State v. Turner

• Decision Date: 09 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 102,594.,102,594.
• Citation: 293 Kan. 1085,272 P.3d 19
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ranell N. TURNER, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

272 P.3d 19
293 Kan. 1085

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Ranell N. TURNER, Appellant.

No. 102,594.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 9, 2012.

[272 P.3d 20]

[293 Kan. 1085] Syllabus by the Court

1. Courts presume that the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless or redundant legislation and construe statutes in such a way as to avoid unreasonable results.

2. Statutes complete in themselves, relating to a specific subject, take precedence over general statutes or over other statutes that deal only incidentally with the same question. When a statute dealing generally with a subject conflicts with another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of that subject, the specific statute controls.

3. When the legislature allows two conflicting statutory provisions to coexist, the rule of lenity applies and the courts must follow the statutory provision more favorable to the accused.

4. When a defendant is convicted of rape and has at least one prior rape conviction, K.S.A. 21–4642 and K.S.A. 21–4704(j)(2)(B) both apply equally and neither is more specific. Such a defendant is therefore to be sentenced under the more lenient statute, K.S.A. 21–4704(j).

Lydia H. Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Steve Six, former attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, J.:

In this appeal we again confront a question of overlapping and conflicting sentencing statutes. Because we conclude that two sentencing statutes, equally specific and both applying to the defendant's circumstances, are inconsistent in the harshness of the penalties they impose, we vacate the sentence and remand for imposition of a lesser sentence.

[293 Kan. 1086] Prior to the convictions that are the subject of this appeal, the defendant, Ranell N. Turner, was convicted in Illinois for rape and deviant sexual assault and convicted in Kansas for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. In March 2009, a jury convicted him of two counts of rape, K.S.A. 21–3502(a)(1)(A), two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, K.S.A. 21–3506(a)(3) (A), two counts of criminal threat, K.S.A. 21–3419(a)(1), and one count of kidnapping, K.S.A. 21–3420. He now appeals his sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

At sentencing, the district court classified Turner as an aggravated habitual sex offender based on his record of sexually violent crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy convictions under

[272 P.3d 21]

K.S.A. 21–4642. The court also imposed a 61–month prison sentence for the kidnapping conviction and two 7–month prison sentences for the criminal threat convictions, all to run concurrent with his life sentence.

Turner initially challenges his sentence under the aggravated habitual sex offender statute, K.S.A. 21–4642. When appellate arguments implicate issues relating to statutory and constitutional interpretation, this court exercises unlimited review. State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1006, 218 P.3d 432 (2009).

In relevant part, K.S.A. 21–4642 reads:

“(a) An aggravated habitual sex offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Such offender shall spend the remainder of the offender's natural life incarcerated and in the custody of the secretary of corrections. An offender who is sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole shall not be eligible for parole, probation, assignment to a community correctional services program, conditional release, postrelease supervision, or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence.

....

“(c) As used in this section:

(1) ‘Aggravated habitual sex offender’ means a person who, on and after July 1, 2006: (A) Has been convicted in this state of a sexually violent crime, as described in paragraphs (3)(A) through 3(J) or (3)(L); and (B) prior to the conviction of the felony under subparagraph (A), has been convicted on at least two prior conviction events of any sexually violent crime.

(2) ‘Prior conviction event’ means one or more felony convictions of a sexually violent crime occurring on the same day and within a single count. [293 Kan. 1087] These convictions may result from multiple counts within an information or from more than one information....

(3) ‘Sexually violent crime’ means:

(A) Rape, K.S.A. 21–3502, and amendments thereto;

....

(E) aggravated criminal sodomy, K.S.A. 21–3506, and amendments thereto....”

It is not disputed that Turner qualified for sentencing under K.S.A. 21–4642. He had two prior conviction events for rape and one prior conviction event for aggravated criminal sodomy and for deviant sexual assault. These are sexually violent crimes under K.S.A. 21–4642(c)(3). He was convicted of multiple counts of rape and criminal sodomy in the present case. When viewed in isolation from the rest of the criminal code, then, K.S.A. 21–4642 required the district court to sentence him to life imprisonment without parole.

Turner contends, however, that two other statutes also govern his convictions and sentences. We will begin our analysis with his claim that the general nondrug crime sentencing guidelines statute, K.S.A. 21–4704, should govern his sentences. This statute sets out the penalties for nondrug crimes, to which severity levels have been assigned.

K.S.A. 21–3502 defines rape and provides various severity levels. Turner does not dispute that his offense fell under 21–3502(a)(1)(A), which is a severity level 1, person felony under 21–3502(c). Because he had a criminal history classification of A, Turner was subject to a sentencing grid range of 592 months (mitigated) to 620 months (standard) to 653 months (aggravated) under K.S.A. 21–4704(a). In the absence of other statutes that create exceptions to the grid sentence, Turner's crimes of conviction would fit the requirements of a gridbox 1–A sentence.

Turner argues that when the legislature allows two conflicting statutory provisions to coexist,...