State v. Trull

Decision Date05 May 1915
Docket Number425.
Citation85 S.E. 133,169 N.C. 363
PartiesSTATE v. TRULL.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Mecklenburg County; Thomas J. Shaw Judge.

Charles E. Trull was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The prisoner was convicted before Shaw, J., at June term, 1914 of murder, in the first degree, of Sidney Swain, who was killed by a blow on the head with an iron pipe, after midnight on Saturday April 16, 1914, while going home from his store. It was in evidence that the deceased before leaving his store about 12:20 at night took from the money drawer all the cash therein, about $225, having been taken in that day, besides there was in the drawer the cash taken in for three or four days previously, and that when his body was found there was only $3 in his hip pocket; that on Tuesday before the homicide the prisoner left his boarding house because he could not pay his board bill and was in the habit of borrowing small sums of money and pawning his effects that on that Saturday afternoon he went to his boarding house and, being asked to pay his bill, said that he would pay on Monday morning; that at 10:30 that night he went to a barber shop and asked to be shaved on credit; that at 3:30 that afternoon he borrowed 75 cents to buy a pair of shoes; that about 12:30 that night the prisoner asked the witness Barton to exchange suits with him, and Barton let him have his coat and about 2 o'clock that night he was awakened by the prisoner, who took off his pants and put on another pair, and at the prisoner's invitation the witness went with him to several places "to have a big time"; that on objection by Barton that he had no money the prisoner then replied that he had plenty of money and would pay all expenses, they visited several places, and the prisoner spent considerable money, besides giving the witness $10. On his return the prisoner seemed much excited and nervous, and during the the night repeatedly insisted on the witness leaving town with him. The witness and the prisoner were arrested early the next morning, and just before the arrest the prisoner said to the witness that if anything got out, and the witness said anything about it, he (the prisoner) would shoot him.

It appears from the testimony of the officers that, when the witness Barton and the prisoner were arrested, $10.55 was taken from Barton and $407.50 from the prisoner; that the prisoner said when arrested that he did not know how much money he had, and the prisoner's pants, which Barton testified he had taken off and put in a drawer on his return, had fresh blood on them; the shoes taken from the prisoner were the same which he had bought with the 75 cents borrowed from Barton, and fitted the tracks found near the body, the tracks showing the five bars which were on the shoes; one of the shoes had blood spots on it. There were other circumstances in evidence, several witnesses testifying that they saw the prisoner about 12 o'clock that night, or shortly thereafter, in the vicinity of the place where the deceased was murdered, some of them noticing the change in his clothing, and that between 11 and 12 o'clock the prisoner had tried to borrow a pistol. Barton further testified that, when they were arrested and taken to the police station, the prisoner beckoned him into the toilet room and suggested how he should obtain testimony as to how the prisoner had obtained money. The driver of the patrol wagon testified that the prisoner beckoned to Barton, and they went together into the toilet room. The chief of police testified that Barton in the prisoner's presence gave substantially the same recital of the circumstances which he testified to on the stand. The prisoner in his own behalf gave his account of his movements that evening, which it is not necessary to recite, and accounted for his money by saying that he had been saving it up for some time to go to Hot Springs, Ark., for treatment of a disease, and that he had put his money around in different places from time to time, that he hid some money in a mattress at his boarding house, that he pulled a plank off a store and had concealed some money there, and that he had hidden money between Riles' Store and the alley, and that that evening he had gone around and collected up the money thus hidden. It is unnecessary to state the evidence more in detail.

In a prosecution for homicide, where robbery was the alleged motive and the evidence wholly circumstantial, an instruction that the state must prove that deceased had the exact money taken from accused held properly refused.

D. B. Paul, of Charlotte, and Newell & Newell, for appellant.

The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARK C.J.

There are no exceptions to the evidence. Exceptions 1, 2, and 3 are to the refusal of the court to give three special instructions requested as to circumstantial evidence.

The first request was to charge that:

"Where the state relies wholly upon circumstantial evidence for conviction, it is incumbent upon the state to establish each circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the state alleges that the deceased was murdered by the defendant, the motive being robbery; and it alleges that the money taken from the defendant's person and also off the witness Barton was the identical money that was taken from the deceased at the time of his murder. Therefore the state must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt, first that the deceased had at least $417.50 on his person at the time of the murder, and that the money taken from the defendant and also from the witness Barton is the identical money that the deceased had. If the state has not so satisfied you, you will return a verdict of not guilty."

The court could not give this charge as asked. This is not an indictment for robbery, and if it were it would not be necessary to prove the identical amount charged. The court in the charge correctly instructed as to circumstantial evidence all that the prisoner could have asked, as follows:

"Each essential and material fact relied upon by the state must be established beyond a reasonable doubt."

The court also charged as to circumstantial evidence:

"When such evidence is relied upon to convict, it should be clear, convincing, and conclusive in all its combinations, and should exclude all reasonable doubt as to guilt."

And further:

"In passing upon such evidence, it is the duty of the jury to consider all the circumstances and determine whether they have been established beyond a reasonable doubt."

This was a sufficient compliance with the prayer. State v. Brackville, 106 N.C. 701, 11 S.E. 284.

The second exception is to the refusal of the court to charge that, "where circumstantial evidence connected the prisoner with the crime, each circumstance depends upon the truth of the preceding one, and the chain is no stronger than its weakest link, and when once broken becomes a rope of sand," and further asks the court to charge as an application of the principle that unless the state satisfied the jury that the defendant did not have the money hid out as he said, and that the money which he had when arrested was the identical money which the deceased had on his person when he was murdered, and that the prisoner and no one else murdered him and took his money, the jury should return a verdict of not guilty. But this was not a case calling for the application of the principle stated. In State v. Neville, 157 N.C. 596, 72 S.E. 800, Mr. Justice Walker said:

"There was no chain of circumstances in this case which required the court to tell the jury that each circumstance which constituted a link * * * should be established to their full satisfaction. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link, it is true; but there is no series of facts in this case necessary to be considered by the jury in order to convict the defendant."

In State v. Flemming, 130 N.C. 689, 41 S.E. 550, the refusal of the court to charge "every link in the chain of evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" was sustained, when in lieu thereof the court instructed the jury, as in this case, that the state must establish every circumstantial fact upon which it relies beyond a reasonable doubt.

In State v. Shines, 125 N.C. 730, 34 S.E. 552, the court said:

"There are cases of circumstantial evidence in which each circumstance depends upon the truth of the preceding one, in which case the evidence may be likened to a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link; but usually that simile is inapplicable. Ordinarily, the circumstances accumulate, each one by itself being of no great weight, but like the bundle of twigs in the fable, or the several strands twisted into a rope or cable, becoming, when united, of great strength"--citing several cases.

Even when a charge giving the simile of a chain may be properly used, it refers only to the necessary links in the chain of evidence. State v. Carson, 115 N.C. 743, 20 S.E. 384; State v. Crane, 110 N.C. 530, 15 S.E. 231.

The third exception is to the refusal of the court to charge, in the identical words of the prayer:

"Where circumstantial evidence is wholly relied upon by the state for conviction, as in this case, the circumstances so relied upon must be so clear and convincing as to point unerringly to the guilt of the defendant and must exclude every possibility of his innocence."

The court in its charge substantially complied with this request, saying:

"Do these circumstances exclude from your conclusion everything except that of guilt?" "Such facts (essential or material facts) so established must not only be consistent with the defendant's...

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