State v. Uncapher
| Decision Date | 24 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-TR-C-09370,94-TR-C-09370 |
| Citation | 70 Ohio Misc.2d 4,650 N.E.2d 195 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio v. UNCAPHER. * |
| Court | Ohio Court of Common Pleas |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Civil or administrative sanctions do not automatically become punishment for purposes of double jeopardy simply because there is a deterrent or punitive impact. Before a civil sanction may be considered punishment, the remedy must be extreme and substantially disproportionate to the remedial character of the statute.
2. For purposes of double jeopardy, R.C. 4511.191 and the administrative license suspension ("ALS") do not meet the Kurth, Halper, and Austin standards for punishment because the ALS is not extreme or disproportionate to the remedial nature of R.C. 4511.191.
3. Ohio administrative license suspensions are for public safety, not punishment. R.C. 4511.191 has a remedial intent entirely proportionate to the public safety and protection of drivers on the public highway. Therefore, the ALS does not rise to the level of punishment to trigger application of double jeopardy to preclude a subsequent prosecution for DUI/PAC, even if we consider the privilege to drive as significant as our freedom and property interests.
4. The immediate effect of the ALS underscores the legislative intent to pass remedial legislation for public safety. With the immediate hearing available for judicial review of the ALS, the alleged violator's constitutional right to due process is satisfied so as to avoid a harsh or undue burden on the accused.
5. Even if the court would conclude that the ALS is not solely remedial but also punitive by acting as a deterrent or "punishment," the suspension is not punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.
6. Because the ALS is subject to judicial determination in the DUI/PAC case and the court is required to credit the ALS to any court suspension in the DUI/PAC case, there is no cumulative or multiple punishment as contemplated under double jeopardy analysis.
7. The ALS and the DUI/PAC are in part separate proceedings in that the ALS is an administrative action at the time of the arrest when the officer delivers notice of the suspension to the accused. However, the ALS merges with the DUI/PAC case in the municipal court, where the traffic judge, within the traffic case, determines the ALS appeal, occupational rights, termination of the suspension, continuation of the suspension, and crediting of the ALS to the court suspension. For all purposes, there is one case, one court, one judge, and one suspension. Therefore, double jeopardy does not apply because the ALS does not involve multiple proceedings as previously characterized by court analysis.
8. In order for there to be a "proceeding," there must be some judicial or quasi-judicial intervention constituting a determination of rights. For double jeopardy purposes there must be more than one proceeding resulting in separate dispositions of defendant's rights. The ALS and DUI/PAC are determined in a single proceeding.
9. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution do not prohibit the criminal prosecution of drunk driving charges ("DUI" and/or "PAC") after the imposition of an administrative license suspension ("ALS") at the time of arrest, and a motion to dismiss on that ground lacks merit.
Mark D. Tolles, City Prosecutor, Bowling Green, for plaintiff.
David Klucas, Toledo, for defendant.
This matter came before the court on the motion of the defendant, Laura T. Uncapher, to dismiss the charges arising under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (A)(3), which prohibit operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and operating a vehicle while having a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the breath.
Her request for dismissal is premised upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits a person from being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, as well as upon the similar provision in Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.
The defendant contends that after her arrest for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and while having a prohibited concentration of alcohol in her system, she had first been punished by an administrative license suspension imposed under R.C. 4511.191 (see Appendix), which put her first in jeopardy.
Uncapher was a "typical" DUI/PAC arrest, and the facts are not in dispute. She was taken to the police station and asked if she would submit to a chemical test of her breath for alcohol content. She consented to the test and generated a result over the legal limit. In addition to receiving a citation pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (A)(3) for the DUI/PAC, she was given a notice of suspension by the police officer pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 on behalf of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
Uncapher has filed a motion pursuant to Crim.R. 12(B) to dismiss the case. Specifically, Uncapher argues that jeopardy attached at the moment of the administrative license suspension ("ALS") after the arrest and that further prosecution is barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution--a.k.a. "double jeopardy."
* * *" (Citations omitted.) United States v. McCaslin (W.D.Wash.1994), 863 F.Supp. 1299, 1301.
Uncapher argues and the court accepts as a premise for this analysis that the double jeopardy issue in the present case is whether or not Uncapher is subject to multiple punishments levied in separate proceedings.
The court further accepts the notion that multiple punishments are permissible under the parameters of double jeopardy if those sanctions are imposed in the same proceeding, but barred if such sanctions are imposed in separate proceedings. In the present case, Uncapher argues that the ALS is a separate proceeding and that the license suspension is a punishment separate from the DUI/PAC charges, thereby prohibiting the prosecution of the DUI/PAC.
Central to Uncapher's analysis is her argument that a civil sanction is equivalent to a criminal punishment. Therefore, as Uncapher argues, multiple punishments occur if both a civil sanction and a criminal punishment are imposed on the defendant out of the same transaction.
Clearly, the constitutional question only arises:
1. if the loss of the privilege to drive is a sufficient depravation of right to consider such as a punishment, and
2. if two proceedings are involved to impose these multiple sanctions.
Then double jeopardy attaches to preclude the second of the two proceedings. 1. Civil or administrative sanctions do not automatically become punishment for purposes of double jeopardy simply because there is a deterrent or punitive impact. Before a civil sanction may be considered punishment, the remedy must be extreme and substantially disproportionate to the remedial character of the statute.
There are no United States Supreme Court cases on the issue of double jeopardy as it might relate to administrative license suspensions and drunk driving charges. But there are those court cases related to other civil matters equated to criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes such as excessive taxes (Kurth, infra ) and extraordinary statutory fines (Halper, infra ), which will be discussed next.
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch et al.
The primary United States Supreme Court case relied on by defendant for purposes of civil sanctions as equivalent to criminal punishment in this review of the application of the "double jeopardy" standard is Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767.
" * * * Montana's assessment of its tax on possession of dangerous drugs--in a proceeding separate from the state criminal proceeding involving the family members--violated the prohibition, under the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause, against successive punishments for the same offense, because under the circumstances (1) the state tax was fairly characterized as punishment; and (2) the tax proceeding which the state initiated was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the family members in jeopardy a second time for the same offense." (Emphasis added.) Editor's Summary to 128 L.Ed.2d at 768.
Kurth involved four separate proceedings all related to the same facts. First, the state filed criminal charges on conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell. The parties entered into a plea agreement resulting in criminal convictions. Second, the county attorney filed a civil forfeiture action, "seeking recovery of cash and equipment used in the drug operation." Third, the Department of Revenue assessed a tax pursuant to the tax code of the state wholly separate from the criminal code and initiated proceedings to collect nearly $900,000 in taxes with interest and penalties. The last proceeding was a petition in bankruptcy where the Kurth family challenged the assessment of the drug taxes and challenged the constitutionality of the state drug-tax statute.
Kurth originated, for purposes of this appeal, in the bankruptcy court as a challenge to a tax assessment. The bankruptcy...
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