State v. Vaughn
| Decision Date | 30 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012AP94–CR.,2012AP94–CR. |
| Citation | 344 Wis.2d 764,823 N.W.2d 543,2012 WI App 129 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Allen Dell VAUGHN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Andrea Taylor Cornwall, assistant state public defender of Milwaukee.
On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general.
Before FINE, KESSLER and BRENNAN, JJ.
[344 Wis.2d 769]¶ 1 Allen Dell Vaughn appeals the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of attempted first-degree intentional homicide while armed for the stabbing of his mother's boyfriend. SeeWis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 939.63, & 939.32.1 The trial court sentenced him to a bifurcated sentence of thirty-five years, consisting of twenty years of initial confinement followed by fifteen years of extended supervision. SeeWis. Stat. § 973.01. Vaughn also appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He claims that he: (1) did not “knowingly and intentionally waive[ ] his constitutional right to be present in court at his trial”; and (2) did not “knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waive[ ] his constitutional right to testify at his trial.” He also contends that: (1) in sentencing him, the trial court “relied on inaccurate information regarding” his “mental health”; and (2) “the postsentencing diagnosis” of his “psychosis constitutes a new factor justifying sentence modification.” We affirm.
¶ 2 Vaughn was accused of stabbing his victim in the end of August, 2006. His trial lawyer was appointed to represent him in early September, 2006. Testifying at the postconviction hearing, the trial lawyer said that early in his representation he was able to have “intelligent discussions” with Vaughn “regarding some of the facts regarding the incident”: “There were a number of conversations that, quite frankly, were perfectly fine and we discussed the case before the competency issues began to crop up.” Nevertheless, those issues did crop up because a week before the scheduled May, 2007, trial date, his trial lawyer told the trial court, the Honorable Frederick C. Rosa, presiding, at a scheduling conference at which Vaughn was not present that he “was very concerned about [Vaughn's] ability to communicate with me in any rational and intelligent manner.” 2 Further, the lawyer reported that Vaughn “basically refused to come out of his [jail] cell” and would not meet with a psychologist the lawyer had hired. The lawyer asked the trial court to order “an inpatient examination” to determine whether Vaughn was competent. The trial court ordered the evaluation, which was done at the Mendota Mental Health Institute. The examining psychiatrist found that Vaughn was competent: “[I]t is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Allen D. Vaughn does not lack substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense at the present time.” He noted, however, that Vaughn had an “Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood,” which the psychiatrist attributed to the stress of Vaughn's pretrial incarceration. The psychiatrist recommended that Vaughn's condition be re-assessed if he should regress:
While Mr. Vaughn appears depressed, this does not cause him to be unmotivated or uninterested in obtaining a favorable outcome. He does not appear to suffer from symptoms of severe depression, but he is at risk for this to occur. It is possible that the stress of a trial or extended confinement could result in future psychiatric instability, but this event is not specifically predicted. Mr. Vaughn has a number of risk factors for suicidal behavior in the context of depression. I suggest that the Court remain vigilant to behavioral changes and consider reassessment at a future date should deterioration of his condition be suspected.
¶ 3 At another pre-trial conference some five months later before the Honorable Clare L. Fiorenza, Vaughn's lawyer told the trial court that he again had “an issue regarding the defendant's competency.” Vaughn was at this conference. The trial court ordered another inpatient competency evaluation. As with the earlier psychiatric evaluation, the psychologist who examined Vaughn at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute concluded in a January 25, 2008, report that he was competent:
Based on my examination, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that Mr. Vaughn is competent to proceed. Mr. Vaughn was able to demonstrate that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. At this time, there is no evidence to suggest that he experiences symptoms of mental illness that could interfere with his abilities relative to competency.
Significantly, the psychologist related in her report Vaughn's ability to lucidly respond to her questions:
I believe Mr. Vaughn understood the nature of the evaluation, his right to refuse, and the limits of confidentiality. He stated,
...
Mr. Vaughn reported that he does not believe he is mentally ill. He added that he does not believe he needs to be hospitalized in a mental institution. When asked why he thinks the question of competency was raised, he stated,
¶ 4 Vaughn's trial lawyer did not accept the psychologist's conclusion that Vaughn was competent, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the psychologist testified. Vaughn was at this hearing. When asked whether he read the psychologist's report, Vaughn several times merely responded that he was not guilty “of attempted homicide.” The trial court turned to Vaughn's lawyer:
THE COURT: Have you reviewed it with Mr. Vaughn, also?
(Defendant mumbling loudly.)
THE COURT: Sir—
[Vaughn's trial lawyer]: I read it word for word to him.
[Vaughn's trial lawyer]: Yes.
Mr. Vaughn, with respect to the report, the report indicates you're competent to proceed. Do you believe you're competent, sir?
All right. The defendant is standing silent, the record should reflect.
¶ 5 The psychologist testified and reiterated her report's conclusions. In response to cross-examination by Vaughn's trial lawyer, she painted a picture of a defendant able to respond appropriately:
Q. Did he appear able to converse with you during the hour and a half you met with him?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did he exhibit episodes of bizarre behavior?
A. No, not during the course of my evaluation he did not.
Q. At any time during your evaluation did he lapse into any type of incoherent shouting?
A. No, he did not.
Vaughn's trial lawyer then asked the psychologist about Vaughn's “responses” to the trial court's questions that the lawyer characterized as “not pertinent to the judge's questions”: “Was there any time during your interview of him that he exhibited the same type of behavior where his answers were completely non pertinent to the question asked?” The psychologist said: “No, there was not a time.” She also said that as far as she knew, Vaughn, in the words of Vaughn's trial lawyer, is “able to interact adequately with the staff and other patients.” Vaughn's trial lawyer also asked if “there is any recognized mental, psychiatric or psychological condition which would render one incompetent in the courtroom yet competent outside the courtroom?” The psychologist responded that she was not “aware of” any, noting “[t]hat would suggest malingering I think, but I have to have more time and more information to evaluate something like that.” When Vaughn's trial lawyer asked whether “[a]t any point in time did Mr. Vaughn seem to indicate that he did not understand what was happening in any of his court appearances that he's been at?” the psychologist said, “No, he did not.” The trial court found Vaughn competent. Vaughn's appeal does not challenge this contemporaneous finding, except insofar as the appeal contends that Vaughn's developing mental illness prevented him from “knowingly and intentionally” giving up his rights.
[344 Wis.2d 775]¶ 6 Vaughn's trial began on March 12, 2008, and had a troubling start. First, although Vaughn's mother brought his street clothes to the courtroom, Vaughn refused to wear them. The trial court asked him, “Mr. Vaughn, would you like to put some regular clothes on, or did you want to proceed to trial with the jail garb, sir?” Vaughn responded, “I'll stay in this.” Second, after the trial court warned Vaughn that if he was disruptive, it would and Vaughn responded, he said, “Let's just do a plea right now.” The trial court asked, “You want to enter a plea?” and Vaughn said, “Yes.” The trial court then asked Vaughn's trial lawyer about “the status of any discussions”:
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