State v. Vansandts, 37115
| Decision Date | 10 August 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 37115,37115 |
| Citation | 540 S.W.2d 192 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph VANSANDTS, Defendant-Appellant. . Louis District, Division Three |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Henry Rieke and Blair K. Drazic, Asst. Public Defenders, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
Brendan Ryan, Circuit Atty., St. Louis, John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Preston Dean, Charles L. Howard, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Joseph H. Vansandts, from a judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court of the City of St. Louis upon a jury verdict by which the appellant was sentenced to five years in the department of corrections for the offense of robbery in the first degree. § 560.120, RSMo 1969.
This appeal requires us to balance the rights of an accused who allegedly lacks mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him and the right of the state to enforce its criminal laws. 1
On September 28, 1972, Mrs. Hazel Burke was employed at the Super Sandwich Shop located at 5200 Chippewa in the City of St. Louis. She was working the 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift alone. The shop was fully lighted. A man, identified as the defendant, Joseph H. Vansandts, entered the store at about 3:30 a.m. and asked for change for a dollar bill. Mrs. Burke went to the register to make change. As she started to make change, she said, 'I asked him if he wanted two dimes and a nickel and as I turned to ask him . . . he hit me with a radio.' The man hit Mrs. Burke on the right side of the face. The blow 'knocked me back away from the register . . ..' The defendant then went to the register and took money.
Defendant then ran out the back door. Mrs. Burke and seen the defendant in the store before--'. . . he had been coming in at night for coffee.' At trial Mrs. Burke was 'absolutely positive' that the defendant was the man who came in and took money from the register.
Immediately after the incident, Mrs. Burke called the police and her employer, Mr. Kenneth Keisker. Officer Kenneth Briscoe was dispatched to the sandwich shop, and upon his arrival he interviewed Mrs. Burke and found her face was 'red and swollen.' He also found the radio on the floor behind the counter. Mrs. Burke gave the police a description of the assailant. Mr. Keisker also came to the store, checked the cash register and found thirty-eight dollars missing. Mrs. Burke was taken to the hospital for treatment. Officer Briscoe called the Evidence Technician Unit, and Officer John Vogan of that unit responded. Officer Vogan recovered and took into his possession a small transistor radio from behind the service counter and dusted it for fingerprints. He obtained three 'lifts' and forwarded them to the Latent Fingerprint Division of the police department, but the prints were inconclusive, since they were smudged.
The appellant was not immediately apprehended for the offense. It was not until some two years later that he was arrested at the state hospital at 5400 Arsenal Street. Appellant had voluntarily admitted himself to the detoxification unit of the hospital on August 26, 1974. On August 31, 1974, Officer Edwin Bullis of the St. Louis police department arrested the defendant and escorted him to the police station for the purpose of conducting a lineup. Mrs. Burke viewed that lineup, which consisted of four men, and identified the defendant as the person who committed the robbery two years before. After the lineup and after Miranda warnings were given, Officer Bullis interrogated the defendant. The defendant made a statement that '. . . he was there at that restaurant at that time and he struck Hazel Burke on the head with a radio and took thirty-eight dollars.'
On October 3, 1974, appellant was indicted for the offense of robbery of the sandwich shop. In a formal motion, the State requested disclosure under the Rules of Criminal Discovery. The motion specifically requested a 'written statement from defense counsel disclosing defendant's intention to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility . . ..' On November 6, 1974, the defendant filed its 'Request for Discovery' and sought any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case, 'including results of physical or mental examinations . . ..'
Three separate independent psychiatric examinations of appellant were ordered to be conducted prior to trial. The first was as a result of a motion filed on November 8, 1974 by counsel for Vansandts for an order for a psychiatric examination. This motion was granted (by Judge Holt, a judge of the circuit court) the same day. Mr. Vansandts was committed to Fulton State Hospital, and the cause was removed from the trial docket and placed on the Mental Examination Docket. A report dated January 29, 1975 was filed by Dr. Richard K. Jacks, D.O.
On February 13, 1975, a court memorandum was filed noting that the psychiatric report had been received and filed. The memorandum stated that, 'neither the State nor the accused nor his counsel having contested the findings of the report within the time allowed, the Court finds . . . that the above-named defendant has mental fitness to proceed . . ..' The court thereupon removed the cause from the mental examination docket and set the trial for March 17, 1975. The appellant was apparently transferred to City Jail. But, on the same date, February 13, 1975, an order was issued transferring Vansandts from the City jail to Fulton because the court (Judge Gaertner, another judge of the circuit) was advised that the defendant 'has been engaging in conduct . . . that is detrimental to his own health' and because of a history of suicidal attempts which were 'classified by examining psychiatrists to be manipulative and attention seeking . . ..' A few days later, on February 18, 1975, defendant's counsel then filed an 'Objection to Findings of Psychiatrist' and requested an examination by another psychiatrist. This request was granted, and another examination was ordered by Judge Gaertner to be conducted by Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center. A second report, dated March 6, 1975, was made by Dr. Jivanlal P. Gohil, M.D., and by memorandum of court this report was received. The memorandum, dated March 13, 1975, stated that, '. . . neither the State nor the accused nor his counsel having contested the findings of the report within the time allowed, the Court finds . . . that the above-named defendant has mental fitness to proceed . . ..' Again the court removed the cause from the Mental Examination Docket and set the cause 'for trial on Monday, May 12, 1975.' After this second report, Vansandts was again transferred to the city jail. But again, and on April 11, 1975, the court (Judge Bloom), having been informed that Vansandts inflicted an injury upon himself on numerous occasions while in confinement, ordered the defendant transferred to Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center for the purpose of another psychiatric examination. 2 A report dated April 30, 1975 was rendered by Dr. Earl P. Dick, M.D. This third report was received by the court on May 7, 1975. Copies of all psychiatric reports were forwarded to counsel for the defendant.
All three reports were similar in nature and findings. Each examination was made independently of the others. They showed that appellant had a history of antisocial behavior and suffered from alcoholism but did not suffer from a psychosis or a mental disease within the meaning of Chapter 552, RSMo 1969. A summary of all three reports is found in Appendix I following this opinion.
Trial of the robbery charge began on May 14, 1975. During the voir dire, defense counsel referred to the fact that one of the issues in the case is that the 'final twelve that are selected here might be judging the mental competence of my client.' After several voir dire questions by defense counsel, the trial court interrupted and stated, 'As far as this Court is concerned there is no question of mental competence before the Court in this trial.' Out of the hearing of the jury, it was disclosed that no issue as to mental competency had been raised by the pleadings, and that the state received no written notice of any defense of mental disease or defect. Defense counsel admitted failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement but attempted to explain this failure by asserting he was unaware of the trial date due to trial docket mixups. Defense counsel reported to the court that the case was on the mental docket and that '(u)ntil this morning, I had not conferred with my client.' Defense counsel said it was 'practically impossible' to comply with the notice requirement of the statute and
'I anticipate that I would like to go forward with the mental disease or defect and that is why I feel that I should be allowed to inquire of the jury their feelings concerning that type of defense.' 3
The court then informed counsel that the cause had never been removed from the trial docket of May 12, 1975, and in the absence of any written intent or indication to the state that 'you intended to rely on such a defense, it is not an issue before this Court . . ..' Defense counsel admitted that he would have no medical evidence concerning the competency of Mr. Vansandts but that it is 'up to the jury to decide . . .' after watching and hearing him. The court thereupon restricted counsel from qualifying the jury on the defense of mental competency.
In chambers, the trial judge made a statement for the record. The judge indicated that the presiding judge of the circuit court had informed him that the cause was on the trial docket, and that the robbery took place in 1972, but the defendant was not available or could not be found until 1974. Previous judges had the defendant examined because the defendant had a tendency of injuring himself, necessitating hospitalization. The trial judge stated that...
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State v. Preston
...This is scarcely heavy evidence to support a mental disease or defect defense. State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d at 124; State v. Vansandts, 540 S.W.2d 192, 204 (Mo.App.1976). Nevertheless, the jury was given clear opportunity to consider the mitigating circumstance of mental disease and defect w......
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