State v. Van Treese

Decision Date11 November 1924
Docket NumberNo. 36292.,36292.
Citation200 N.W. 570,198 Iowa 984
PartiesSTATE v. VAN TREESE.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Poweshiek County; D. W. Hamilton, Judge.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, and with intent to conceal same. There was a verdict of guilty and a judgment thereon. The defendant has appealed. Affirmed.J. H. Patton, of Grinnell, for appellant.

Ben J. Gibson, Atty. Gen., Maxwell A. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., and R. W. Boyd, Co. Atty., of Montezuma, for the State.

EVANS, J.

The property involved in the larceny charged in the indictment consisted of four $100 bills and twelve $50 bills, amounting to a total of $1,000. The larceny had been committed by one Bryan Dale, post office clerk. The money in question was contained in an envelope and was addressed to one of the banks of Grinnell. The larceny was committed at the Grinnell post office when Dale was an employee therein. Sometime thereafter, Dale delivered the currency to the defendant herein, under an arrangement whereby the defendant was to receive the sum of $200 for putting the money into circulation and obtaining smaller bills therefor. Sometime later the defendant delivered the same currency to one Gooch, jointly indicted with him, under an arrangement that, if Gooch should reduce the currency to smaller bills, he should receive from this defendant $100. Neither party ever put the money into circulation. After a lapse of some months, official suspicion was directed to Gooch and he was arrested. Shortly thereafter the defendant herein was also arrested, and likewise, Dale. Dale was indicted for larceny and pleaded guilty thereto.

[1][2] I. One of the principal grounds of reversal urged is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. Particular stress is laid upon the alleged lack of evidence that the defendant knew that the money was stolen. As witness he denied his knowledge thereof. Dale was witness for the state and testified that he had not at any time disclosed to this defendant the fact that he had stolen the money. It is urged therefore that the evidence in behalf of the state fails to prove knowledge. That knowledge was not proved by direct evidence may be conceded. It was not requisite upon the state to produce direct evidence of such fact. It was permissible to it to prove the same by circumstantial evidence. Indeed such is the usual method of such proof. It appears from the testimony of the defendant himself that during the entire time he held the money he did so in constant fear, and that he was afraid to present the larger bills to anyone for the purpose of getting smaller bills in exchange. His explanation of this is that he suspected that the bills were counterfeit, but had not suspected that they had been stolen. The circumstance thus admitted however, was a very significant one and permitted damaging inference by the jury. The jury was not bound to accept the defendant's explanation of the circumstance. Other circumstances quite as damaging appear in the record and we deem the evidence as abundant to sustain the conviction, with little room therein for reasonable doubt.

[3] II. Complaint is made of instruction No. 10, given by the court. This instruction was as follows:

“If you are satisfied, after you have considered all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time the defendant received the currency, or bills in question from Bryan Dale that he believed that the said currency or bills had been stolen, and that he received them with intent to aid the said Bryan Dale in the concealment thereof and of depriving the owner thereof, then he would be guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. And this is true, even though he was not told that it was stolen property. Provided, you have also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryan Dale had stolen said currency, or bills, as explained to you in these instructions.”

The specific complaint is that the court erred in permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty, if he believed when he received the currency that it had been stolen. The contention is that it was incumbent upon the state to prove that the defendant knew that it had been stolen and that it was not sufficient...

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