State v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
Decision Date | 23 May 1910 |
Docket Number | 15,988 |
Citation | 126 N.W. 859,87 Neb. 29 |
Parties | STATE OF NEBRASKA v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ORIGINAL action by the state to enjoin defendant from carrying out certain contracts. Injunction allowed.
INJUNCTION ALLOWED.
William T. Thompson, Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Nelson H. Loomis, Edson Rich and E. H. Crocker, contra.
OPINION
This is an original action in this court brought by the attorney general in the name of the state and by the authority of the Nebraska State Railway Commission to enjoin the defendant railroad company and its officers, agents, and servants from carrying out certain contracts made with the owners of certain newspapers in the state of Nebraska providing for the issuance of railroad tickets and the furnishing of transportation to certain classes of persons named in the contract, for advertising to be furnished the railroad company in the newspapers belonging to the other contracting parties. A temporary restraining order was prayed for and granted at the time of the filing of the petition. It is shown by the evidence that the command of the restraining order was obeyed and that since its issuance no other contracts of the kind have been entered into, the contracts in existence have been abrogated, and the transportation issued recalled. The defendant railroad company, however, still insists that the execution of such contracts and the furnishing of transportation in accordance therewith is not a violation of law, and, while obeying the restraining order, insists upon its right to have this question determined.
Before considering the legal proposition involved, it will be necessary to summarily state the evidence. A copy of a contract entered into with the owner of the "New Era" of Kearney is set forth in the petition, and it is conceded that contracts entered into with a number of other publishers in the state are substantially the same. The contract referred to is as follows:
The testimony of the employee in charge of the advertising department of the defendant in regard to the customary dealings with newspaper owners under the contract is to the effect that the advertisements placed in all such newspapers are to be charged at the regular rate charged by the newspaper in each case to the public generally for the same service, which would vary in different localities; that a statement or bill would be rendered by the publisher for the advertising done, and that the transportation issued did not exceed the value of the advertising when the transportation was measured at the rate of two cents per mile; that it was not issued when the advertising was placed, but after the advertising had been run, and the statement of the amount due followed; that the transportation issued did not exceed the amount of the bills rendered, and that special forms of trip, 500-mile, and 1,000-mile tickets were issued under these contracts. It is also shown that the railroad company had no permission or authority from the railway commission to enter into the contracts, either before or after their execution.
The attorney general contends that the contracts and the tickets issued in conformity therewith constitute a violation of the acts popularly known as the "Railway Commission Act" (laws 1907, ch. 90, Ann. St. 1909, secs. 10649-10663), the "Anti-Pass Act" (laws 1907, ch. 93, Ann. St. 1909, secs. 10664, 10665), and the "Two-Cent Fare Act" (laws 1907, ch. 92, Ann. St. 1909, secs. 10618, 10619), and that the transportation issued under the contract constituted a special rate, an unjust discrimination, and an unreasonable preference, as defined by said acts. He takes the broad ground that transportation furnished by a railroad company for any consideration other than a money consideration, to an adult, and at a rate other than two cents per mile, constitutes an unjust discrimination prohibited by law.
The defendant contends that, under the contract, the railroad company paid for the advertising furnished at the regular published and current rates by credits upon its books for the amount furnished, and that the transportation was paid for at the full legal rate of two cents per mile by such credits; that the Nebraska law is designedly different from the interstate commerce acts, in that it does not prohibit "different" compensation for transportation, and does not limit payment to cash only; that if the act had regulated the medium of payment it would have been unconstitutional; that there was no attempt to discriminate, or to violate the two-cent fare law, and that what was done had no such effect.
The sections of the statutes (Ann. St., 1909) controlling the case are as follows:
Section 10618. "It shall be unlawful for any...
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