State v. Vandenacre
| Decision Date | 08 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | 22610,Nos. 22609,s. 22609 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerry D. VANDENACRE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
J. Bradford Chapman, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.
Jerry D. Vandenacre appeals from judgments of conviction for grand theft, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b); malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001; and driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001; entered by the district court on October 27, 1995, following a jury trial. For reasons set forth below we affirm the judgments of conviction.
Two separate criminal informations were filed charging Vandenacre with the commission of various felonies and misdemeanors. All of the charges were disposed of without the necessity of trial with the exception of the charges of grand theft, malicious injury to property, driving without privileges, and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, I.C. §§ 18-905 and -915. These remaining charges were consolidated for jury trial and guilty verdicts were returned as to the grand theft, malicious injury to property and driving without privileges charges, but Vandenacre was found not guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Judgments of conviction were entered accordingly.
The issues on appeal are essentially as follows:
(1) Was substantial evidence presented at Vandenacre's trial upon which a rational juror could have found that he exercised unauthorized control over property exceeding $300 in value?
(2) Did the district court correctly rule that Vandenacre's offer to stipulate to some elements of the grand theft charge did not preclude an officer's testimony relating to his fingerprint investigation?
(3) Was Vandenacre prejudiced by the prosecution's improper question about prior felonies so as to entitle Vandenacre to a new trial?
(4) Has Vandenacre showed the presence of cumulative errors?
A. The Value Issue Relative to the Grand Theft Charge.
The grand theft charge was based upon the theft of a stereo from a home. Since Vandenacre did not deny that he wrongfully took, obtained or withheld the stereo system from the owner, and indeed admitted in his testimony that he had wrongfully taken the stereo system with the intent to sell the same, the only factual issue at trial regarding the grand theft charge was whether or not, at the time of the theft, the purloined stereo system had a value in excess of $300. See I.C. §§ 18-2403, 18-2407(1)(b)(1). 1 Vandenacre contends that he was not guilty of grand theft, but at most, the evidence would only support a finding of petit theft, a misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-2407(2).
The state called two witnesses to testify as to the value of the stereo system at the time of its theft, one of whom was the owner of the stereo system. Over the objection of the defense as to lack of foundation, the owner opined that at the time of the theft the stereo system had a fair market value of $850. She predicated such opinion upon her understanding of the phrase "fair market value," her opportunities to speak with people who sell similar new and used stereo systems and to her familiarity with the sale price of such systems.
The other witness called by the state to testify, inter alia, as to the value of the stereo system was a Kootenai County deputy sheriff. On direct examination the deputy was asked several questions for the purpose of laying a foundation to elicit his opinion as to the value. When the state asked the deputy to render his opinion, Vandenacre objected upon the grounds of lack of foundation, and the trial court sustained the objection. Immediately thereafter the state asked the following question and the deputy gave the following answer:
Q: Sergeant, if the victim, the owner of these three components, were to want to sell these three components February 27th of 1995, what would you pay for them?
Vandenacre did not object to the question nor did he move to strike the deputy's answer. Having failed to do so, such testimony was properly before the jurors for their consideration and to give it such weight as they deemed appropriate. Standing alone, however, such evidence may very well have been insufficient to support a verdict finding Vandenacre guilty of grand theft.
Vandenacre called only one witness, who described herself as a private investigator, to testify as to the market value of the stolen property. She opined that the market value of the stereo system was $225.
Vandenacre contends that the state failed to produce substantial, competent evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the value of the property which he had admittedly stolen had a value in excess of $300. We reject such contention.
We initially note that under I.R.E. 701, a trial court may allow a lay witness to state an opinion about a matter of fact within her knowledge, so long as two conditions are met: (1) the witness's opinion must be based on her perception, and (2) the opinion must be helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or a determination of a fact in issue. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32, 803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990). The admissibility of such testimony turns upon its underlying factual basis, not the fact that it is in the form of an opinion. Id. Admissibility of opinion testimony is discretionary with the trial court, and absent an abuse of discretion, the decision to admit opinion evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct.App.1993).
Also, it is settled in Idaho that, in civil actions, the owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness.
Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 43, 896 P.2d 949, 951 (1995); Howes v. Curtis, 104 Idaho 563, 568, 661 P.2d 729, 734 (1983); McFarland v. Joint School District No. 365 in Elmore and Owyhee Counties, 108 Idaho 519, 522, 700 P.2d 141, 144 (Ct.App.1985). Idaho courts, we believe, should apply the same rule in criminal proceedings, as other jurisdictions have. See State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 704 n. 1, 946 P.2d 1338, 1344 n. 1 (Ct.App.1997) and cases cited therein. In the present case, however, Vandenacre does not argue that the owner of the stereo system should not have been permitted to testify as to her opinion concerning value. Likewise, he does not suggest that the trial court erred in admitting the deputy sheriff's answer that the latter would pay seven or eight hundred dollars for the stereo system. He merely contends that such testimony fails to meet the substantial, competent evidence requirement necessary to support the grand theft verdict.
The applicable standard of review we apply in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict finding Vandenacre guilty of grand theft is not disputed. Where there is substantial, competent evidence to support a jury verdict, it will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Clayton, 101 Idaho 15, 607 P.2d 1069 (1980); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 858 P.2d 800 (Ct.App.1993). Also, a conviction will not set aside where there is substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Boag, 118 Idaho 944, 947, 801 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Ct.App.1990), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The appellate court will not substitute its view for those of the jury, and the jury is entitled to draw reasonable, justifiable inferences from the evidence. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct.App.1992).
Furthermore, when a defendant stands convicted, the evidence will be viewed on appeal in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho 199, 646 P.2d 441 (Ct.App.1982). See also State v. Boag, supra. When we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists we are precluded from substituting our judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 662 P.2d 1149 (Ct.App.1983); Fenley, supra; Boag, supra.
Having reviewed all of the evidence placed before the jury by both the state and Vandenacre, we hold that there was substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found that the fair market value of the stereo system exceeded $300 at the time of Vandenacre's admitted theft thereof.
Later in the trial, Edward Anderson, a patrol deputy employed by the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department, was called as a witness for the prosecution. The prosecutor was beginning to inquire of Deputy Anderson as to the fingerprint investigation of the victim's home when the defense objected:
Deputy Anderson then testified that he conducted a fingerprint search of...
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