State v. Vail

• Decision Date: 28 December 2017
• Docket Number: 17–354
• Citation: 236 So.3d 644
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. William Felix VAIL
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

236 So.3d 644

STATE of Louisiana

v.William Felix VAIL

17–354

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Opinions rendered December 28, 2017

John F. DeRosier, 14th JDC District Attorney, Carla S. Sigler, Karen C. McLellan, Assistant District Attorneys, P. O. Box 3206, Lake Charles, LA 70602–3206, (337) 437–3400, COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

Chad M. Ikerd, Louisiana Appellate Project, P.O. Box 2125, Lafayette, LA 70502, (225) 806–2930, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT: William Felix Vail

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, D. Kent Savoie, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

PICKETT, Judge

FACTS

On October 30, 1962, Mary Horton Vail's body was recovered from the Calcasieu River. Her husband, William Felix Horton, had reported to the local authorities in Lake Charles that he and his wife had been in a boat on the river at night, checking trot lines, when his wife accidently fell out of the boat and drowned. The investigating officers were suspicious of Mr. Vail's account of how he claimed the incident occurred based on what they viewed as inconsistencies between what he reported to them and physical findings on the boat. Mr. Vail was arrested and charged with his wife's murder. The coroner, however, concluded the manner of death was accidental drowning. When this matter was presented to a grand jury the matter was ultimately pretermitted. Having failed to secure an indictment, the state dropped the charges pending against the defendant.

Throughout the ensuing years the matter continued to be investigated, off and on, both by law enforcement and private investigators. Additional evidence was gathered which the state believed to be both relevant and significant.

On June 27, 2013, a second grand jury indicted the defendant for the 1962 second degree murder of his wife, Mary Horton Vail, committed in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1.

Trial commenced on August 8, 2016. On August 12, 2016, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of Second Degree Murder against the defendant. On September 21, 2016, the defendant filed a "Motion and Memorandum Regarding Sentencing." The defendant was subsequently sentenced, on September 26, 2016, to life in prison without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On September 29, 2016, the defendant filed a "Motion to Reconsider Sentence" which was denied without a hearing.

The defendant appeals both his conviction and sentence.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The State failed to sufficiently prove Felix Vail was guilty of murdering his wife.

2. A Presumption Wrapped in a Probability: the trial court erred by allowing the State to offer unproven "other bad acts" evidence by use of "the doctrine of chances."

3. The trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury as to the burden of proof required before the other crimes evidence could be considered.

4. Conviction by Deposition: The trial court erred in declaring key State witnesses unavailable for trial when they were merely inconvenienced by having to appear at trial, and allowing their prior depositions to be admitted by video at trial.

5. Conviction by Misrepresentation: The trial court erred in denying the defense's motion to suppress the evidence of Gina Frenzel on grounds the motion was untimely—not on the merits—when the defense established "good cause" for the late filing.

6. The 54–year delay in prosecuting this case was prejudicial to Felix Vail. The delay violated his rights to a fair trial.

7. The trial court's sentence of life, because the previous sentence was unconstitutional, was an ex post facto increase in punishment and a violation of the Separation of Powers. Therefore, the only constitutional sentence was to the maximum for the next lesser included sentence of manslaughter.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent concerning the information given to the defendant by the court regarding the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief.

The court improperly advised the defendant that he has "two years from today's date and the sentence becoming final to file for post-conviction relief." Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8 provides that the prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief is two years, and it begins to run when the defendant's conviction and sentence become final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922.

The trial court is instructed to correctly inform the defendant of the provisions of Article 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the defendant within 10 days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written proof in the record that the defendant received the notice.

In addition, neither the court minutes nor the sentencing transcript reflect that the court specified the life sentence imposed is to be served at hard labor. However, the exchange at sentencing between the court and defense counsel clearly reflects an understanding by all parties that the sentence is a hard labor sentence. Accordingly, the trial court is instructed to correct the court minutes to reflect that the defendant's sentenced is to be served at hard labor.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

The defendant argues that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to prove that he murdered his wife, Mary Horton Vail. He argues the evidence in this case is entirely circumstantial, the state failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and that Mary Horton Vail's death was accidental.

In State v. Williams , 13-497, pp. 3-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, 1239–40, writ denied , 13-2774 (La. 5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024, this court discussed the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence, as follows:

In State v. Bryant , 12-233 (La. 10/16/12), 101 So.3d 429, the Louisiana supreme court addressed the sufficiency of the evidence claims, reiterating that the appellate review of such claims is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). SeeState v. Captville , 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984). In applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the appellate court must determine that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is "sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryant , 101 So.3d at 432. See also La.Code Crim.P. art. 821.

In State v. Spears, 05-964, p. 3 (La. 4/4/06), 929 So.2d 1219, 1222–23, the supreme court stated that:

constitutional law does not require the reviewing court to determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988). Rather, the fact finder is given much discretion in determinations of credibility and evidence, and the reviewing court will only impinge on this discretion to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.

"Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial." State v. Jacobs , 07-887, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 535, 551, writ denied , 11-1753 (La. 2/10/12), 80 So.3d 468, cert. denied , 568 U.S. 838, 133 S.Ct. 139, 184 L.Ed.2d 67 (2012). We note that, whether the conviction is based on direct evidence or solely on circumstantial evidence, the review is the same under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. State v. Williams , 33,881 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/00), 768 So.2d 728 (citing State v. Sutton , 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983) ), writ denied , 00–99 (La.10/5/01), 798 So.2d 963. Circumstantial evidence is that where the main fact can be inferred, using reason and common experience, from proof of collateral facts and circumstances. Id. Where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, in order to convict, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." La.R.S. 15:438.

In State v. Chism , 436 So.2d 464, 469 (La.1983) (citations omitted), the supreme court discussed the use of circumstantial evidence, stating:

Circumstantial evidence involves, in addition to the assertion of witnesses as to what they have observed, a process of reasoning, or inference by which a conclusion is drawn. Like all other evidence, it may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be quite worthless, or it may be irresistible and overwhelming. There is still no man who would not accept dog tracks in the mud against the sworn testimony of a hundred eye-witnesses that no dog passed by. The gist of circumstantial evidence, and the key to it, is the inference, or process of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. This must be based on the evidence given, together with a sufficient background of human experience to justify the conclusion.

Consequently, before a trier of fact can decide the ultimate question of whether a reasonable hypothesis of innocence exists in a criminal case based crucially on circumstantial evidence, a number of preliminary findings must be made. In addition to assessing the circumstantial evidence in light of the direct evidence, and vice versa, the trier of fact must decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing inferences should be resolved, reconciled or compromised; and the weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference. From facts found from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should proceed, keeping in mind the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, to decide the ultimate question of whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

In the instant case, the defendant was convicted of second...