State v. Wade
| Decision Date | 25 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 19403,19403 |
| Citation | 772 P.2d 1291,105 Nev. 206 |
| Parties | The STATE of Nevada, Appellant, v. Brian Edward WADE, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
The issue presented in this appeal is one of first impression for this court, viz., whether a prisoner in another state who is serving a sentence in a jail, rather than a state prison, may require this State to comply with Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), NRS 178.620. We conclude that Article III(a) of the IAD does not apply to prisoners serving sentences in jails.
On April 6, 1987, respondent Brian Edward Wade (Wade) was arraigned in Clark County, Nevada on charges of burglary and possession of stolen property. Wade subsequently received an own recognizance release. Wade failed to appear on the date set for his preliminary hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
On September 8, 1987, a court in Arizona having convicted Wade of theft sentenced him to serve a one year term of confinement in the Maricopa County Jail. In a letter dated September 11, 1987, Wade informed the Clark County District Attorney's Office of his confinement in Arizona and requested he be brought to trial on the pending Nevada charges. 1 In late May, 1988, the Clark County District Attorney's Office received from Wade a form letter entitled "Request for Speedy Trial Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers--Article III." The District Attorney's Office replied and informed Wade that although it planned to extradite him at the conclusion of his Arizona sentence, it could not accommodate his request because he was serving time in a county jail as opposed to the Arizona State Prison.
At the conclusion of his Arizona sentence, this State extradited Wade. On July 26, 1988 Wade waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to district court. Thereafter, Wade moved to dismiss the charges against him by arguing that the State had failed to comply with Article III(a) of the IAD as it had not brought him to trial within 180 days. The State opposed Wade's motion and asserted that a prisoner in a jail could not invoke Article III(a).
At the August 16, 1988 hearing on Wade's motion, the district court did not believe that a prisoner's rights under the IAD depended on whether the institution in which the prisoner was incarcerated was called a jail or a prison. The district court held that the State had failed to bring Wade to trial within the 180 day period required by Article III(a), and, therefore dismissed the charges against Wade with prejudice. This appeal followed.
The IAD applies only to states that are parties to the agreement. NRS 178.620. Both Arizona and Nevada have entered into the IAD. ARS § 31-481; NRS 178.620. When four conditions precedent have been satisfied a receiving state 2 must bring a defendant to trial within 180 days. NRS 178.620, Article III(a). The four conditions are:
(1) the defendant has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, (2) during the continuance of that term of imprisonment the charges in question are pending against the defendant in another party State, (3) a detainer based on such charges has been lodged against the defendant, and (4) the defendant has caused written notice and request for final disposition of the charges to be delivered to the appropriate prosecuting authorities and court.
United States v. Hutchins, 489 F.Supp. 710, 713 (N.D.Ind.1980); NRS 178.620, Article III(a). A state's failure to comply with Article III(a)'s 180 day limitation results in a severe sanction. If the defendant is not brought to trial within the time proscribed, the remedy is dismissal of all charges with prejudice. NRS 178.620, Article V(c).
The purpose of requiring a defendant to be brought to trial within the specified period is set forth in Article I, which, in pertinent part, provides:
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, information [sic] or complaints....
The State, distinguishing the function of jails from that of prisons, maintains that the IAD's purpose is not advanced by applying the agreement to defendants incarcerated in jails. Thus, in the State's view, defendants serving sentences in jails should not be entitled to invoke the IAD's provisions. 3
According to Wade, the only difference between a jail and a state prison is the sign on the building. Wade cites numerous cases to support his position that the jail/prison distinction raised by the State is without legal significance. See, e.g., People v. James, 318 P.2d 175, 181, 155 Cal.App.2d 604 (1957) (); Attorney General v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 382 Mass. 57, 413 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1980) (); State v. Tahash, 264 Minn. 300, 119 N.W.2d 15, 19 (1962) (). Wade argues that these cases demonstrate that courts in other contexts have been unwilling to draw a distinction between jails and prisons.
Although Wade's argument is not totally without merit, we believe that for purposes of permitting a defendant to invoke Article III(a)'s provisions there is a significant distinction between jails and state prisons. The term "prison" is defined in NRS 193.0215 and "means any place designated by law for the keeping of persons held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest." While the definition of prison arguably includes jails, as a practical matter jails are designed only for short-term detention and punishment, not rehabilitation. Compare NRS 209.389 () with NRS 211.020 (...
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