State v. Vinson
| Citation | 63 N.C. 335 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
| Decision Date | 31 January 1869 |
| Parties | STATE v. VINSON. |
A mule had been stolen from the residence of its owner upon Saturday night, and upon the next night, again, from the residence of A. B.: Held, that the fact that upon Sunday morning the prisoner had carried the mule--which from appearances then had been tied out during part of the preceding night, to the house of A. B.; even when taken in connection with the additional fact that he assisted in stealing it upon Sunday night, although it might raise a conjecture, was no evidence that he had stolen it on the night before.
( State v. Allen, 1 Hawks 6; State v. Ingold, 4 Jon. 217; Mathis v. Mathis. 3 Jon. 132; Sutton v. Madre, 2 Jon. 320; Hart v. Newland, 3 Hawks, 122; State v. O'Neal, 7 Jon. 251; Homesley v. Hogue, 2 Jon. 39, cited and approved.)
LARCENY, tried before Warren, J., at Spring Term 1868 of the Superior Court of WAYNE.
This was an indictment against the defendant and one John Thomas, for stealing a mule. The evidence was that the mule was the property of Council Wooten, administrator of John Wooten, deceased, and that it was stolen on a Saturday night from the residence of Mrs. Wooten, widow of said John Wooten. That early the next morning the mule, having on it a broken bridle, was seen about 300 yards from the residence of Mrs. Phoebe Woodward, the mother of the defendant, with whom he lived, going in the direction of said residence and from the direction of a spot in the woods where some animal of the kind had been recently tied to a tree, about equi-distant from the residence of the said John Thomas and Mrs. Woodward. That on that morning, the defendant carried the mule to the house of one Tom Best, a colored man, who lived about a quarter of a mile from defendant's mother, and on her land, and asked him to keep it there. Best objected because of his scarce supply of provender, and because the mule might have been stolen. Defendant told him to keep it till the owner came, and the owner would doubtless pay him, and he at length consented to do so. That during that day the defendant and John Thomas had several conferences togethor at different times and places, and that Thomas and one Needham Smith went to Mrs. Woodward's about 10 o'clock in the morning, and inquired for the defendant and a stray mule. Thomas was introduced as a witness for the State, and testified that Vinson proposed to him to take the mule off and sell it. After some chaffering about the division of the proceeds of the sale, this was agreed upon. In pursuance of this design they employed Joe Best, son of Thomas Best, to chain and keep off a fierce dog, and that (Sunday) night he and Vinson went a little after dark, and took the mule from the premises of Tom Best, without his knowledge or consent. Witness carried the mule off for the purpose of selling it, but was overtaken and arrested. He told Vinson that he had said to those who arrested him, that he got the mule from him, Vinson, and Vinson replied, “you ought not to have told that.”
The defendants excepted to the competency of this witness on the ground that he was a co-defendant in the indictment--that it had been found true as to him--that he had been arrested thereon and had not been tried. The exception was overruled.
It was also in evidence that during the whole of the said Saturday night, the defendant was present at a dance eight miles distant from the residence of Mrs. Wooten and two or three miles from that of Mrs. Woodard.
Mrs. Woodard testified that the mule came to her premises early on Sunday morning and jumped the fence into a lot near the house; that shortly after the defendant came home, and at her instance, carried the mule to Tom Best's. That soon after Thomas and Smith came to the house (about 10 o'clock,) they started off at defendant's suggestion, to look at the mule.
The Court charged the jury (among other things) that if they believed the defendant did not steal the mule himself, and was not present when it was stolen, yet if he advised and procured it to be done, he was guilty. Defendant excepted, on the ground that there was no evidence to sustain this view of the case.
The Court instructed the jury as to what evidence would tend to show a felonious or an innocent purpose on the part of one who takes property by finding.
The Court also charged that if the defendant had in good faith put the mule in the possession of Best to keep for the owner, and was innocent up to that time, yet, if he afterwards confederated with Thomas to take and carry away the mule and they did this with the felonious intent necessary to constitute the crime of larceny, (which was explained to the jury,) he was guilty, and to this the defendant excepted.
Verdict: “guilty.” Rule for new trial. Rule discharged, Judgment and appeal.
Strong, for the appellant .
The circumstance that the defendant stole the mule from the possession of Best, is no evidence that he had stolen him before that,--more than that he had previously stolen some other mule at a different time and place. See the cases Bond v. McBoyle, 7 Jon. 1; Benton v. March, 6 Jon. 409; Mathis v. Mathis, 3 Jon. 132; Sutton v. Madre, 2 Jon. 320; State v. Revels, Bus. 200; Cobb v. Fogleman, 1 Ire. 440; State v. Haywood, Phil. 378.
Attorney General, contra.
There was ample evidence to convict the prisoner of having stolen the mule from the residence of Best, on Sunday night, if the jury believed it. But we cannot know that the jury did believe it, and that they did not find him guilty of the larceny, which the case states was committed by some one, on the previous Saturday night from the residence of Mrs. Wooten. State v. Allen, 1 Hawks, 6; State v. Ingold, 4 Jon. 217. The Judge told the jury, in effect, that there was evidence, from which they might find, that the prisoner either stole the mule himself on the Saturday night, or procured it to be done; to which the prisoner excepted. All the other exceptions taken by the prisoner, are properly abandoned in this Court. So that the only question is, whether the case shows any evidence tending to prove the guilt of the prisoner on the Saturday night. It is easy enough to express in general terms the rule of law; if there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, the weight of it must be left to the jury, but if there be no evidence conducing to that conclusion, the Judge should so say, and, in a criminal case, direct an acquittal. Hepburn v. Dubois, 12 Peters, 345; Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 205.
But it is confessedly difficult to draw the line between evidence which is very slight, and that, which, as having no...
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