State v. Valure
| Decision Date | 03 October 1895 |
| Citation | 64 N.W. 280,95 Iowa 401 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. OLE VALURE, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Hamilton District Court.--HON. N. B. HYATT, Judge.
The defendant was convicted in justice's court of selling intoxicating liquors without a permit, and appealed to the district court. He was tried in that court, and again convicted, and adjudged to pay a fine of fifty dollars and costs. From that judgment he appeals.
Affirmed.
George Wambach for appellant.
Milton Remley, attorney general, for the state.
I.
On the twenty-third day of June, 1893, the trial of this cause was commenced in justice's court, and on the next day the jury, having failed to agree, was discharged, and the cause was continued to the third day of July, 1893. It is claimed that no record of the continuance was made by the justice at that time. On the day to which the case was adjourned the defendant appeared, and objected to the entry of a continuance alleged to have been made on that date, and requested a change of the place of trial, which was granted and the cause was transferred to another justice, who continued the case, against the objection of the defendant to the sixth day of July. On that day the defendant moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that the justice had no jurisdiction of the cause for reasons shown by the information. The motion was overruled, and a trial was had with the result already stated. In the district court the defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the justice before whom the defendant was convicted had no jurisdiction, and on the further grounds that the justice in whose court the case was instituted has failed to record some of the actions at the time they were taken, and had not ordered a second trial until nine days after the first jury was discharged. The district court overruled the motion, and of that ruling the defendant complains.
The grounds of the motion to dismiss filed in the district court were not the same as the one made in justice's court, and the record does not show clearly that the allegations of fact upon which the former is based are true. By treating them as true, and the questions raised as properly presented in the district court, we must hold that the motion was rightly overruled. The correctness of the ruling must be determined by the law of this state. The alleged errors which were committed in justice's court were not of a character to affect any substantial right of the defendant. Section 4702 of the Code provides that when an appeal is taken from a justice's court in a criminal case the cause appealed shall stand for trial anew in the district court in the same manner that it should have been tried before the justice, without regard to technical errors or defects which have not prejudiced the substantial rights of either party. The next section provides that no appeal from a justice's court shall be dismissed. Under these provisions the alleged failure of one of the justices to make proper and timely entries had no effect upon the rights of the parties after the appeal to the district court was taken. The authorities cited in support of the claim of the appellant on this branch of the case are from other states, and relate chiefly to civil cases.
II. It is urged that by adjourning the case more than three days without the consent of the parties, jurisdiction was lost by the justice, and the case of Telegraph Co. v Boylan, 86 Iowa 90 , is relied upon as sustaining the claim. That case was a civil action, governed by section 3527 of the Code, relating to the practice in civil cases. It provides that under certain conditions the justice "may adjourn the cause for a period not exceeding three days." Section 3549 authorizes the justice to discharge the jury in a civil case, and, when that is done, requires him to issue a new precept for another, "to appear at a time therein fixed, not more than three days distant, unless the parties otherwise agree." But neither of these sections is applicable to trials in criminal cases. Section 4687 of the Code applies in such cases as this, and is as follows: "If the jury be discharged as provided in the last section the justice may proceed again to the trial in the same manner as upon the first trial and so on until a verdict is rendered." That does not prohibit an adjournment without the consent of parties for more than three days. Article 1, section 10, of the constitution of Iowa gives to...
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