State v. Wadsworth, 36663
| Decision Date | 01 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 36663,36663 |
| Citation | 210 So.2d 4 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Edward Arthur WADSWORTH, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Fred T. Gallagher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Sholts & Adams, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
This cause is before the court for review, on direct conflict grounds, of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Wadsworth v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 836.
The respondent-defendant was convicted by a jury and adjudged guilty of the offense of manslaughter by an intoxicated motorist as denounced by Section 860.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. several witnesses--police officers and others--testified that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. It was also shown that a miniature vodka bottle was found in defendant's car following the collision. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. His attorney cross-examined the State's witnesses; however, the defendant did not take the stand in his own defense nor offer any evidence whatever to rebut the charge against him.
On appeal, a majority of the appellate court were of the opinion that the judgment of conviction should be reversed because of harmful error in admitting into evidence the testimony of one Laken. This testimony is summarized as follows in the majority opinion:
'Louis Laken testified that he was a sales clerk in a retail liquor store. He stated that Wadsworth came in the liquor store two or three times a week for a period of over two years prior to the fatal collision and purchased miniature bottles of vodka. Laken further testified that Wadsworth, while making these purchases, stated that he (Wadsworth) 'had a problem.' Defendant's counsel made timely and appropriate objection and also moved for a mistrial but to no avail.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the point of law involved, it should be noted that we are not as sanguine as was the appellate court that defendant's 'problem' was alcoholism. The purchase of a miniature bottle (one and six-tenth ounces) of vodka two or three times a week seems to us to be more consistent with the necessity of concealing his purchases from a disapproving (or, perhaps, an alcoholic) wife than with the necessity of purchasing a sufficient quantity of liquor to satisfy the inordinate thirst of an alcoholic. For the purpose of this review, however, we assume, as we must, that the jury had the right to infer from Laken's testimony that defendant was an alcoholic.
The point of law with which we are here concerned arises from the appellate court's findings that the evidence that defendant was an alcoholic was not relevant to any issues before the court, and that its 'sole thrust' was at the character and propensity of the defendant. It was held that, in these circumstances, the Laken testimony was inadmissible under the rule of Williams v. State, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 654. In Williams, this court re-stated the rule respecting the admissibility of evidence in terms of relevancy: Evidence which is relevant to any material issue is admissible unless the sole relevancy is to the character of the accused or his propensity toward crime. If these findings of a majority of the appellate court were correct, it is clear that, under the rule of the Williams case, the Laken testimony was properly held to be inadmissible.
It is contended here on behalf of the State, however, that the appellate court's findings--both as to relevancy and as to the nature of the testimony as an assault on the character of the defendant--are in direct conflict with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Locke v. Brown, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 45. In the Locke case--a civil suit for damages arising out of an automobile accident--the intoxication of the plaintiff was a material issue, and the trial judge admitted evidence that plaintiff was hospitalized for alcoholism on several occasions before and after the accident. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed, the court holding, in effect, that where a factual issue is raised as to the condition of sobriety or insobriety of one of the parties at the time of the accident, evidence that such party was habitually intoxicated or a drunkard is admissible. The court did, however, limit the application of the rule as follows:--
We agree with the Second District Court of Appeal--and with the well considered dissenting opinion in the case Sub judice--that evidence of alcoholism relates to the 'prior intemperate habits' of a person rather than to the character of such person, as held by a majority of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the decision here reviewed. Certainly, in ordinary common parlance, alcoholism is not said to be or thought of as a trait of character. The Legislature of this State apparently considers it a matter of habit. See § 562.50, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. prohibiting the supplying of alcoholic beverages to a person 'habitually addicted' to the use of alcoholic beverages; Sec. 440.02(19), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. excluding from workmen's compensation coverage a disability resulting from 'a disease due to the Habitual use of alcohol'; and § 65.04, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. specifying as one of the grounds for a divorce in this State 'habitual intemperance.' (Emphasis added.) The habit may become so fixed as to constitute a disease. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 1940, 238 Ala. 648, 193 So. 104.
We also agree that evidence of the prior intemperate habits of a person is relevant to, and may be given as corroborating evidence on, the question of whether such person was intoxicated at any given time and place, when intoxication at such time and place is a material issue in the cause. The reasons for this rule are well stated in Locke v. Brown, supra, and in the dissenting opinion in the case Sub judice and need not be here repeated.
In the Locke case, an issue was formed by the pleadings as to the plaintiff's intoxication at the time of the accident, and evidence was adduced by the parties, pro and con, in support of their respective contentions. In the instant case, the defendant pleaded 'not guilty' to the crime charged against him--manslaughter by an intoxicated motorist--thus joining issue on and holding the State to strict proof of each and every essential element of such crime. One of such essential elements, and a material factual issue in the case, was the intoxication Vel non of the defendant at the time of the accident which caused the death of the decedent. From the defendant's behavior at the time of the accident, as shown by the State's witnesses, the jury...
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