discharged a firearm during the commission of an offense as a judicial sentencing factor rather than an element of the crime. Harris v. United States , 536 U.S. 545, 556, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002). And that year, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Arizona's capital sentencing statutes that allowed a judge to find and balance mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose a death sentence. Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).

Ten years later, the United States Supreme Court overruled Harris in Alleyne . The Court found "no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the minimum." Alleyne , 570 U.S. at 116, 133 S.Ct. 2151. Thus, the Court held that any fact that increases the minimum sentence must "be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." 570 U.S. at 116, 133 S.Ct. 2151.

This court extended Alleyne to Kansas' hard 50 sentencing statutes (hard 40 for crimes committed before July 1, 1999) in Soto , 299 Kan. at 122-24, 322 P.3d 334. We later held the rule of law declared in Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively to invalidate a sentence that was final before the date of the Alleyne decision. Kirtdoll v. State , 306 Kan. 335, Syl. ¶ 1, 393 P.3d 1053 (2017) ; see Trotter , 2017 WL 462164, at *1.

Modification of Trotter's Sentence

While that history explains the legal basis for Trotter's complaint, it does not address the pivotal question in his appeal: Can he obtain relief from his sentence given that it was final several years before our decision in Soto and the United State Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne ? The finality of his sentence means no court has jurisdiction to modify the sentence unless there is a jurisdictional basis for presenting the argument to the court. Coleman , 312 Kan. at 119-20, 472 P.3d 85 (quoting Trotter , 296 Kan. at 905, 295 P.3d 1039 ). Requests for a sentence modification must be "dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless there is statutory language authorizing the specific requested relief." 312 Kan. at 120, 472 P.3d 85 (citing State v. Anthony , 274 Kan. 998, 1002, 58 P.3d 742 [2002] ).

Given that, the Coleman decision explored the potential ways a court could have jurisdiction to hear the claim of someone like Trotter or Coleman who seeks relief from the hard 40 or 50 minimum term of his or her life sentence. Trotter filed a motion invoking K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6628. In Coleman , we considered and rejected K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6628 as a procedural path for relief. Coleman , 312 Kan. at 121-24, 472 P.3d 85. We also considered other potential procedural mechanisms because "pro se postconviction pleadings must be analyzed by their content, not necessarily by their label." 312 Kan. at 120, 472 P.3d 85. We held that no procedure offers Trotter a path to jurisdiction. See Coleman , 312 Kan. at 121-24, 472 P.3d 85. Trotter's briefing does not persuade us to depart from Coleman 's holdings.

One of the procedural mechanisms discussed in Coleman is a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504. That statute allows courts to consider an illegal sentence at any time, which includes after a direct appeal is final. But what constitutes an illegal sentence is not open ended, and this court has made clear that "a sentence imposed in violation of Alleyne does not fall within the definition of an ‘illegal sentence’ that may be addressed by K.S.A. 22-3504." Coleman , 312 Kan. at 120, 472 P.3d 85 (citing ...