State v. Vinton

• Decision Date: 18 May 1909
• Parties: STATE v. VINTON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

119 S.W. 370

220 Mo. 90

STATE v. VINTON.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

May 18, 1909.

1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 814) — INSTRUCTIONS—APPLICABILITY TO EVIDENCE.

In a prosecution for larceny, it was not error to omit a proper qualification, in an instruction relative to good character, as an element for the jury's consideration in passing upon the question as to whether such evidence of good character was sufficient to overcome the presumption of guilt by reason of the recent possession of the stolen articles, where there was no evidence as to accused's good character.

2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 563)—EVIDENCE—CORPUS DELICTI.

The corpus delicti may be established by purely circumstantial evidence.

3. LARCENY (§ 64) — EVIDENCE—POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN GOODS.

The possession of recently stolen goods raises such a presumption of guilt against the possessor as to throw on him the burden of showing how he came by them, or that he came honestly by them, and, in the event of his failing to do so, to warrant a conclusive presumption of his guilt.

4. LARCENY (§ 56) — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE—CORPUS DELICTI.

In a prosecution for larceny, evidence held sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Moses N. Sale, Judge.

Charles A. Vinton, alias J. D. Hardy, was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

This cause is now presented to this court upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, convicting him of grand larceny. On March 16, 1907, the circuit attorney filed in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis an information, duly verified, charging defendant with grand larceny. The stolen property consisted of jewelry of the value of $1500, and was alleged to be the property of the J. Bolland Jewelry Company, a corporation. The defendant was duly arraigned, and entered his plea of not guilty. On March 22, 1907, this cause was continued to the next term of court. However, on April 15, 1907, both parties announcing ready for trial, a jury was impaneled and sworn, and the trial of the cause proceeded. The facts developed upon the trial of this cause were substantially as follows: The three rings and two brooches charged in the information to have been stolen by defendant were shown by the evidence to have been the property of the J. Bolland Jewelry Company, a corporation, whose place of business was at 513 Locust street, St. Louis, Mo. The rings and brooches in evidence were identified quite positively by the witnesses on inspection, and by means of secret marks registered by the company. The register was in evidence. The total value of the jewelry alleged to have been stolen by defendant was $1,572. The pieces comprising the lot were severally valued by the witnesses at sums ranging from about $125 to nearly $400. The jewelry in evidence was shown to have been part of the J. Bolland Jewelry Company's window display in February, 1907, and the two brooches and the diamond ring were placed in the window on the morning of February 23, 1907, by the witness Lindsley. At 6 p. m. of that day, when the jewelry used in dressing the window was removed therefrom, these three articles were missing. The two other missing rings seem not to have been in the show window on that day. Search was instituted immediately upon discovery of the loss, but the articles were not found. It was at first suspected that some employé had abstracted the jewelry in question, but that suspicion never took the direction of any particular person. On March 12, 1907, 17 days after the loss of the jewelry by the Bolland Company of St. Louis, defendant was arrested in Cleveland, Ohio. He was wearing the ring set with rubies and diamonds when arrested. Defendant at first denied having any of the other jewels, but, being confronted with one Miller, a pawnbroker, he admitted pawning the diamond brooch at Miller's establishment in Cleveland, and repaid him $25 of the loan, thereby recovering the brooch. Defendant had secured $30 from Miller. He also first denied that he was staying at the American House in Cleveland, but finally admitted that the contrary was true. A search of his room there had already been made, resulting in the discovery and reclamation of the diamond and pearl studded brooch. After these occurrences defendant laid claim to the jewelry, saying he had bought it at the World's Fair from one Collins or Collors, and that it belonged to his wife. He added, however, that he now had it, and was going to dispose of it. After his arrest he explained placing the pearl brooch between the mattresses in his room by saying it was safer there, and that he might have lost it. Defendant claimed to have been keeping the jewelry prior to visiting Cleveland in a safe deposit vault in St. Louis. When arrested defendant was using an alias, the name J. D. Hardy. There was no testimony offered on the part of the defendant; but, at the close of the state's case, defendant requested the court to give an instruction, in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, that the jury be directed to return a verdict of not guilty. This request was refused, to which action of the court defendant preserved his exceptions. The court fully instructed the jury upon every phase of the case to which the testimony was applicable. It is not essential that the instructions be reproduced. We will give them such attention as may be required during the course of the opinion. The defendant preserved exceptions to the giving of instructions by the court. However, he asked no specific instructions, except the demurrer heretofore referred to; neither did he indicate the particular matters on which he desired additional instructions given. The cause being submitted to the jury upon the evidence and instructions of the court, they returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged, fixing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of two years. Timely motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed, and by the court overruled. Sentence and judgment were entered of record in accordance with the verdict, and from this judgment defendant prosecuted this appeal, and the record is now before us for consideration.

Willis H. Clark, for appellant. S. W. Major, Atty. Gen., and Jas. T. Blair, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

FOX, J. (after stating the facts as above).

1. The record in this cause discloses numerous assignments of error. However the brief and argument of learned counsel for appellant is confined principally to the discussion of the question presented as to whether or not there was any proof of the corpus delicti of the offense with which appellant stands charged. We have carefully considered in detail the disclosures of the record, and have analyzed all of the evidence. The record discloses numerous objections to the admission of evidence offered by the state, and it is sufficient to say, regarding the action of the court in its rulings upon such objections, that we have carefully considered the testimony offered, as well as the objections interposed by the defendant, and in our opinion there was no substantial error committed by the court, none at least affecting the substantial rights of the defendant respecting a fair and impartial trial.

2. This brings us to the consideration of the instructions given by the court. We have carefully examined in detail all of the instructions submitted to the jury, and in our opinion they fully cover every phase of the case to which the testimony was applicable. While counsel for appellant properly preserved exceptions to the giving of all instructions by the court, yet in his brief and argument he does not undertake to criticise...