State v. Utley

• Decision Date: 17 November 1997
• Citation: 956 S.W.2d 489
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Demetrius Dewayne UTLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 489

956 S.W.2d 489

STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Demetrius Dewayne UTLEY, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Nashville.

Nov. 17, 1997.

John Knox Walkup, Attorney General & Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General, Darian B. Taylor, Assistant Attorney

General, Nashville, Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General, William R. Reed, Assistant District Attorney, Franklin, for Appellant.

David Baker, Assistant Public Defender, Nashville, for Appellee.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Chief Justice.

The question to be decided in this appeal is whether the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial as required under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. To answer that question, we must determine the type of state action which will engage the defendant's right to a speedy trial. ¹

In this case, the trial court found that the speedy trial right was engaged by the issuance of an arrest warrant against the defendant and that a delay of five and one-half years from the issuance of the arrest warrant was a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. As a result, the trial court dismissed the armed robbery charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

After a review of applicable federal and state authority, we conclude that the issuance of an arrest warrant alone does not trigger a speedy trial analysis and that the right to a speedy trial is not implicated until there is an arrest or a formal grand jury accusation. In this case, there was a delay of eight months from the service of the arrest warrant to the argument on the motion for speedy trial. Because the delay is not presumptively prejudicial under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we conclude that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions.

We also conclude, however, that the five-year delay from the commission of the offense to the arrest, raises due process concerns under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, and that a due process analysis is required as to whether the delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, and whether the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. Because this issue was not heard in the courts below and no record was developed, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

On June 4, 1987, a criminal arrest warrant for armed robbery was issued for the defendant, Demetrius Dewayne Utley, for an alleged offense committed on May 27, 1987, in Davidson County, Tennessee. The defendant was not served with the warrant until June of 1992, even though he had been in the State's custody for unrelated convictions for the majority of the five years. After the return of an indictment in September of 1992, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge because he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The motion was filed in December of 1992 and granted in February of 1993.

The trial court concluded that the speedy trial right was triggered by the issuance of the arrest warrant in 1987, despite the fact that the defendant was not arrested or indicted until 1992. The court found that the five and one-half year period was "intolerable and egregious," particularly since the defendant had been in the custody of the state. After concluding that the defendant had been prejudiced, the trial court dismissed the armed robbery charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the issuance of the arrest warrant triggered the right to a speedy trial. After applying the four-factor analysis in Barker v. Wingo, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated.

The State argues that the speedy trial right is not implicated until a formal grand jury accusation or the restraint provided by an actual arrest, and that prior to these events, the defendant is protected by the statute of limitations and the right to due process. The defendant maintains that the lower courts correctly determined that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. We granted the State's application to appeal to consider this important issue.

SPEEDY TRIAL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This provision is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). The Tennessee Constitution also provides that "in prosecutions by indictment or presentment [the accused has the right to] a speedy public trial." Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 9. The right to a speedy trial is also statutory in Tennessee: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to a speedy trial...." Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-14-101 (1990).

The purpose of the speedy trial guarantee is to protect the accused against oppressive pre-trial incarceration, the anxiety and concern due to unresolved criminal charges, and the risk that evidence will be lost or memories diminished. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2692, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the Supreme Court established four factors to consider in evaluating a speedy trial issue: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and the prejudice suffered by the defendant from the delay. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; see also State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81, 83-85 (Tenn.1973) (adopting Barker analysis).

The threshold question in this case is what state action triggers speedy trial analysis. In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), the United States Supreme Court said that "it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraint imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provisions...." Although not confronted with the issue of an arrest warrant, the Court said:

[W]e decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to arrest. Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusations: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer. ...

404 U.S. at 321-22, 92 S.Ct. at 463-64 (emphasis added); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. at 2692 ("arrest, indictment or other official accusation").

From the time it was decided, the Tennessee Supreme Court has followed Marion. In State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn.1996), we held that the defendant, who was charged in a sealed grand jury presentment, was an "accused" for purposes of the speedy trial provision because he was "faced with a formal accusation." We stressed that it is "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraint imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge" that triggers the speedy trial analysis. Likewise, in State v. Baker, 614 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tenn.1981), we relied on Marion in holding that "no speedy trial rights arise until after formal accusation, either by arrest or by grand jury action." ²

Although we have not specifically addressed the issue in this Court, other state courts have. The majority view of other state and federal jurisdictions is that the issuance of an arrest warrant or complaint does not invoke speedy trial rights. ³ For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court observed in State v. Crawford:

[With respect to an intermediate court's decision,] we do not necessarily agree with the conclusion ... that the issuance of an arrest warrant in and of itself triggers the sixth amendment right of a person not yet arrested to a speedy trial. This conclusion does not comport with the purpose of the sixth amendment. 'The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nonetheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved charges.'

521 A.2d at 1039, n. 13 (quoting in part United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982)).

On the other hand, some courts have held that an arrest warrant or complaint does trigger speedy trial protection. In State v. Holtslander, 102 Idaho 306, 629 P.2d 702 (1981), the court, applying its state constitutional right to a speedy trial, held that an arrest warrant constitutes a formal charge and that the right to a speedy trial engages upon the issuance of a formal charge or arrest, whichever comes first. ⁴

Like the other courts that follow the majority view, this Court has determined that a warrant alone does not trigger speedy trial analysis; to the contrary, a formal grand jury action or the actual restraints of an arrest are required. Wood, 924 S.W.2d at 345; Baker, 614 S.W.2d at 353. We have followed Marion 's lead, reasoning that it is at this stage of arrest and grand jury action that the significant interests served by the right to a speedy trial are most directly implicated: the protection against oppressive pre-trial incarceration and the reduction of anxiety and concern caused by unresolved charges. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 321-22, 92 S.Ct. at 463-64. Moreover, as we and other courts have recognized, a defendant has other protections during delays prior to arrest, in particular, the applicable statute of limitations and the right to due process. As we noted in Baker,

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