State v. Vogler

• Citation: 297 S.W.3d 116
• Decision Date: 03 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. SD 29492.,SD 29492.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard D. VOGLER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

297 S.W.3d 116

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard D. VOGLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. SD 29492.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

November 3, 2009.

Bryan D. Scheiderer of Rolla, MO, for Appellant.

Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Presiding Judge.

Richard Vogler (Defendant) was charged by information with the class C felony of possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, in violation of § 195.202.¹ After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of that offense and sentenced to serve five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and admitting evidence that methamphetamine was found on Defendant's person during a warrantless search by a police officer. Defendant argues that the search of his person and the seizure of the controlled substance were unlawful because those events occurred after Defendant's traffic stop was completed without the officer having an objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed a crime. This Court agrees. Defendant's conviction is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts relevant to this issue were presented to the trial court via the written report and trial testimony of the arresting officer, Phelps County Deputy Sheriff Will Loughridge.² On April 10, 2003, Loughridge was on patrol in Newburg, Missouri. At 6:40 p.m., he observed a 1991 Cadillac make a left turn without signaling. Loughridge activated the lights on his patrol car, and the Cadillac pulled over. The traffic stop was initiated at 6:41 p.m. Defendant exited the Cadillac and asked if he needed to produce his driver's license and proof of insurance. When Loughridge responded affirmatively, Defendant handed over those documents. Loughridge told Defendant that he had been stopped for not signaling. Defendant was advised that, although he would not be issued a ticket for the violation, the officer did need to check Defendant's driving status. Loughridge instructed Defendant to take a seat back in his vehicle, and Defendant complied.

Loughridge returned to his patrol car and used the radio to inquire whether Defendant had a valid driver's license and whether there were any warrants out for his arrest. The radio check revealed that Defendant had a valid license and no warrants. Only a few minutes had elapsed since Defendant had been stopped, and he was still sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle as instructed with the window down. Loughridge walked back to the Cadillac and stood off to the side of the open window. He handed Defendant his license and insurance card. Loughridge said nothing about the results of his radio check. Instead, he immediately asked if there was anything illegal in the car, such as drugs or weapons. Defendant said he did not have any of those items, and Defendant did not appear to Loughridge to be under the influence of a controlled substance. Loughridge then asked if he could search the vehicle for weapons or drugs, and Defendant agreed. He exited the vehicle and stood away from it. Loughridge asked Defendant if he had any weapons on his person. He said he did not have any. Loughridge asked if he could pat Defendant down for the officer's safety, and Defendant agreed. During the pat-down, Loughridge felt something in Defendant's pants pocket. When the officer asked what it was, Defendant said he had "a little bit of weed," which the officer understood to be marijuana. Defendant removed the substance from his pocket and gave it to Loughridge. After confirming that the substance appeared to be marijuana, Loughridge conducted a further search of Defendant's person. Loughridge looked inside of Defendant's wallet, which had been in his back pants pocket, and found a plastic baggie containing a small amount of what appeared to be methamphetamine. Loughridge placed Defendant under arrest. At this point, only seven minutes had elapsed since the initial stop occurred. Defendant was transported to the Phelps County jail.

After Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence that resulted from Defendant's search. The motion alleged that Defendant's warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that the search of Defendant's person occurred consensually after the traffic stop had concluded because a reasonable person in Defendant's position would have felt free to go. At trial, the court also overruled Defendant's objections when the State presented evidence concerning the results of Loughridge's search of Defendant's person. After Defendant was convicted and sentenced, this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

At a suppression hearing, "[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion shall be upon the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be overruled." § 542.296.6; State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. banc 1992). Therefore, the State bore the burden of production and persuasion to show that the warrantless search of Defendant's person was valid. State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Mo. banc 1997). On appeal, our task is to determine whether the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 530 (Mo. banc 2003). The ruling below should be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Granado, 148 S.W.3d 309, 311 (Mo. banc 2004). Whether the conduct at issue violates the Fourth Amendment is an issue of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007).

III. Discussion and Decision

The only issue presented by Defendant's appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred in overruling the motion to suppress and admitting the challenged evidence at trial. Defendant contends the evidence should have been suppressed because it was the result of an unlawful search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution. This case, like many others arising from traffic stops, involves the inevitable tension between the efforts of law enforcement officers to enforce drug laws and a citizen's right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Barks, 128 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Joyce, 885 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Mo.App.1994).³ This Fourth Amendment right is enforced through the exclusionary rule. State v. Kempa, 235 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Mo.App.2007). To be reasonable, a search or seizure usually must be based on probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant. See State v. Dillard, 158 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Mo.App.2005); State v. Gantt, 87 S.W.3d 330, 332 (Mo.App.2002). "Warrantless searches or seizures are per se unreasonable unless there are special circumstances which excuse compliance with federal and state warrant requirements." State v. Hensley, 770 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. App.1989).

"A routine traffic stop based on the violation of state traffic laws is a justifiable seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Barks, 128 S.W.3d at 516. Such a seizure, however, "may only last for the time necessary for the officer to conduct a reasonable investigation of the traffic violation." State v. Granado, 148 S.W.3d 309, 311 (Mo. banc 2004). The reasonable actions taken by an officer during such a stop may include: (1) asking for the driver's license, registration and proof of insurance; (2) questioning the driver about his purpose and destination; (3) running a record check on the driver and his vehicle; and (4) issuing a citation or warning. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 204 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Mo.App.2006). "Once the investigation of a traffic stop is concluded, the detainee must be allowed to proceed unless specific, articulable facts create an objectively reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. Dickerson, 172 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Mo.App.2005).

The trial court decided, and we agree, that the traffic stop ended when Loughridge handed Defendant his license and insurance card. At that point, the investigation of the traffic violation was over. Both Defendant and the State agree with this aspect of the trial court's ruling. It is also undisputed that, at the conclusion of the traffic stop, Loughridge was not aware of any specific, articulable facts creating an objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity so as to support any further detention. Defendant argues that the evidence used against him was obtained as the result of his illegal detention after the conclusion of the traffic stop. The State argues that, just as the trial court ruled, the evidence was obtained as the result of a consensual encounter between Defendant and the police.

Thus, the crux of the controversy is whether the subsequent encounter between Loughridge and Defendant was consensual. In State v. Granado, 148 S.W.3d 309 (Mo. banc 2004), our Supreme Court summarized the controlling legal principles this way:

Even if a law enforcement officer does not have reasonable suspicion to further detain a driver at the completion of a traffic stop, the officer may question the driver if the encounter has turned into a consensual one. So long as the person is free to leave, the officer can talk to him and is free to ask whether he has contraband on his person, or in his car, or in his residence. This does not mean that an officer is free to involuntarily detain a driver without reasonable suspicion under...