State v. W. Duluth Land Co. (In re Taxes Delinquent of St. Louis Cnty.)

• Decision Date: 02 February 1899
• Citation: 78 N.W. 115,75 Minn. 456
• Parties: In re TAXES DELINQUENT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY. STATE v. WEST DULUTH LAND CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

75 Minn. 456

78 N.W. 115

In re TAXES DELINQUENT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY.¹

STATE

v.WEST DULUTH LAND CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 2, 1899.

Case certified from district court, St. Louis county; S. H. Moer, Judge.

Action by the state of Minnesota to enforce delinquent taxes of St. Louis county. The West Duluth Land Company objects. Case certified. Judgment entered as ordered below.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In proceedings under the provisions of Gen. St. 1894, c. 11, to enforce the collection of taxes on real property remaining unpaid and delinquent, it is no defense that the objector's property was assessed at more than twice its value in money, or what it would have sold for in money. Nor is it a defense that such property, suburban in its character, was so assessed, while central business property in the same taxing district was systematically assessed at not more than half its money value, and intervening property was assessed from half to its full true value. The taxpayer's remedy for official misconduct of this kind is to appear before the town, or city, or county board of equalization, and there attempt to correct the wrong.

2. Sp. Laws 1891, c. 54, § 13, which section authorizes the park board of the city of Duluth, an appointed body, to annually determine the amount of tax to be levied in said city for park purposes, not exceeding such sum as can be raised by a tax of one-tenth of 1 per cent. upon each dollar of taxable property, is not unconstitutional.

3. The provision in said section requiring the park board to certify the amount determined by it to be necessary to be levied as a tax to the county auditor on or before October 1st of each year is, in so far as the time is concerned, merely directory. The certificate here questioned was made October 14th. Held to be a sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.

4. The effect of Laws 1895, c. 289,—a general law relating to the issuance of county bonds,—was to repeal, by implication, the prohibition as to any subsequent or further issue of bonds by the county of St. Louis, found in Sp. Laws 1877, c. 63, § 10. It was further legislation on the subject, and therefore removed the inhibition.

5. Under the provisions of chapter 289, Laws 1895, there were issued by the county above mentioned bonds of the face value of $140,000, and the board of county commissioners entered into a contract with a broker, in which it was stipulated that the should receive 10 per cent. of such face value as compensation in full for lithographing and printing the blank bonds, and for all services in connection with and incident to their sale, including all sums paid by him for legal advice and services. As a matter of law it cannot be held on these facts alone that the agreed compensation was a violation of section 4 of said chapter 289, which forbids a sale of bonds at less than face value.

6. Sp. Laws 1891, c. 312, entitled ‘An act for the formation and to fix the boundaries of the independent school district of the city of Duluth,’ was not obnoxious to the provisions of section 33 of article 4 of the constitution, as it existed at the time of the enactment. It created a school district, with boundaries coincident with those of the city. The entire chapter could have properly been incorporated into the city charter as providing merely for one of the executive branches or departments of the municipality. It was legislation for a city.

7. The subject of the act was expressed in its title.

8. As authorized in the act, the board of education passed a resolution in which a total amount was levied as a tax for school purposes for the current year; but the total amount was apportioned to three distinct funds, namely, general, building, and sinking. Held, that it sufficiently appeared that the levy designated as ‘general fund’ was for the maintenance of schools, and authorized by Gen. St. 1894, § 3809; that the levy designated as ‘building fund’ was for the erection of school houses, or the purchase of sites, authorized by sections 3806 and 3807; and that the levy specified as a ‘sinking fund’ was made to meet the principal and interest of the indebtedness of the district as it matured, and was authorized by section 3808.

9. Many regulations are made by statute and designed for the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote method, system, and uniformity in the mode of proceeding, the compliance or noncompliance with which does not, in any respect, affect the rights of taxpaying citizens. These may be considered directory. Officers may be liable for not observing them, but their observance is not a condition precedent to the validity of the tax.

10. That the provisions of Gen. St. 1894, §§ 3802, 3807, and 3809, prescribing to some extent the manner in which the county auditor shall be notified of the amount of a tax levy made by a board of education, and the method of certifying such amount, have not been strictly complied with, is, because of the language found in sections 1586, 1588, no defense in proceedings of this nature. Geo. E. Arbury and McCordie & Crosby, for the State.

Billson, Congdon & Dickinson, for objector.

COLLINS, J.

In proceedings to enforce the collection of taxes on real property in the county of St. Louis remaining delinquent and unpaid for the year 1896 (Gen. St. 1894, c. 11), the West Duluth Land Company, whom we will call the ‘objector,’ filed an answer, in which questions were raised by it as the owner of several tracts of land against which judgments were sought. A trial was had by the court, and upon its findings of fact it ordered, as a conclusion of law, that judgments be entered as demanded. Thereafter the court certified several points or questions, raised by the objector, as provided for in Gen. St. 1894, § 1589, which we will state in our own language, and consider seriatim.

1. Was it any defense that the objector's property was assessed at more than twice its value in money, and more than twice what it would have then sold for at a fair cash sale? And was it any defense that the property, suburban in its character, was systematically assessed at more than its full value in money, while central business property was systematically assessed at nor more than half its money value, while intervening property was variously assessed from half its true value up to such true value? In the recent case of State v. Lakeside Land Co. (Minn.) 73 N. W. 970, certified up as this was, it was held, after a very extended and careful consideration of the point (fully evidenced by the exhaustive and complete opinion), that: ‘If the assessment of a taxpayer's land is impartial, equal, and fair, compared with the average valuation of other lands generally (except particular omitted or undervalued tracts) in the same taxing district, the fact that certain particular properties have been intentionally and willfully omitted from the tax lists, or intentionally and willfully undervalued, is no defense, either partial or total, to the application of the state for judgment for the amount of taxes levied against the land.’ The only difference between the cases is that in the one from which we have quoted one-third of the taxable property of this same county was either omitted from assessments, or undervalued, through the intentional and unlawful manipulations of the assessors and other tax officials, and, as a consequence of these willful omissions and undervaluations, the objector's lands had to bear much more than their fair share of the burdens of taxation; while in this case a systematic method of assessing this objector's lands, suburban in character, at more than twice their value in cash, and at the same time systematically assessing central business property, in the same taxing district, at not more than half its cash value, resulted in the same thing,—the imposition upon this objector's lands of more than their fair share of the burden. The result was the same, and, if this be so, the unfair and illegal methods adopted to accomplish it cannot affect the owner's rights or remedies. They would be the same in each case. And the consequence of permitting a defense based upon these facts would be the same. The objector here made no offer to show that its property was assessed on a greater valuation than other suburban property, and, according to its offer, central business property was valued for assessment purposes at half its value or less. If no other property owner objected on this ground, and the relief demanded here had been granted, it is certain that this objector's property would have been taxed upon a greatly reduced valuation, as compared with other suburban property, and that the central business property mentioned would have been taxed upon the unequal valuation of which complaint is made. As was said in the Lakeside Case, the inevitable result would be to increase existing irregularities, instead of removing them. This objector would pay less taxes in proportion to the real value of its property than all other taxpayers, except such as owned the business property referred to. We conclude, as indicated in the opinion in the case just mentioned, that the taxpayer has a remedy for just such official misconduct as that alleged in the offer upon which is based the question now under consideration, and that he must attempt to correct a grievance of this character before tax proceedings reach the time for answering. It is his right to appear before the town, or city, or county board of equalization if he wishes to correct errors as to the assessment of his own property, and also if he feels that he has been aggrieved in the omission of property belonging to others from the assessment rolls, or that such property has been undervalued. Again quoting from the Lakeside Case: ‘These things can all be corrected, then, so as to produce entire equality among all taxpayers, and without loss or embarrassment to the public. And ...