State v. Tuttle

• Decision Date: 31 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 22025.,22025.
• Citation: 2002 SD 94,650 N.W.2d 20
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas John TUTTLE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

650 N.W.2d 20

2002 SD 94

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Thomas John TUTTLE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 22025.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs April 22, 2002.

Decided July 31, 2002.

Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Frank Geaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Paul E. Pietz of Minnehaha County Public Defender's Office, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

KONENKAMP, Justice.

[¶ 1.] The defendant was taken into police custody for questioning. During interrogation, the detective threatened that the defendant's failure to cooperate would be noted in the police report, suggesting that refusal to admit guilt might result in harsher treatment. Because a person cannot be coerced into foregoing a Fifth Amendment right, and because this threat plainly caused the defendant to confess, we conclude under the totality of circumstances that the confession was obtained involuntarily and should be suppressed. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

A. Background

[¶ 2.] After having several drinks at a party on Monday, October 30, 2000, Thomas John Tuttle and his friend Bereket Emehezian drove to the residence of Tuttle's grandmother, a mobile home at the Park View Trailer Court, in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Soon after arrival, Tuttle and Emehezian got into an argument. A shoving match ensued. Various residents of the trailer court came out to watch. One of them succeeded in separating the two, whereupon Emehezian got into his car and sped away. Tuttle chased him on foot as far as the entrance and then walked back to his grandmother's home.

[¶ 3.] Shortly afterwards, law enforcement officers arrived on the scene to investigate. Finding nothing unusual, they were preparing to leave when Tuttle's grandmother approached the officers and requested that they eject some people she did not want in her home. Upon entering her trailer, the officers found Terrance Yellow Earrings, leaning against the kitchen sink, bleeding profusely. There was a recently washed paring knife in the sink. In addition to Yellow Earrings and Tuttle's grandmother, the officers found three other people in the trailer: Tuttle's mother (the girlfriend of Yellow Earrings), and Tuttle's two uncles. Tuttle himself was outside the trailer, leaning up against a vehicle, when the officers arrived. After Yellow Earrings received first aid from the officers, he was taken by ambulance to the hospital. A medical examination revealed that he had sustained eleven stab wounds.

[¶ 4.] None of the people found in the trailer claimed to know who had committed the stabbing. Accordingly, the police took them all, as well as Tuttle, in for questioning. Under interrogation by Detective Thaddeus Openhowski, Tuttle admitted to having stabbed Yellow Earrings three times. Tuttle was charged with aggravated assault in violation of SDCL 22-18-1.1(2). In the jury trial, Yellow Earrings was the only eyewitness who testified on the identity of his assailant. No one else present during the assault appeared as witnesses. During the course of his testimony, it emerged that Yellow Earrings was, at the time of trial, incarcerated on a charge of tampering with a witness involved in this case. The paring knife was admitted into evidence, over defense objection. The jury found Tuttle guilty. The court sentenced him to six years in the penitentiary, noting that this relatively light punishment was appropriate to Tuttle's age (eighteen) and his prospects of rehabilitation.

[¶ 5.] After sentencing, Tuttle moved for a new trial, arguing that fresh evidence had arisen, namely that Tuttle's mother, Carol, had assaulted Yellow Earrings and had inflicted stab wounds once before and once after the assault here in question, and that the circumstances surrounding those incidents were sufficiently similar that their admission into evidence would probably have led to Tuttle's acquittal. The court denied Tuttle's motion. On appeal, Tuttle raises the following issues: (1) Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence his statements to police? (2) Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence a knife found at the scene of the crime? (3) Did the trial court err in denying his motion for a new trial?

B. Miranda Waiver

[¶ 6.] Tuttle moved to suppress statements he made during his interrogation on the grounds that (a) he did not waive his Miranda rights, and (b) his admissions were involuntary. The circuit court denied his motion. Tuttle argues that the court committed reversible error in so ruling. We give deference to pure fact findings on such questions as whether the proper warnings were actually given, but we review de novo a trial court's ruling on the question whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights. State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d 486, 488.

[¶ 7.] When a defendant moves to suppress statements taken during a custodial interrogation, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury, preferably before trial. SDCL 19-9-9. In this hearing, the prosecution must show that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966)

. For a waiver determination, a court should consider a defendant's age, experience, intelligence, and background, including familiarity with the criminal justice system, as well as physical and mental condition.¹

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979).

[¶ 8.] The State must prove a waiver of Miranda rights only by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 485 (1986)

(reversing Colorado's higher standard of clear and convincing evidence). It is resolved now, under the recent decision in Dickerson v. United States, that Miranda is a federal constitutional requirement, reviewable under federal standards. 530 U.S. 428, 432, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2329, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 411 (2000). Therefore, we will no longer hold the State to a higher burden of proof under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 898 (S.D.1984) (imposing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).

[¶ 9.] An express waiver is not necessary, but a waiver cannot be presumed from a defendant's silence or confession alone. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. Explicitness of a waiver is a factor for consideration. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gupta, 183 F.3d 615, 618 (7thCir.1999)

(valid waiver because defendant signed written waiver and repeated his statement twice after Miranda rights were given); Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 815-16, 821 (9thCir.1990) (valid waiver because written waiver signed after Miranda rights were explained three or four times even though defendant was sixteen years old with a low I.Q.); U.S. v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (10thCir.1986) (valid waiver when each defendant signed two different Miranda waivers because express waiver is "usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver"). In addition, a suspect may partially waive Miranda rights. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832, 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 928 (1987). To prove a valid waiver, the State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant's rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986).

[¶ 10.] On the question whether Tuttle knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we quote the crucial passage in the initial part of his interview:

Detective (D): [Having read Tuttle the Miranda warnings from a card, asks] Do you understand these rights?

Tuttle (T): Yeah.

D: Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to me at this time?

T. No.

D: No, what? You don't want to talk to me?

T: I don't want to waive the rights.

D: You want to waive the rights?

T: No. You said you want to talk; let's talk.

D: OK. Well, let me, let me, OK, cuz, yeah, I understand that, you understand your rights, correct?

T: Yeah.

D: Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to me at this time?

T: No, no.

D: You don't want to talk to me?

T: Nah, I don't want to waive my rights. I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here.

D: OK. We are getting confused here, OK? In other words, if you don't want to talk to me, then say, "I don't want to talk to you." But if you want to waive your rights, which means, "yes, I understand all that, but I do want to talk to you," then you have to say, "yes, I want to talk with you."

T: How do I say, "I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here"?

D: OK. So you, do you wish to waive these rights and do you want to talk to me at this time?

T: Yeah.

D: There you go, that's what you're, you're sure that's what you want to do?

T: I just want to get the hell out of here.

D: So you can get the hell out of here. OK; let me go put this card away.

In this colloquy, Tuttle states that he does not want to waive his rights, but he does wish to talk with the detective. Thus, at that point, it was unclear whether Tuttle's refusal to waive Miranda rights amounted to an unequivocal invocation of those rights.

[¶ 11.] The detective later testified on this exchange: "During the reading of the Miranda warnings [Tuttle] was saying `no,' but I think he wanted to talk. He was not understanding the exact questioning." The trial court found that "[a]t all times the defendant expressed a willingness, even a desire, to talk to the police about what had happened." But Tuttle's willingness or desire to talk is not equivalent to an understanding that talking to the detective was tantamount to renouncing his Fifth Amendment rights. On this aspect, the detective testified: "Certain...