State v. Waddle

• Decision Date: 09 December 1896
• Parties: STATE v. WADDLE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

100 Iowa 57

69 N.W. 279

STATE

v.WADDLE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 9, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Wapello county; W. D. Tisdale, Judge.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of endeavoring to incite or procure another to commit perjury. The charge is as follows: “That said W. B. Waddle, on or about the sixth day of June, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, in the county aforesaid, and state of Iowa, and on divers other times and days, did unlawfully and feloniously, intending to pervert the due course of law, did corruptly and maliciously incite, instigate, and endeavor to persuade and procure one Lizzie Seadore to charge and prosecute one David R. Watts, in the court of the state of Iowa, having jurisdiction to try and determine the same (the particular name of said charge or proceeding and court or courts is to the grand jury unknown), of the charge of being father of a certain illegitimate child, to which the said Lizzie Seadore had given birth, she being an unmarried woman, and not the wife of the said David R. Watts, in which procedure or prosecution the oath of affirmative of the said Lizzie Seadore was and is required by law. The said W. B. Waddle, then and there well and truly knowing that the said David R. Watts was and is not the father of said illegitimate child, and that said charge was and is untrue, and the said W. B. Waddle then and there well understood and knew that the said Lizzie Seadore then and there knew that said David R. Watts was and is not the father of said child, and that said charge was and is false and untrue, and the said W. B. Waddle did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, corruptly, and maliciously solicit, suborn, incite, instigate, and endeavor to procure and persuade the said Lizzie Seadore to appear in court, and prosecute said David R. Watts on said charge, as aforesaid, and to make oath or affirmation in such proceeding and trial that the said David R. Watts was and is the father of said illegitimate child, as aforesaid, the same being a material and relevant matter to the issue therein, and thereby, then and there, to put in issue that the said W. B. Waddle knew that such testimony was and is false and untrue, and then and there well understood and knew that the said Lizzie Seadore then and there knew such testimony was and would be false and untrue, contrary to and in violation of law.” Defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case was tried to a jury, and a verdict of guilty returned. Judgment of fine and imprisonment in the county jail was entered on the verdict. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Jaques & Jaques and Seneca Cornell, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and Jesse A. Miller, for the State.

GIVEN, J.

1. The first contention is as to a rule of evidence. Section 3936 of the Code defines the crime of perjury. Section 3937 provides: “If any person procure another to commit perjury, he is guilty of subornation of perjury.” And section 3938, under which this indictment is found, provides: “If any person endeavor to incite or procure another to commit perjury, though no perjury be committed, he shall be punished,” etc. Perjury is manifestly an element in each of these offenses. In the first two it is perjury committed, and in the last perjury endeavored to be procured to be committed. Appellant contends that it is incumbent on the state in this prosecution to prove that, if Lizzie Seadore had sworn that David R. Watts was the father of her child, it would have been false, by the testimony of two witnesses, or by the testimony of one, supported by corroborating and independent circumstances, equivalent in weight to the testimony of a single witness. Appellee's counsel do not question the correctness of this rule as applied to prosecutions for perjury, but contend that it is not applicable to cases like this. They do not deny that the burden is on the state to show that it is not true that David R. Watts was the father of Lizzie Seadore's child, but contendthat this may be done by the evidence of one witness. The reason for the rule in proving perjury is that “the unsupported evidence of one witness would be simply one oath against another.” 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 323. It must be remembered, however, that in this case there is not one oath...