State v. Wakefield
| Decision Date | 23 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 2523,2523 |
| Citation | 323 S.C. 189,473 S.E.2d 831 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Everette Leon WAKEFIELD, Jr., Appellant. |
Everette Leon Wakefield, Jr., was convicted of distribution of crack cocaine, pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (Supp.1994), and distribution of crack cocaine within a one-half mile radius of a playground, pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-445 (Supp.1995). Wakefield appeals only his conviction for distribution of crack cocaine. 1 We affirm. 2
In his initial brief, Wakefield states the following issue:
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wakefield committed the crime of distributing crack cocaine.
In his reply brief, Wakefield states the following issues:
(1) Did the trial judge properly deny [Wakefield's] motion for a directed verdict on the charge of distribution of crack cocaine because the direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, reasonably tended to prove that [Wakefield] was guilty of this offense or was such that his guilt could be fairly and logically deduced?
(2) Whether the State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Wakefield committed the crime of distributing crack cocaine.
At the close of the State's case, Wakefield moved for a directed verdict on the grounds the State did not present "enough credible evidence to go to the jury."
The State responds to Wakefield's appeal primarily addressing the trial judge's denial of Wakefield's motion for a directed verdict. The State asserts Wakefield did not raise the issue of whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of distributing crack cocaine. As such, the State argues Wakefield did not preserve this issue for appeal.
Technically, Wakefield's Issue (1) in his reply brief should not be considered on appeal because all issues must be argued in the initial briefs. See Rule 207(b)(1)(B), (D), SCACR; Rule 210(b), SCACR; see also First State Sav. and Loan v. Phelps, 299 S.C. 441, 385 S.E.2d 821 (1989); Sloan Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Bd. of Health and Envtl. Control, 285 S.C. 523, 331 S.E.2d 345 (1985). Additionally, the issue stated in Wakefield's initial brief was not raised to the trial judge, and thus, was not preserved for appeal. See Cook v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 309 S.C. 179, 420 S.E.2d 847 (1992) (). However, since the State addressed the denial of Wakefield's motion for a directed verdict and was not prejudiced by the revision in the reply brief, the Court addresses the merits of this issue. In addition, Wakefield's appeal only addresses his conviction for distribution of crack cocaine and not distribution of crack cocaine within a one-half mile radius of a playground. The State points out Wakefield's failure to appeal both convictions; however, the convictions are so closely connected it is necessary to review both.
In November of 1992, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agents Eleanor Savage and Coby Perry were assisting Investigator Brian Miller, a City of Greenwood police officer, in an on-going narcotics investigation. Around 1:00 p.m. on November 12, 1992, Agents Savage and Perry met with Investigator Miller at a predetermined location in Greenwood. At that time, Agent Perry checked the surveillance equipment, including Agent Savage's "body wire," a small transmitting device which allowed the other officers to conduct audio surveillance on her and the confidential informant. Agent Perry searched the confidential informant to insure that he did not have any drugs or weapons in his possession. Then, they went to an area of Greenwood known as Palmetto Court. At this location, Agent Savage was unsuccessful in finding someone from whom she could purchase drugs. While driving to the locations, Agent Savage and the confidential informant drove in one vehicle and Agent Perry and Investigator Miller followed in another vehicle approximately 200 yards behind. By speaking over her wire, Agent Savage kept Agent Perry informed of her location.
After Agent Savage and the confidential informant left Palmetto Court, they went to 333 Marion Street in Greenwood. Agent Perry and Investigator Miller followed Agent Savage's vehicle and continued the audio surveillance. As Agent Savage and the confidential informant got out of the car and approached the residence, several individuals were standing in the front yard and one individual was seated on the porch. Agent Savage testified the informant referred to the individual they approached as "Slick" or "Stick" (hereinafter referred to as Wakefield). While listening to the wire, Investigator Miller heard Wakefield referred to as "Tweet" and not "Stick." Agent Savage asked Wakefield about purchasing a "slab," which is one hundred dollars' worth of crack cocaine. After this discussion, Wakefield went into the house. When Wakefield returned, he and Agent Savage walked to the side of the house where he showed her several "slabs." Wakefield told Agent Savage to pick the best one. Agent Savage picked a "slab" and then returned to her car to get additional money. Wakefield and the confidential informant remained at the side of the residence. When Agent Savage returned, she gave Wakefield five twenty-dollar bills from SLED funds. The money was never recovered.
Following the purchase, Agent Savage and the confidential informant returned to her car. By speaking over her wire, Agent Savage informed Agent Perry and Investigator Miller she had just made a purchase from a black male wearing a black and orange hat and a black Miami Hurricanes jacket with a hood on it. Because Agent Savage did not know the individual, she asked the surveillance team to ride by the scene. Approximately 30 to 45 seconds later, Agent Perry and Investigator Miller drove by 333 Marion Street. Based on Agent Savage's description of the suspect's clothing and his nickname "Tweet," Investigator Miller identified the individual as Everette Leon Wakefield. Investigator Miller had seen Wakefield approximately 50 times prior to November 12, and talked with him on several occasions at 333 Marion Street. Agent Perry also testified he saw a black male matching this description in the yard.
On cross-examination, Investigator Miller testified there was a large embankment with trees in the front yard of the 333 Marion Street residence. He testified the weather was clear on the day of the drug purchase. He stated he disagreed with Agent Perry's report which listed it had rained that day. Miller also acknowledged the Miami Hurricanes jacket was popular in 1992. He further testified he was positive the individual he saw was Everette Wakefield and not his brother, Nolan Wakefield; however, he could not indicate how he would be able to distinguish the two individuals.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on November 12, Agent Savage and the confidential informant met with Agent Perry and Investigator Miller at a predetermined location. At that time, Agent Savage secured the crack cocaine she had purchased in an evidence bag and made notations on it. On the bag, Agent Savage wrote the date and time of the purchase, the county where she made the purchase, the individual who sold it to her, the residence where the purchase was made, the Approximately five days after the purchase, Agent Savage prepared her report of the incident. The report listed Wakefield's nickname as "Tweet," the nickname indicated by Investigator Miller. Shortly after making her report, Agent Savage identified Wakefield's photograph out of a series of photographs as the person from whom she had purchased crack cocaine on November 12, 1992.
amount of drugs, the time she secured the evidence, and her initials. During this meeting, Investigator Miller informed Agent Savage that Wakefield was the individual who sold her the crack cocaine.
SLED analysis of the substance purchased by Agent Savage revealed it was 1.48 grams of crack cocaine. Wakefield was not arrested until approximately June 10, 1993, because the officers wanted to continue the on-going investigation.
At trial, Agent Savage and Investigator Miller both identified Wakefield as the person who had sold the crack cocaine to Agent Savage on November 12, 1992. Wakefield did not object to this in-court identification.
Officer Raymond Thomason, a police officer for the City of Greenwood Police Department, testified he had seen Wakefield more than 100 times at 333 Marion Street. He further testified he had seen Wakefield's vehicle parked in front of this address and had spoken with Wakefield at this location on more than one occasion. Officer Thomason also testified the Macedonia Baptist Church and its playground are located approximately one-half a block from 333 Marion Street. A map of the area indicated that the distance is 500 feet.
On cross-examination, Officer Thomason testified William Oscar Johnson was a friend of Wakefield's brother Nolan, who lived next door to the 333 Marion Street residence. He further testified Johnson's nickname is "Stick."
A vehicle tax receipt in Wakefield's name listed 333 Marion Street as his residence. A driver's license check also listed Wakefield's residence as this address.
1. Did the trial judge properly deny Wakefield's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of distribution of crack cocaine?
2. Did the State...
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