State v. Vaughan

Decision Date03 December 1958
Docket NumberNo. 10600,10600
PartiesThe STATE of Texas et al., Appellants, v. Beatrice Louise VAUGHAN et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Will Wilson, Atty. Gen., James H. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L. Burns, Houston, for the State.

Doren Eskew, City Atty., Thomas P. de Steiguer, Asst. City Atty., Austin, for City of Austin.

Tom Blackwell, County Atty., Peter Zaremba, Asst. County Atty., Austin, for Travis County.

J. A. Rauhut, Austin, for the Chidren's Home of Austin.

David L. Tisinger, James R. Sloan, Austin, for Beatrice Vaughan and others.

Pearce Johnson, Austin, for unborn children of Beatrice Vaughan and Eugenia Faye Roberdeau.

GRAY, Justice.

This is a condemnation proceeding and is an appeal from a judgment, rendered on a jury's verdict, awarding damages for the taking of real property and also awarding damages allegedly sustained by reason of notice to vacate the property.

The State, acting by the State Building Commission, instituted this proceeding against the owners of the property in question naming them as follows:

'Beatrice Louise Vaughan, and husband, Glendon Myron Vaughan; Eugenia Faye Roberdeau, and husband, George Randolph Roberdeau; Eugenia Louise Izard, and husband Glynn Ray Izard; Faye Jones Thompson, a widow; The unborn children of Beatrice Louise Vaughan; The unborn children of Eugenia Faye Roberdeau; The City of Austin, Texas; The County of Travis, Texas; The Children's Home in Austin, Texas.

'Each of the foregoing owners is named as an owner individually, and the following are named also as owners in the respective capacities shown:

'Eugenia Faye Roberdeau, as independent executrix of the Estate of Lena Castleman.

'Beatrice Louise Vaughan, as independent executrix of the Estate of Lena Castleman.

'Eugenia Louise Izard, as a representative of a class, the class being the unborn children of Beatrice Louise Vaughan and the unborn children of Eugenia Faye Roberdeau.'

The purpose of the proceeding was to acquire all of Lot 4 and parts of Lots 5 and 6 in Block 147 of the City of Austin as a site for a State Office Building. The named property constituted a single unit and was all, not just a part, of defendants' tract.

The City of Austin, Travis County and the Children's Home of Austin were parties in the trial court and are parties here. The City of Austin and Travis County also sought recovery of accrued taxes.

The property in question was a part of the estate of Lena Castleman, deceased. She left a will and by its terms the parties here, except the State, acquired their interests therein. The tax claims were not a part of the will.

By an Act of the 54th Legislature, Acts 1955, 54th Leg. p. 1298, Ch. 514, now art. 678m, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., the State Building Commission created by Sec. 51-b of art. 3, Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., is declared to be a State agency and is given the power of eminent domain 'under the General Laws' for the purpose of obtaining sites for State buildings. The Commission is authorized and directed to employ an Executive Director 'to carry out such duties as the Commission may direct.' Also the Commission is authorized to take such action as it deems necessary to provide for future development of the State Building Program. The Commission has designated such an area in the City of Austin. It is known as the Capitol Area and is bounded on the South by Eleventh Street, on the East by San Jacinto Street, on the North by Nineteenth Street and on the West by Lavaca Street.

The property which is the subject matter of this appeal is located within the above designated area.

The property had improvements consisting of an apartment house, a two-story duplex, and two one-story bungalows, all of which were occupied by tenants. On April 9, 1956, the Executive Director wrote the following letter:

'Dear Mrs. Roberdeau:

'As you know, the State of Texas has determined that your land is needed for the State Office Building. To insure payment of full market value for your property the State has caused a complete and exhaustive appraisal to be initiated by a recognized authority on the appraisal of real estate.

'Pending completion of the appraisal, to avoid any inconvenience to you, the State desires to keep you fully informed of its land acquisition schedule. It is estimated that the full appraisal will be completed by July 1, 1956. When the appraisal is completed you will be contacted by a negotiator for the State. To insure fairness and equality to you and each property owner and fairness to the State, the negotiator will be authorized to negotiate on the basis of the appraised price of your property.

'To assist you in planning your departure from the property and to provide you ample time to make arrangements therefor, the State has set the date for acquiring possession as far ahead as is consistent with its construction schedule. Adherence to the building schedule will require delivery of possession of your property to the State by August 15, 1956.

'Preparation of the Master Plan for the Capitol Area is now in progress by the planning consultant who is preparing the Master Plan for the City of Austin. It is estimated that this plan will be delivered to the State Building Commission by May 1, 1956. Immediate study of the plan will be made by the Commission and, as soon as possible, the Commission will adopt and announce the official Master Plan for the Capitol Area. Realizing that this information will be helpful to land owners and tenants who desire to remain in the vicinity of the Capitol we will make every effort to expedite announcement of this plan.

'Yours very truly,

's/ Ralph R. Wolf

'Ralph R. Wolf

'Executive Director'

Because of this letter the tenants vacated the improvements on the property and they have since been vacant.

The State's right to condemn the property was admitted and the trial was had on the issue of damages.

Prior to the introduction of any evidence the State filed its motion to suppress:

'I.

'Any testimony or evidence of any character as to the cost to owners or claimants of the land here involved of removing furniture and fixtures from said land.

'II.

'Any testimony or evidence of any character as to a loss of value to furniture and fixtures situated within the improvements on the land involved by reason of the taking or the imminence of the taking of the land by the State of Texas.

'III.

'Any testimony or evidence of any character as to the loss of rentals or loss of income to the owners or claimants of the land involved occasioned by the imminence of the taking of the land by the State of Texas or occasioned by the announcement by the State of Texas that said property would be taken.'

In opposition to paragraph 3 supra the defendants stated that they desired to introduce the above letter in evidence for the purpose of showing that tenants vacated the property and that they had sustained loss of rentals.

The trial court ruled that evidence of the cost of removing furniture and fixtures and evidence of loss of value of such furniture and fixtures by reason of the taking of the property would not be admitted as separate items of damages but would be admitted as affecting an appraiser in his appraisal of market value of the property. The letter supra was admitted in evidence. The State excepted to the trial court's rulings and to the introduction in evidence of the letter. Witnesses testified as to the market value of the property.

The cause was submitted to a jury on three special issues which together with the jury's answers are:

'Special Issue No. 1: What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the market value in Austin, Texas, on March 25, 1958, of the property involved in this case?

'Answer: $133,102.50.

'Special Issue No. 2: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants or any of them have sustained any financial loss or damage prior to March 25, 1958, by reason of the notice sent by the State in April, 1956, to the tenants to vacate by August 15, 1956.

'Answer: Yes.

'Special Issue No. 3: If Issue No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, then you will answer:

'What do you find from the preponderance of the evidence was the amount of financial loss or damage sustained by defendants or any of them prior to March 25, 1958, by reason of the notice sent by the State in April, 1956, to the tenants to vacate by August 15, 1956.

'Answer: $9,650.00.'

The State objected to the submission of issues 2 and 3 and requested instructions limiting the jury's consideration of certain items of damages. These objections and requests were overruled. However the following instruction was given in substantially the same words as requested by the State:

'In arriving at your findings as to the reasonable market value, if any, of the property in question, you will exclude from your mind any consideration and any reflection connected with the value of wuch property to the plaintiff, or connected with the value of such property to the defendants, but you shall consider only the value thereof as adopted to such uses as would affect a purchaser and seller in the general market, or as would affect general market value in a market where neither buyers or sellers are under any pressure to either buy or sell.'

A judgment was rendered that defendants recover $142,752.50, with interest and costs; that the City of Austin recover of the owners of the property texes, penalties and interest in the sum of $5,659.35, and that Travis County recover taxes, penalties and interest in the sum of $861.35. The tax liens were fixed and foreclosed and the clerk was directed to pay said sums out of the funds deposited by the State but without any direction as to the interests to be charged therewith.

The State presents twenty six points the first fifteen of which are in effect directed to the above motion to suppress evidence, ...

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