State v. Tyler
| Decision Date | 24 January 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 57703,57703 |
| Citation | 342 So.2d 574 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Gary TYLER. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Jack Peebles, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L. Smith, Jr., L. J. Hymel, Jr., Thomas S. Halligan, Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Attys. Gen., Melvin P. Barre, Dist. Atty., Norman J. Pitre, Harry J. Morel, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
The grand jurors of St. Charles Parish returned a true bill on October 21, 1974, charging that on October 7, 1974 16-year-old Gary Tyler committed first degree murder of 14-year-old Timothy Weber in violation of Article 30 of the Criminal Code. By answer to a bill of particulars the State advised that the prosecution would be conducted under Article 30(4) of the Code, which then provided in pertinent part;
'First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
'(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person;
'Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death.'
In a trial by jury commencing on November 5, and ending November 14, 1975, a unanimous verdict of guilty of first degree murder was returned. The mandatory death penalty was imposed.
Several weeks after sentence, trial counsel was relieved and appellate counsel was substituted.
After the appeal record was filed here, a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence was addressed to the trial court on March 10, 1976. On the State's motion, the appeal having divested the trial court of jurisdiction, this Court remanded the case to the trial court on March 18, 1976, for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to hear the new trial motion, with full reservation of rights to the defense and the State under the appeal then pending in this Court.
Upon remand defendant again filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on April 28, 1976 after an extensive hearing. On the basis of the reservation of defendant's rights in this Court's order of remand, the defense assignment of error to the trial judge's denial of the motion for a new trial is considered as part of this appeal.
In the meantime, before this case was argued in this Court, the United States Supreme Court decided Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). By that decision the death penalty prescribed by Article 30 of the Criminal Code, in effect on October 7, 1974, was declared unconstitutional, the Court holding:
With this decision as authority, the defense moved in this Court for an order discharging Tyler from custody, alleging that Article 30 of the Criminal Code was now a statute proscribing certain acts with no legal sanction or punishment. The argument is that the Court could not, under these circumstances, order resentencing since no rational statutory basis for punishment existed.
Then, before argument of the appeal on November 10, 1976, this Court, on October 14, 1976, rendered its decision in State v. Jenkins, et al., 340 So.2d 157 (1976). It was observed there that the decision in Roberts v. Louisiana was not the first time decisions of the United States Supreme Court had invalidated this State's statutory capital punishment provisions, referring to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Each time, as a result of these decisions, this Court was called upon to decide upon the sentences of persons validly convicted, but unconstitutionally sentenced to death. In each case the trial courts were instructed to substitute life imprisonment for the death sentence.
The decision in State v. Jenkins noted, however, that the situation created by the decision in Roberts v. Louisiana differed from that brought about by the Witherspoon and Furman decisions. In responding to the holding in Furman, the Louisiana Legislature, by Act 111 of 1973, enacted new Articles 30 and 30.1 providing classifications for the crime of murder. First degree murder, under this new classification, carried a mandatory death penalty while second degree murder required imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. Under these circumstances the Court in State v. Jenkins, et al., concluded:
On the same day, based upon the rationale in State v. Jenkins, this Court arrived at the same result in a number of cases presenting the same issue. State v. Skelton, 340 So.2d 256; State v. Davenport, 340 So.2d 251; State v. McDaniel, 340 So.2d 242; State v. Smith, 340 So.2d 222 and State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208.
These decisions are, therefore, dispositive of the issue. Tyler's conviction may be affirmed, but the death penalty is unconstitutional and State v. Jenkins requires resentencing in keeping with the formulation of that decision.
Another issue is presented by the motion to discharge from custody. It is also a threshold issue, for it involves jurisdiction. The argument is made that because an adult defendant convicted under the first degree murder statute may not be retried or resentenced under the present second degree murder statute, this juvenile defendant may not be retried under the second degree murder statute.
This contention is based upon the premise that the decision in Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, while permitting the conviction to stand, had the effect of abrogating any sentence under the first degree murder statute, thus requiring defendant's discharge from custody. As pointed out in Part I above, this premise is not well-founded. A sentence has been approved in such cases by our decision in State v. Jenkins, supra, and the other cases cited in Part I. Roberts v. Louisiana does not, therefore, require a retrial of defendant under the second degree murder statute, or any other, only a remand of this case for appropriate sentencing.
Invalidation of the death sentence by the Roberts decision has the effect, defendant contends, of removing the crime of first degree murder from its classification as a 'capital offense', one that may be punishable by death. Thus, the argument proceeds, the Constitution of 1921, in effect on October 7, 1974 (the date of this offense) does not confer jurisdiction on the district court in a noncapital case where a juvenile is involved. Jurisdiction over juveniles is only conferred on the district court 'for capital crimes and crimes defined by any law defining attempted aggravated rape if committed by children fifteen years of age or older.' La.Const. art. VII, § 52 (1921). 1 See La.Const. art. VII, § 35 (1921).
When the same issue was raised recently in State v. Smith, we held:
'Defendant maintains that when the death penalty was declared unconstitutional, first degree murder lost its status as a capital crime, and he should have been remanded to the custody of the juvenile court. (Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 933(2): "Capital offense' means an offense that may be punished by death'). The identical issue was raised after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), struck down the death penalty provision of our prior first degree murder statute, La.R.S. 14:30 (1950). State v. Whatley, 320 So.2d 123 (La.1975). Whatley held that the district court retained jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with first degree murder because 'as enacted, La.R.S. 14:30 (1950) constituted a legislative classification that the crime of murder constituted a capital offense, and that conduct punishable by this statute remained a 'capital' crime for purposes of Louisiana law (even though Furman held that the death sentence could not actually be imposed or executed.' 320 So.2d at 125. Defendant was charged, tried and convicted for an offense which the legislature classified as 'capital,' and Roberts has no bearing upon the jurisdiction of the district court in this matter.' 339 So.2d 829, 835 (La.1976).
That holding was considered dispositive of a similar issue raised in State v. Moore, La., 340 So.2d 1351, decided December 13, 1976. See also State v. Whatley, 320 So.2d 123 (La.1975).
By the view we have taken of the issues presented in the motion to discharge if this conviction is affirmed, the final contention that the juvenile court may not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant is rendered moot. This is so because if defendant's conviction is affirmed he will not be tried again, only resentenced in the court of his conviction.
Having resolved the issues raised by the motion...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tyler v. Phelps
...in Louisiana state court and sentenced to die. On appeal, the death penalty 1 was vacated but the conviction was affirmed, State v. Tyler, 342 So.2d 574 (La.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2180, 53 L.Ed.2d 227 (1977). After unsuccessfully pursuing state habeas corpus, Tyler v. Phelp......
-
State v. Sandifer
...powered assault rifle and shoots indiscriminately ... at a group of people specifically intends to kill the victims"); State v. Tyler , 342 So.2d 574, 582 (La. 1977) (observing that "there is authority in law for the proposition that shooting into a crowd indiscriminately with intent to kil......
-
State v. Willis
...to the jury, is not a ground to recuse the trial judge from hearing and deciding the motion for a new trial. Cf. State v. Tyler, 342 So.2d 574 (La.1977). Although a trial judge's preconception of the defendant's guilt in a bench trial is probably grounds for recusation, such is not necessar......
-
State v. Chapman
... ... s/ Ruth vonUnwerth ... Ruth vonUnwerth ... SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME ... THIS 13th DAY OF JUNE, 1980 ... s/ Garic Kenneth Barranger ... GARIC KENNETH BARRANGER" ... 4 State v. Jones, 344 So.2d 1036 (La.1977); State v. Tyler ... ...